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Instead of an Introduction

Welcome to the first issue of the cognitive linguistic journal Language, Mind, Culture and Society (LaMiCuS). The journal's title reflects two key features of cognitive linguistics: an assumption that language is not autonomous, but is instead integrated with broader abilities organizing human cognition, such as categorization, conceptualization, and information processing — and the one that language is intertwined with culture and society. In this way, the title presupposes a broad area of linguistic research informed by multiple approaches that need not be fully compatible with one another, even though they are founded on a number of shared assumptions. As described by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens,

Cognitive Linguistics is a flexible framework rather than a single theory of language. In terms of category structure (one of the standard topics for analysis in Cognitive Linguistics), we might say that Cognitive Linguistics itself, when viewed as a category, has a family resemblance structure [...] : it constitutes a cluster of many partially overlapping approaches rather than a single well defined theory (2007: 4).

LaMiCuS is the official journal of the Polish Cognitive Linguistics Association (PCLA). It aims at presenting the achievements of Polish cognitive linguists, along with latest trends in international cognitive linguistics. Research on meaning and the relations between language and culture had been conducted in Poland for several decades before it moved, at first unintentionally, toward the spirit of the cognitive linguistic model formulated in America by, among others, George Lakoff and Charles Fillmore. Shortly thereafter, Polish linguists started to make use of the instruments developed by American cognitive linguists on a regular basis. From this connection emerged highly original conceptions. Inspired by cognitive linguistics, Russian semantics, and structuralism, the research conducted by the Warsaw school of semantics turned out to be particularly seminal. In Lublin, the research on folklore informed by Humboldt's philosophy of language, Sapir and Whorf's linguistic
relativity, and by the findings of Russian linguists concerning the relations between language and culture tied in with cognitive linguistics, which gave rise to cognitive etholinguistics. It is a major goal of LaMiCuS to popularize this kind of research — research accomplished by Polish linguists which stems from a range of inspirations, including, but not limited to, cognitive linguistics.

The inaugural issue comprises articles illustrating several important tendencies in the latest research situated in the broad area of cognitive linguistics. The issue opens with a contribution from Zoltán Kövecses titled “Conceptual metaphor theory: Some new proposals.” This article demonstrates that the study of metaphor, which spurred a rapid development of cognitive linguistics nearly four decades ago, continues to prompt research problems and provoke questions that are both current and weighty. More specifically, Kövecses argues that research into metaphor should place greater emphasis on the pivotal role of context in the creation and use of metaphors in discourse and relate the methodology of studying metaphor to a multi-level conceptual hierarchy of experience. In conclusion, Kövecses emphasizes that the study of metaphors needs to be extended beyond cases involving correlations between sensorimotor experience and abstract ideas and take into account four kinds of experience: situational, discursive, conceptual-cognitive, and bodily.

The contribution by Adam Głaz, titled “Worldview as cultural cognition,” is an example of how a combination of multiple strands of reflection on language may provide insight into the world, human knowledge, and cognitive processing. Drawing inspiration from Bartmiński, Underhill, Wierzbicka, and Sharifian, Głaz uncovers what their work has in common: an idea of cultural cognition and its reflection in language. Then through an analysis of two texts describing the same event — the 2016 terrorist attack in Nice — Głaz describes divergent viewpoints, attention foci, and degrees of specificity, thereby revealing differences pertaining to cultural content.

In his article “Translating minds: Cognitivism and translation,” Krzysztof Hejwowski characterizes a translator's effort as a process which on the one hand involves reconstructing the world in the source text with reference to scenes, thematic networks, scripts, and viewpoints and, on the other hand, results in producing a new text that will presumably activate similar mental structures in target-language readers. Additionally, Hejwowski points to pre-cognitivist ideas in Polish translatological research of the 1950s, which yet again corroborates the generalization formulated a few years ago by Elżbieta Tabakowska: “The history of both older and more recent Polish linguistics interweaves many threads indicating an intuitively cognitive approach to language” (2004: 5).

In an article “Onstage or off, or somewhere in between? Intersubjectivity markers in Dawkins and Lennox’s debate ‘Has science buried God?’” Shala Barczewska sheds light on the problem of linguistic expression of (inter)subjectivity
through both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the ways in which the pronoun *you* and its derivatives were used in the 2008 debate “Has science buried God?” held between zoologist Richard Dawkins and mathematician and philosopher of science John Lennox at the Oxford University Museum of Natural History. In an in-depth analysis carried out with the use of the theoretical-descriptive apparatus of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, Barczewska demonstrates that the participants of the 2008 debate use second person pronouns (*you,* *yours,* *yourself*) for different purposes. While Dawkins uses the pronouns primarily with reference to an impersonal, hypothetical ‘other,’ and his overall strategy consists in placing his own perspective on the complexity of life onstage, in defending it, and then leaving it to the listener to accept or reject his construal, Lennox utilizes them with a view to engaging his interlocutor more directly and bringing him over to share Lennox’s vantage point for viewing life’s complexity.

In her article “Corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics: The case of English clausal complementation,” Agnieszka Kaleta discusses two statistical methods for analyzing corpus data: behavioral profiles and colostructional analysis. In the empirical part, she applies colostructural analysis, or rather its sub-type: distinctive collexeme analysis, to the study of sentence semantics of constructions with aspectual verbs (e.g. *start*) and with emotion verbs (e.g. *love*) in English. Both these verb types may take a complement expressed by the *to*-infinitive or gerund. This makes them perfect material for the distinctive collexeme analysis, which has been developed for the comparison of the distribution of quasi synonymous forms and functions. Kaleta proposes that the differences in the usage of these two types of clausal complementation are motivated by different image schemata. The *to*-infinitive complements express the image schema of a PATH, while the gerundival complements represent reified processes. Additionally, in the constructions with the verbs of emotions the *to*-infinitive expresses the volitional character of the whole construction, while the gerundival complement expresses the positive or negative attitude to a given action or process. Kaleta also analyses two pairs of constructions with performatives: *promise* -*ing*/that and *admit* -*ing*/that with the use of behavioral profiles, which allow her to identify subtle differences in their meanings. These case studies lead Kaleta to a general observation about the applicability of corpus studies in the semantic analysis of sentence constructions. The main advantage they offer is the possibility to gauge the frequency of occurrence of various constructions and their contexts of use. This in turn allows the researcher to identify the prototypical and the peripheral forms. The fact that the schematic sentence constructions that have a high degree of abstraction are not directly reflected in the corpus Kaleta sees as a downside of corpus methods. Yet, one may argue as well that the fault resides not in the corpus methods, but in the weakness of the theoretical constructs, which do not lend themselves to appropriate operationalizations.
The last two contributions to the inaugural issue of LaMiCuS relate to the idea of conceptual integration, put forward by Fauconnier and Turner. One is predominantly polemical, while the other highlights the advantages of the analytical framework of conceptual integration as an instrument for the description of occasionalisms functioning in a multimodal context. In an article titled “Intensification and metonymy in some XYZ constructions: From the Bible to Einstein,” Mario Brdar analyses figurative uses of what is called the XYZ construction, in which Y is realized as Bible, oasis, flagship, or minefield. The author claims that despite their superficial similarity to metaphors, these expressions are different in that they do not involve the degree of polysemy that normally characterizes metaphorical vehicles. Therefore, they are figurative uses with an intensifying function, resulting from metonymic shifts. They are also related to another subtype of the same XYZ construction, where Y is a proper name and the whole construction is based on metonymic paragon models. As a result, both subtypes of the construction are complex intensifiers that compress the intensification process and the property being intensified into a single lexeme.

In her article “Context-dependent derivational innovations found in online journalistic texts and their comments,” Krystyna Waszakowa concentrates on effective decoding of nonce words used in a context-determined speaker-hearer interaction. Analysing kamerundyner, a derivational innovation that occurred in a meme commenting on the behaviour of Ryszard Petru, leader of the Nowoczesna (‘Modern’) party, Waszakowa refers to structural linguistics when discussing its form and employs approaches developed within cognitive linguistics to account for the way this novel expression is conceptualized by both the speaker and the hearer. The analysis is based on a four-space conceptual integration network model as proposed by Fauconnier and Turner. In addition, Waszakowa invokes two important notions that contribute to an in-depth interpretation of kamerundyner, i.e. Langacker’s notion of usage event and Kubriakova’s concept of analogy. Waszakowa’s contribution invokes the spirit of the Warsaw school of semantics in that it is a model example of how to complement a structuralist description with a cognitivist analysis, but also of how to combine Western and Eastern traditions of linguistic thought.

LaMiCuS will also feature reviews of books written by Polish and foreign authors on the complex relations between language, culture, and cognition. The reviews will hopefully deepen the understanding of these relations, but they are also intended to aid our readers in following publications on this area. The first issue contains three reviews. In the first one, Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczuk looks at a book comprising a series of lectures by one of the founding fathers of cognitive linguistics, Ronald Langacker. In the second review, Krzysztof Kosecki discusses a collection of articles on embodiment edited by Marek Kuźniak, Bożena Rozwadowska, and Michał Szawerna. In
the last one, Marek Kuźniak, co-editor of the volume on embodiment, reviews a cognitively flavored book on translation authored by Piotr Blumczyński.

We wish to invite readers and contributors alike to direct our attention to books which they think merit a discussion in review articles, in the hope that through their publication LaMiCuS will become a better vehicle for exchanging scholarly reflection on language, but also, and no less importantly, for popularizing the cognitive view of language with Polish linguists.

Most of the research problems tackled in the inaugural issue of LaMiCuS were discussed at the annual PCLA conferences, which, for a number of years, have facilitated the circulation of ideas within the communities of cognitive linguists in Poland and abroad. At this juncture, it is important to note that this would not be possible had it not been for the efforts of Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, a founder of PCLA and its first president, and her colleagues from the University of Łódź, who jointly conceived of PCLA as a forum for exchanging cognitivist reflections on language. It was in the final years of the previous century in Łódź, that a favorable intellectual climate was created which provided a ground not only for a creative reception of cognitive theories of language, especially the ones propounded in America, but also for their original development. At that time, most prominent Polish cognitivists were associated with the Łódź circle. Notable examples include Tomasz P. Krzeszowski, an important precursor of cognitive linguistics in Poland and the translator of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal book Metaphors We Live By; Aleksander Szwedek, the founder of the Department of Cognitive Linguistics at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań; Joanna Ślósarska, a literary critic and art theorist who promoted application of cognitive linguistic methodology to the analysis of works of art; and the second PCLA president, Alina Kwiatkowska, who continued Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s efforts to promote cognitive linguistics in Poland and integrate the Polish community of cognitive linguists.

Cognitive linguists making up the Łódź circle worked in tandem with cognitively minded researchers from the University of Gdańsk, Jagiellonian University, the University of Warsaw, the University of Silesia in Katowice, and Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin. In 1979, Tomasz P. Krzeszowski moved from Łódź to Gdańsk, where he supervised doctoral dissertations by many up-and-coming linguists, most notably Bogusław Bierwicz, Wojciech Kubiński, and Kamila Turewicz, who subsequently contributed to the popularization and development of the cognitive approach to language. In Gdańsk, Krzeszowski’s collaboration with Roman Kalisz resulted in the creation of a thriving center for research in cognitive linguistics. Subsequently, other Polish centers for cognitive linguistics emerged, due to the efforts of Elżbieta Tabakowska in Cracow, Elżbieta Góriska in Warsaw, Iwona Nowakowska-Kempna in Katowice, and Henryk Kardela in Lublin.
The Polish community of cognitive linguists owes the tradition of holding annual meetings during conferences titled “Cognitive Linguistics in the Year...” to Boguslaw Bierwiczzonek, who took up presidency of PCLA with great enthusiasm in 2011. Since then, each successive PCLA conference has attracted multiple guests from abroad. Past plenary speakers have included such prominent representatives of international cognitive linguistics as Dirk Geeraerts, Christopher Hart, Martin Hilpert, Laura Janda, Suzanne Kemmer, Leonard Talmy, and Jordan Zlatev. Still, PCLA’s annual conferences have also shown that the development of cognitive linguistics in Poland is sometimes hindered by such barriers as the lack of standardized Polish terminology and insufficient cross-fertilization of ideas among researchers from different university faculties and departments. We hope that LaMiCuS will help remove these barriers by featuring research articles in English and Polish and by supplementing each research article published in English with a sizable abridgement in Polish and vice versa. Last but not least, we hope that our journal will continue the best traditions of cognitive linguistics in Poland.

Editorial Board

REFERENCES:

Oddajemy w Państwa ręce pierwszy numer pisma _Language, Mind, Culture and Society (LaMiCuS)_ poświęcony językoznawstwu kognitywnemu. Tytuł odzwierciedla jeden z najważniejszych rysów kognitywnego podejścia do języka: założenie, że nie jest on autonomiczny, ale zależny od szerszych zdolności ludzkich organizujących procesy poznawcze, takich jak kategorizacja, konceptualizacja czy mechanizmy przetwarzania informacji, a ponadto — uwikłany w relacje kulturowe i społeczne. Tak szeroko i elastycznie określone granice zainteresowań badawczych wskazują także na typowe dla językoznawstwa kognitywnego łączenie zbliżonych do siebie koncepcji, które jednak trudno byłoby całkowicie zunifikować. Jak ujmują to Dirk Geeraerts i Hubert Cuyckens (2007: 4),

> Cognitive Linguistics is a flexible framework rather than a single theory of language. In terms of category structure (one of the standard topics for analysis in Cognitive Linguistics), we might say that Cognitive Linguistics itself, when viewed as a category, has a family resemblance structure (...): it constitutes a cluster of many partially overlapping approaches rather than a single well defined theory.

_LaMiCuS_ jest pismem Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawstwa Kognitywnego i za cel stawia sobie prezentowanie z jednej strony dorobku polskiej lingwistyki kognitywnej, a z drugiej — najnowszych tendencji światowych w tej dziedzinie. Prowadzone od wielu dziesięcioleci w Polsce badania nad znan- czeniem oraz związkami języka i kultury w wielu kwestiach zbliżyły się — początkowo nieintencjonalnie — do modelu badań zaproponowanego za oceanem przez George’a Lakoffa, Charlessa Fillmore’a i ich współpracowników, a następnie, nawiązując do prac amerykańskich językoznawców kognitywnych, szeroko korzystały z narzędzi przez nich wypracowanych. Z tego połączenia powstały koncepcje oryginalne. Interesująco rozwinięła się warszawska szkoła semantyczna, odwzorująca się zarówno do tradycji strukturalistycznej, jak i osiągnięć semantyki rosyjskiej oraz językoznawstwa kognitywnego. Badania nad folklorem w środowisku lubelskim skupionym wokół Jerzego Bartmiń-
skiego odwołujące się do myśli Humboldtowskiej, Sapirowsko-Whorfowskiej
i rosyjskiej refleksji nad związkami języka i kultury okazały się częściowo
zbieżne ze współczesnym językoznawstwem kognitywnym, co zaowocowało
powstaniem etnolingwistyki kognitywnej. LaMiCuS zamierza sukcesywnie
prezentować także takie prace, powstałe na gruncie polskiego językoznaw-
stwa w różnych inspiracjach, wśród których lingwistyka kognitywna jest
tylko jednym z wielu źródeł.

Tom pierwszy składa się z artykułów ukazujących kilka ważnych tendencji
w najnowszych badaniach prowadzonych w ramach tego szerokiego programu
badawczego, który określa się jako językowoznawstwo kognitywne. Otwiera go
tekst Zoltána Kövecsesa „Conceptual metaphor theory: Some new proposals” po-
święcony metaforze pojęciowej. To właśnie od badań nad przenośną rozpoczął
się burzliwy rozwój podejścia kognitywnego w lingwistyce, a po prawie czterech
dekadach nadal w tej dziedzinie formułuje się wciąż aktualne i ważne pyta-
nia i problemy badawcze. Nowe propozycje Kövecsesa polegają na szerokim
uwzględnianiu roli kontekstu w tworzeniu i użyciu metafor w dyskusjach oraz
na powiązaniu metod badań nad metaforą z hierarchią systemu pojęciowego.
W konkluzji podkreśla on, że analizy metafor pojęciowych nie powinny się ograni-
czać do uwzględniania jedynie korelacji między doświadczeniem sensorycz-
no-motorycznym a pojęciami abstrakcyjnymi, lecz brać pod uwagę cztery typy
doświadczenia: sytuacyjne, dyskursywne, pojęciowe i cieleśnie.

Ciekawym przykładem łączenia wielu nurtów refleksji nad językiem jako
kluczem do świata, ludzkiej wiedzy i procesów poznania jest tekst Adama Głaza
„Worldview as cultural cognition”. Korzysta on z inspiracji Bartmińskiego,
Underhilla, Wierzbickiej i Sharifiana, wydobywając z ich koncepcji wspólny
mianownik: odzwierciedlony w języku kulturowy charakter poznania. Następ-
nie na materiale badawczym złożonym z dwu różnych tekstów dotyczących
tego samego wydarzenia – zamachu terrorystycznego w Nicei w 2016 roku –
wskaże różne punkty widzenia, ogniska uwagi i stopnie uszczegółowienia
oglądu, odsłaniając tym samym różne treści kulturowych.

W tekście „Translating minds: Cognitivism and translation” Krzysztof
Hejwowski ukazuje wysiłek tłumacza jako proces złożony po pierwsze z re-
konstruowania świata w tekście źródłowym, uwzględniający sceny, punkty
widzenia i scenariusze, a po drugie – z tworzenia nowego tekstu, który mógłby
aktywować podobne struktury mentalne u odbiorców docelowych. Przy okazji
odkrywa wątki prekognitywne w polskiej myśli translatologicznej z lat pięć-
dziesiątych ubiegłego wieku, co jeszcze raz potwierdzałoby tezę postawioną
przez Elżbięcie Tabakowską kilkanaście lat temu: „W historii dawniejszego
i nowszego językowoznawstwa polskiego przewija się wiele nitek wskazujących
na intuicyjnie kognitywne podejście do języka” (2004: 5).

W artykule zatytułowanym „Onstage or off, or somewhere in between?
Intersubjectivity markers in Dawkins and Lennox debate ‘Has science buried
God?” Shala Barczewska rzuca nowe światło na zagadnienie językowego wyrażania (inter)subiektywności dzięki ilościowej i jakościowej analizie użycia zaimka you i jego wariantów w debacie między zoologiem Richardem Dawkinsem a matematykiem i filozofem nauki Johnem C. Lennoxem pt. „Czy na uka pogrzebała Boga”, która odbyła się w Muzeum Uniwersytetu Oksfordzkiego w 2008 roku. Wnikliwa analiza tekstu debaty przeprowadzona przez Barczewską przy użyciu aparatu pojęciowego gramatyki kognitywnej Ronalda W. Langackera pokazuje, że Dawkins i Lennox posługują się zaimkami 2. osoby (you, yours, yourself) całkiem odmiennie. O ile Dawkins używa tych zaimków w odniesieniu do hipotetycznej lub nieokreślonej 3. osoby, a jego ogólna strategia polega na umieszczaniu na scenie swoich poglądów, obronie tych poglądów, a następnie pozostawieniu słuchaczowi decyzji co do ich przyjęcia czy odrzucenia, o tyle najważniejszymi rysami strategii Lennoxa są bezpośrednie zwroty do Dawkinsa za pomocą zaimków 2. osoby i skłanianie go do spojrzenia na sens życia z perspektywy rozmówcy.

W swoim artykule „Corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics: The case of English clausal complementation” Agnieszka Kaleta omawia dwie metody statystycznej analizy danych korpusowych: profili behawioralnych i analizy kolostrukcyjnej. W części empirycznej analizę kolostrukcyjną, a właściwie jej typ: dystynktywną analizę koleksemiczną wykorzystuje do badania semantyki konstrukcji zdaniowych z czasownikami aspektowymi (np. to start) i czasownikami emocji (np. to like) w języku angielskim. Oba te typy czasowników mogą mieć dopełnienie wyrażone w bezokoliczniku (to + Verb) lub w formie imiesłowowej (Verbing). Zatem są idealnym materiałem do badania za pomocą dystynktywnej analizy koloksemicznej, która polega na porównaniu dystrybucji form i funkcji wyrażeń quasi-synonimicznych. Jak wykazuje Kaleta na podstawie wyników badań, różnice w użyciu i znaczeniu tych par dopełnień zdaniowych (clausal complementation) wynikają z tego, że dopełnienia z to motywuje schemat wyobrażeniowy ŚCIEŻKI, a dopełnienia z -ing reprezentują zreifikowane procesy. Ponadto w przypadku czasowników emocji forma z to wyraża wolicjonalny charakter całej konstrukcji, a forma z -ing pozytywny lub negatywny stosunek podmiotu do czynności. Autorka przeanalizowała również dystrybucję form promise -ing/that oraz admit -ing/that za pomocą profili behawioralnych, co pozwoliło jej odkryć pewne subtelne różnice znaczeniowe pomiędzy tymi formami. Te studia przypadku pozwalały Kalecie na sformułowanie ogólnej refleksji nad przydatnością badań korpusowych w analizie semantyki konstrukcji zdaniowych. Za ich zaletę uważa możliwość określenia częstości wystąpień różnych konstrukcji i ich kontekstów wyrazowych i na tej podstawie odróżniania form prototypowych od peryferyjnych. Jako wadę natomiast wskazuje to, że schematyczne konstrukcje składniowe o wysokim stopniu abstrakcji nie znajdują bezpośredniego odzwierciedlenia w korpusie.
Dwa ostatnie teksty łączą odwołania do koncepcji Gilles’a Fauconniera i Marka Turnera: w pierwszym mają one charakter polemiczny, natomiast w drugim uwypuklone zostały zalety modelu analizy integracji pojęciowej jako narzędzia opisu asystemowych innowacji słowotwórczych w multymodalnym kontekście. W artykule „Intensification and metonymy in some XYZ constructions: From the Bible to Einstein” Mario Brdar analizuje niedosłowne użycia trójczłonowych konstrukcji określanych jako XYZ, w których środkowy element realizowany jest przez leksemy Bible ‘Biblia’, oasis ‘oaza’, flagship ‘wizytówka’ (dosł. ‘okręt flagowy’) lub minefield ‘pole minowe’. Autor stawia tezę, że mimo poznornego podobieństwa do metafor, wyrażenia te nie wykazują cech prototypowych przenośności, np. nie odnajdziemy w nich szeroko zakrojonej polisemii typowej dla metaforycznych domen źródłowych. Prowadzi to do wniosku, że są to użycia niedosłowne o funkcji intensyfikującej wynikającej z przesunięć metonimicznych. Użycia te wiążą się z innym podtypem tej samej konstrukcji, gdzie element Y wyrażony jest nazwą własną, a powstałe w ten sposób wyrażenia oparte są na tzw. wzorcowych modelach metonimicznych (metonymic paragon models). Obie podkategorie konstrukcji XYZ mają charakter złożonego intensyfikatora wyrażającego zarówno wzmacnianą cechę, jak i proces jej wzmocnienia.

Artykuł Krystyny Waszakowej zatytułowany „Kontekstowe innowacje słowotwórcze w internetowych tekstach publicystycznych i w ich komentarzach” porusza istotny problem efektywnego odczytywania okazjonalizmów, jakie pojawiają się w określonym kontekście. Dokonując szczegółowej interpretacji wyrażenia kamerundyn, użytego w memie i będącego komentarzem zachowania przewodniczącego partii „Nowoczesna”, Ryszarda Petru, Autorka odwołuje się najpierw do tradycji językoznawstwa strukturalnego, analizując samą warstwę leksykalną wyrażenia, a następnie sięga po narzędzia proponowane przez językoznawców kognitywnych, aby głębiej zrozumieć intencję nadawcy komunikatu oraz sposób jego postrzegania przez odbiorcę. W tym celu wykorzystuje w swojej analizie czteroprzestrzenny model integracji pojęciowej Gilles’a Fauconniera i Marka Turnera oraz koncepcję zdarzenia użycia językowego (ang. usage event) Ronalda Langackera, przywołując także pojęcie analogii w rozumieniu Jeleny Kubriakowej.Tekst Waszakowej jest modelowym przykładem udanego dopełniania analiz strukturalnych kognitywnych oraz łączenia inspiracji językoznawczych z zachodu i wschodu, co jest ważnym rysem warszawskiej szkoły semantycznej.

W czasopiśmie będziemy także umieszczać recenzje książek traktujących o relacjach między językiem, poznaniem a kulturą, zarówno autorów polskich, jak i zagranicznych. Mamy nadzieję, że pozwoli to z jednej strony na wzbogacenie dyskusji nad tymi zagadnieniami (recenzję traktujemy bowiem jako tekst naukowy), z drugiej zaś pomoże Czytelnikom śledzić pojawiające się w tym obszarze publikacje. Pierwszy numer pisma przynosi

Zachęcamy Czytelników i Autorów do zgłaszania publikacji ich zdaniem wartych przedstawienia w formie recenzji na łamach naszego pisma. Chcemy libyśmy w ten sposób wnieść wkład w wymianę myśli naukowej, a także, co równie ważne, w popularyzację kognitywnego podejścia do języka w polskim językoznawstwie.

Zwyczaj corocznych spotkań na konferencjach z cyklu Lingwistyka kognitywna w roku... środowisko polskich językoznawców kognitywnych zawdzięcza Bogusławowi Bierwiaconkowi, który z wielką energią przystąpił do pełnienia obowiązków przewodniczącego PTJK w roku 2011. Obecnie każda konferencja PTJK przyciąga wielu zagranicznych gości, a wśród wykładowców plenarnych zawsze znajdują się najznamienitsi przedstawiciele lingwistyki kognitywnej z całego świata; w ostatnich pięciu latach byli to: Dirk Geeraerts, Christopher Hart, Martin Hilpert, Laura Janda, Suzanne Kemmer, Leonard Talmy i Jordan Zlatev. Doroczne spotkania polskich językoznawców kognitywnych pokazały również pewne bariery, na jakie napotykła rozwój kognitywnej refleksji na językiem, np. trudności przenikania idei pomiędzy poszczególnymi filologiami czy brak jednolitej terminologii polskiej. Wyrażamy nadzieję, że nasze pismo przyczyni się do usuwania tych barier, m.in. dzięki publikowaniu w dwu językach i zamieszczaniu obszarowych skrótów każdego artykułu anglojęzycznego w języku polskim i każdego polskiego tekstu w języku angielskim, oraz będzie kontynuowało najlepsze tradycje polskiego językoznawstwa kognitywnego.

Redakcja

BIBLIOGRAFIA

In recent years, I have made some new suggestions concerning conceptual metaphor theory (Kövecses 2010a, 2010b, 2015a, 2017). They are related especially to two areas of the functioning of the conceptual system: (1) the role of context in the production of metaphors and (2) the level conceptual organization that applies to conceptual metaphors. In the present paper I would like to demonstrate how the context can produce viable metaphors and how the level of conceptual organization in metaphor can have an impact on a debated issue in CMT: namely, the issue of methodology.
1. INTRODUCTION

In some recent publications, I have proposed two major ways in which conceptual metaphor theory needs to be supplemented (see especially, Kövecses 2015a, 2017). One concerns the role of context in the creation of metaphors in discourse. While the comprehension of metaphors has always been seen as being aided by taking context into account, the role of context in the production of metaphors in discourse has been largely ignored by researchers.

A contextualist version of conceptual metaphor theory requires the characterization of at least three large issues that center around the following three questions: (1) What is needed for (metaphorical) meaning making?; (2) What are the most common contextual factors that play a role in the use and creation of metaphors?; and (3) What is the cognitive mechanism by means of which the contextual factors actually produce metaphors in natural discourse? It is the third issue that I will be concerned with in this paper.

The second proposal I made in recent years was that the conceptual metaphors occupy a variety of distinct levels in our conceptual system. Conceptual metaphors should not be thought of as occurring at a single level of schematicity. Instead, they should be seen as parts of a “schematicity hierarchy” on at least four levels (Kövecses 2017).

A consequence of this view is that conceptual metaphors are not a unitary phenomenon, and this has implications for the way we study them. I suggest that different methodologies apply to the four levels of metaphoric schematicity and that it is probably a mistake to insist on a “single best” method in the study of metaphor.

2. METAPHOR: A CONTEXTUALIST VIEW

In the present section, I attempt to briefly discuss the main conceptual ingredients that appear to be prerequisite for the production of a particular metaphorical expression in a discourse situation. I propose that there are at least four cognitive processes involved in this: (1) Out of the many construal, or cognitive, operations the speaker must decide on metaphor as a meaning making device. (2) Given the various context types, the speaker is exposed to a wide array of information or experiential knowledge that “compete” for the speaker’s attention. (3) One of the contextual factors will emerge as the strongest and primes the speaker to use the matching metaphorical expression. (4) The expression will have the meaning that is appropriate for the communicative intention of the speaker. I label the required cognitive processes as follows:

1. cognitive/construal operations,
2. types of context,
3. contextual priming,
4. conceptual pathways.
2.1. **Construal Operations**

In any given context, the speaker chooses a particular construal operation out of the many that are available to him/her. Below is a list of these operations that cognitive linguists typically work with (based on Langacker 2008; see also Kövecses 2006):

- Schematization/abstraction
  - Image-schemas
- Attention/focusing
  - Figure-ground
  - Scope of attention
  - Scalar adjustment (granularity; fine-grained – course-grained conceptualization)
  - Dynamic and static attention (sequential and summary scanning, including fictive motion)
- Prominence/salience
  - Profile – base
  - Trajector – landmark alignment
- Perspective
  - Viewpoint
  - Subjectivity – objectivity
- Metonymy

**Metaphor**

- Mental spaces
- Conceptual integration

Often, several of these constitute alternative choices for the construal of a situation. The alternative operations commonly include abstraction, schematization, attention, perspective (subjectivity – objectivity), metonymy, metaphor, and conceptual integration. In the case under consideration, the speaker decides on using metaphor. This choice is indicated by bold type in the list above.

2.2. **Categories, Types, and Kinds of Context**

The in-depth study of discourse shows that the use of metaphors in discourse is influenced by a large variety of contextual factors. The specific contextual factors can be grouped into four large categories: situational context, discourse context, conceptual-cognitive context, and bodily context. All four of these context types can be broken down into various kinds of specific contextual factors. In Kövecses (2015a), I arrived at the following inventory of types of context and the kinds of specific contextual factors that belong to them.

- **Situational context**
  - Physical environment
Social situation
Cultural context
Discourse context
Surrounding discourse
Previous discourses on the same topic
Dominant forms of discourse and intertextuality
Conceptual-cognitive context
Metaphorical conceptual system
Knowledge about elements of the discourse
Ideology
Knowledge about past events
Interests and concerns
Bodily context

I discuss and exemplify all of these types and kinds of context in my book *Where Metaphors Come From*. However, a brief comment is in place here on the last type of context, which I call “bodily context.” The body is not only responsible for the production of hundreds of conceptual metaphors through the many correlations between subjective and sensory-motor experience (cf. Grady 1997a, b; Lakoff & Johnson 1999), but it can also prime the use of particular metaphors in more immediate, local contexts (see, e.g., Gibbs 2006; Gibbs & Colston 2012; Boroditsky 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002). In other words, it can lead to the production of metaphors in discourse in the same way as the other contextual factors previously mentioned can. This explains why I regard it as a type of context.

My general claim is that it is differential experience (as defined by the contextual factors above) that is mainly responsible for the use of (especially novel) metaphors in discourse and that the cognitive operation that helps speakers achieve this is priming. The view I propose here may be thought of as a cognitively-oriented alternative to Sperber and Wilson’s treatment of metaphor use and comprehension as an “inferential process” (Sperber & Wilson 1995 /1986/, 2008).

2.3. CONTEXTUAL PRIMING

In some previous publications (see, e.g., Kövecses 2005; 2010a, b; 2015a), I showed that contextual factors can motivate, trigger, prompt, facilitate, shape, etc., the use of a particular metaphor in discourse. We can think of these various mental operations as instances of “priming.” Priming is a well-studied cognitive process used extensively in psychological and psycholinguistic experiments with a sizeable literature (see, e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002; Casasanto 2009; Gibbs & Colston 2012; and several other studies). Priming is based on the simulation of some experience in the situational, discourse, bodily, and conceptual-cognitive context.
Experiments that make use of priming as a method in their design can range from “in vitro” to “in vivo” experiments (see Kövecses 2005). In the latter, people simply go through their everyday routines constituting particular contextual factors, and the researcher asks the participants questions about the way they conceptualize a particular situation, given those experiences. Studies, such as those mentioned above, indicate that various bodily and discourse (semantic) experiences that function as contextual factors do shape the subjects’ metaphorical (and nonmetaphorical) conceptualizations of the situations related to those experiences. It is shared experience (the dynamically evolving “common ground” in a situation, as used by Clark 1996) that enables the production and comprehension of metaphors in discourse.

I suggest that contextual factors can all prime the use of particular metaphors in context — simply because the choice of the metaphors would be coherent with the contextual factors functioning as primes. I think of the use of context-induced metaphors as a result of real-world (i.e., in vivo) priming without the researcher being present.

Kahneman (2011), examining the issue from a non-cognitive-linguistic perspective, gives us a flavor of the strength of priming effects in metaphorical thought. This is what he writes concerning an experiment that involves metaphorical thought:

Other experiments have confirmed Freudian insights about the role of symbols and metaphors in unconscious associations. For example, consider the ambiguous word fragments W_ _H and S_ _P. People who were recently asked to think of an action of which they were ashamed are more likely to complete those fragments as WASH and SOAP and less likely to see WISH and SOUP. Furthermore, merely thinking about stabbing a coworker in the back leaves people more inclined to buy soap, disinfectant, or detergent than batteries, juice, or candy bars. (Kahneman 2011: 56)

This experiment involves the conceptual metaphor BAD/IMMORAL IS DIRTY and some of the actions (cleaning) that are associated with this metaphorical source domain. In general, my suggestion is that the various kinds of experiences in real life can prime people to choose particular metaphors (i.e., metaphorical source domains) in the course of conceptualizing target domains.

We typically talk about “the context of X.” The X here is a metaphor, or, more specifically, the use of a metaphor in discourse. It can be suggested that the context of a metaphorical discourse is some experiential content that controls or influences the use of metaphors in discourse. This experiential content consists of the four types of context identified above: linguistic-discourse context, situational context, the conceptual-cognitive context, and the bodily context.

In every situation we have a large amount of experiential content to deal with in the course of communication. Consequently, the question
arises: Which of these will prime the speaker to produce a metaphor (and the hearer to comprehend it)? Van Dijk (2009) proposes the idea that contextual content is represented by the conceptualizers as a “context model.” A context model is a(n idealized) cognitive model of the situation in which such communication takes place that comprises a number of components, including the following: Setting (time, location, circumstances, props) and Happening, which consists of Actors (individuals or groups) and Activity/Conduct (Van Dijk 2009: 39). The latter can be personal, social, and mental. We can think of such elements as the components of a context model that respond to the questions below (the questions are followed by the designations of various specific contextual factors as discussed above and in Kövecses 2010a, b; 2015a):

- What do I know about the speaker, the topic, and the hearer? Knowledge about the main elements of the discourse
- What was said in the present discourse so far? Surrounding discourse
- What was said about the topic on previous occasions? Previous discourses on the same topic
- What are the major discourse types that dominate public discourse? Dominant forms of discourse and intertextuality
- What are the systems of thought that govern public discourse? Ideology underlying discourse
- What are the properties of the physical situation where something is conceptualized? Physical environment
- What are the properties of the social situation in which something is conceptualized? Social situation
- What are the properties of the cultural situation in which something is conceptualized? Cultural situation
- What has happened preceding the discourse? History
- What are the people participating in the discourse interested in and concerned with? Interests and concerns
- What are the properties of the conceptualizers’ body? The body as context
- What is the content of the participant’s conceptual system? The metaphorical conceptual system as context

The conceptualizers are aware of, but probably also actively seek out, the information that responds to these questions, and, as a result, they can form a specific context model in every communicative situation where metaphorical conceptualization occurs. Given the model (of all of this experiential content), only a manageable set will become sufficiently active to prime the use of particular metaphors in the discourse. The set of potential contextual factors above is the result of empirically studying discourses that contain metaphors and the situations in which the discourses
were used. In this sense, the factors form a “natural” set. Thus, the results of this empirical research indicate common tendencies in metaphorical conceptualization.

Although considerably limited to the (empirically arrived-at) twelve general factors above, a decision still has to be made by the speaker concerning which particular piece of perceptual or mental information they utilize for metaphorical use. The only way to further constrain the available information for the purpose of metaphor creation in discourse seems to be to take into account the particular target domain meaning the speaker-conceptualizer wishes to express in the communicative situation. Given this target-domain meaning, the appropriate source-to-target mapping(s) may be activated from the experiential content of the contextual model.

Let us take an example for this from the work by Semino (2008). Semino studied the metaphors used by various participants at the 2005 G8 summit meeting in Scotland on the basis of an article about the summit. The summit was accompanied by a major rock concert called Live 8. Some participants assessed what the G8 summit had achieved positively, while some had doubts concerning its results. Semino looked at one such negative assessment she found in an article about the summit. She states:

In contrast, a representative of an anti-poverty group is quoted as negatively assessing the G8 summit in comparison with the Live 8 concert via a metaphor to do with sound:

1.4. Dr Kumi Naidoo, from the anti-poverty lobby group G-Cap, said after ‘the roar’ produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered ‘a whisper’. The reference to ‘roar’ could be a nonmetaphorical description of the sound made by the crowd at the concert. However, the use of ‘whisper’ in relation to the summit is clearly a (negative) metaphorical description of the outcome of the discussions in terms of a sound characterized by lack of loudness. Hence, the contrast in loudness between the sounds indicated by ‘roar’ and ‘whisper’ is used metaphorically to establish a contrast between the strength of feeling and commitment expressed by the concert audiences and the lack of resolve and effectiveness shown by the G8 leaders. (Semino 2008: 3–4)

In my view, the metaphor whisper here emerges from the physical(-social) context in which it is produced. Dr. Kumi Naidoo creates the metaphor whisper against a background in which there is a very loud concert and a comparatively quiet summit meeting. We can think of the loudness and the relative quiet of the occasion as perceptual features of the two events. Thus, the original conceptualizer, Dr. Kumi Naidoo, chooses a perceptual property of the physical context from all the experiential content that is available to him.
2.4. Conceptual pathways

However, we are still left with another question: How can whisper be used in the sense of ‘the lack of resolve and effectiveness,’ as proposed by Semino? “Whisper” and “lack of resolve and effectiveness” appear to be fairly different and distant notions. Out of the many potential experiential experiences represented by the twelve questions above, this particular one can be selected, I suggest, because the specific (target-domain) meaning, “lack of resolve,” seems to be expressible by it; i.e., it can convey the desired meaning. It can convey it because a particular conceptual pathway (made of several conceptual metaphors and metonymies) can be built between the two meanings (between that of whisper and “lack of resolve”), as I show elsewhere (Kövecses 2010a, b; 2015a). This way, a particular piece and kind of information (or experiential content) and a particular context-induced metaphor (whisper) is chosen out of the huge number of available options in the situation.

The required conceptual pathway consists of the following conceptual metaphors and metonymies: INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT, EMOTIONAL RESPONSES FOR THE EMOTIONS, ANGRY BEHAVIOR FOR ANGER/ARGUMENT, and EMOTION FOR DETERMINATION TO ACT. We need each of these metaphors and metonymies to be able to account for the meaning of the word whisper in the example. The INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT metaphor is especially important, in that it provides us with the connection between the degree of the loudness of the verbal behavior and the intensity of the determination, or resolve, to act. This way a particular piece and kind of information (or experiential content) and a particular context-induced metaphor (whisper) is chosen out of the huge number of available options in the situation.

3. The multi-level view of conceptual metaphors

I mentioned in the introduction that conceptual metaphors occur on four levels of schematicity: more specifically, image schemas, domains, frames, and mental spaces. (I describe the four levels and justify their differentiation in Kövecses 2017.) In other words, we have a vertical hierarchy of levels, such as the following:

- IMAGE SCHEMA
- DOMAIN
- FRAME
- MENTAL SPACE

The image schemas, domains, and frames are part of what we can conceive of collective semantic memory. Mental spaces, however, are our online individual representations of discourse. The diagram below indicates this:
IMAGE SCHEMA
DOMAIN collective semantic memory
FRAME

MENTAL SPACE online individual representation of discourse

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

My suggestion is that the contextual factors mentioned above affect conceptual metaphors at the level of mental spaces. To stay with the example of whisper, we can say that the conceptualizer of the G8 summit metaphorically construes the situation in an EVALUATION mental space through the whisper metaphor, which is, in turn, based on the INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT metaphor at a higher level, and which is connected to a number of other conceptual metaphors and metonymies. The linguistic metaphor arises as a result of the influence of the perceptual situation in the course of the online representation of the events in question, that is, the level of mental spaces.

4. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS VIEW FOR THE METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING METAPHOR?

There are a number of different approaches to the study of metaphor within a general conceptual metaphor theory framework. These different methods sometimes compete with one another and claim superior status in the field. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) work was later seen as an “intuitive” approach to metaphor. The label was used because Lakoff and Johnson and their followers were believed to rely on their own intuitions in identifying metaphors and grouping them into sets of examples for conceptual metaphors. Corpus linguists argue that to find all or most of the conceptual metaphors in a language, one needs to take advantage of large corpora, such as the BNC (British National Corpus) or COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English) (see, e.g., Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 2005; Stefanowitsch 2006). They emphatically point out that our linguistic intuitions are not adequate for studying metaphors. More recently, I proposed to revive the older intuitive method (Kövecses 2015b), and pointed out that the revised “lexical” approach has advantages that the corpus-linguistic method cannot ignore. Other metaphor scholars place emphasis on the social-pragmatic uses of particular metaphorical expressions. They typically work with smaller databases than corpus linguists, and study the communicative functions of metaphors in authentic discourses (e.g., Musolff 2006; Cameron 2003; Semino 2008). Some scholars pay attention to how frames and metaphors are related and study various metaphorical constructions.
(see, e.g., Sullivan 2013). They often make use of the Framenet project that was developed by Charles Fillmore.

Psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists study metaphors as a conceptual phenomenon and the embodied nature of metaphorical conceptualization (see, e.g., Gibbs 1994, 2006; Gibbs & Colston 2012; Boroditsky 2001; Casasanto 2009). This work is largely experimental — in the form of either “in vitro” or “in vivo” experiments (see Kövecses 2005 on this distinction). Neuroscientists take advantage of the most recent brain imaging techniques and try to identify the neuronal activities that underlie the use of conceptual metaphors in the brain (Gallese & Lakoff 2005, and see Coulson 2008 for an overview). Finally, groups of scientists are working to build computational models of how humans use conceptual metaphors for a variety of purposes (see, e.g., Narayanan 1999; Feldman 2006).

Thus, we have at least the following approaches dedicated to the study of conceptual metaphors:

- Intuitive approach,
- Corpus linguistic approach,
- Lexical approach,
- Discourse analysis approach,
- Framenet type approach,
- Psycholinguistic experimentation,
- Neuroscientific experimentation,
- Computational modeling.

There are undoubtedly other approaches, but even this set shows very clearly the variety of methods for the study of conceptual metaphor.

How can we pair the different approaches with the different levels of metaphor described above in the paper? The following pairing of approaches with the levels is suggestive, rather than definitive. Most of the approaches can be used to study several different levels. I suggest that the different approaches primarily attach to the following levels of metaphor:

**IMAGE SCHEMAS** – Psycholinguistics; Neuroscience

**DOMAINS** – Intuitive approach; Corpus linguistics; Lexical approach; Framenet

**FRAMES**

**MENTAL SPACES** – Discourse analysis; Computational modeling
- Psycholinguistics; Neuroscience

What lends significance to these pairings of levels and methods is threefold: First, there is no single approach that can be used to study all levels of metaphor. Second, several distinct approaches can be used to study the same
level(s), but they can contribute complementary insights to it/them. Third, certain approaches may be better-fitted to study a particular level than others.

In sum, there should not be rivalry between the various approaches, since they all have different insights to contribute to the field. The real challenge is to see how the different levels work together and to design programs to study the entirety of metaphor use with the help of the many distinct methodologies that are most appropriate for particular levels.

5. Conclusions

Conceptualizers derive their metaphors from four large types of experience: the situational, discourse, conceptual-cognitive, and bodily contexts. The four context types and the contextual factors belonging to them prime conceptualizers to choose their metaphors in discourse. The priming effect can take place only if the conceptualizers (both speaker and hearer) can build the appropriate conceptual pathway between the intended target-domain meaning and the particular experiential content that is primed.

This view extends the study of metaphor beyond those cases that are body-based in the usual sense in conceptual metaphor theory (i.e., correlations between sensorimotor experience and abstract ideas). The metaphors based on the situational, the discourse, the conceptual-cognitive context, together with the bodily one that involves unique features of individual bodies may represent the majority of cases of metaphor use in natural communicative situations.

Finally, I proposed a multi-level view of metaphor in which the levels range from the most schematic level of image schemas to the least schematic one of mental spaces. The context influences the most specific level of conceptualization, the level of mental spaces. Such a multi-level view has implications for methodology in studying metaphors. We can probably suggest that each level can be approached by a different method or set of methods and that there is not one single methodology that works “best” for all the levels. The study of metaphor is most successful if we approach all the levels by the methods that work best for each.

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Streszczenie

Teoria metafory pojęciowej – nowe propozycje

1. WProwadzenie
W nowszych pracach z zakresu metafory pojęciowej Zoltan Kövecses (2010a, 2010b, 2015a, 2017) proponuje dwukierunkowe rozszerzenie tej teorii przez: (a) dowartościowanie roli kontekstu w tworzeniu i stosowaniu metafor w dyskursie oraz (b) uwzględnienie hierarchii co najmniej czterech poziomów systemu pojęciowego i powiązanie z nimi wyboru różnych metod badań nad metaforą.

2. Metafora w ujęciu kontekstowym
Warunkami wstępnymi utworzenia wyrażenia metaforycznego w dyskursie są co najmniej cztery rodzaje procesów kognitywnych:
1. Operacje poznawcze/konstruujące (interpretacyjne), spośród których nadawca wybiera metaforę jako narzędzie tworzenia sensu.
2. Różne rodzaje kontekstu, które dostarczają mówiącemu licznych informacji i wiedzy konku­rujących o jego uwagę.
3. Torowanie kontekstowe, czyli wyprzedzające przygotowanie nadawcy do użycia takiego wyrażenia metaforycznego, które pasuje do najwyrazistszego czynnika kontekstowego.
4. Ścieżki konceptualne, dzięki którym wybrane wyrażenie metaforyczne ma znaczenie zgodne z zamierzoną intencją komunikacyjną mówiącego.

2.1. Operacje konstruujące (interpretacyjne)
Mówiący ma w danym kontekście do swej dyspozycji różne operacje konstruowania sceny, m. in. sche­matyzację/abstrakcję (schematy wyobrażeniowe), ogniskowanie uwagi (figura – tło; zakres uwagi; dopasowanie skalarne – konceptualizację drobnoziarnistą lub gruboziarnistą; uwagę dynamiczną i statyczną – skanowanie sekwencyjne i sumaryczne, w tym ruch fikcyjny), wyznaczanie pozycji/istotności (profil – baza; trajektor – landmark), przyjmowanie perspektywy (punkt widzenia; subiektywność – obiektywność) oraz posługiwany się metonimią lub metaforą, operowanie przestrzeniami mentalnymi i integrację pojęciową. Spośród tych możliwości wybiera metaforę.

2.2. Kategorie, typy i rodzaje kontekstu
Użycie metafory w dyskursie zależy od wielu czynników kontekstowych, które można podzielić na cztery główne kategorie (i ich typy). Należą do nich:
1. Kontekst sytuacyjny, który obejmuje otoczenie fizyczne, sytuację społeczną i kontekst kulturowy.
2. Kontekst dyskursu, który zawiera dyskurs otaczający, wcześniejsze dyskursy na dany temat oraz dominujące formy dyskursu i intertekstualność.
3. Kontekst pojęciowo-poznawczy, w którym mieszczą się: metaforyczny system pojęciowy, wiedza o składnikach dyskursu, ideologia, wiedza o minionych zdarzeniach oraz zainteresowania i obawy.
2.3. Torowanie kontekstowe

Różne czynniki kontekstowe mogą motywować, uruchamiać, ułatwiać lub kształtować użycie danej metafory w dyskursie, czyli torować drogę dla tej metafory – jako spójnej z danym kontekstem. Van Dijk (2009) wprowadza pojęcie „modelu kontekstu”, czyli reprezentacji sytuacji komunikacyjnej w umyśle konceptualizatora. Składnikami tego (wyidealizowanego) modelu sytuacji, w której zachodzi komunikacja, są: Sceneria (czas, lokalizacja, okoliczności, rekwizyty) oraz Wydarzenie, które obejmuje Aktorów (jednostki lub grupy) i Działania/Zachowania. Można te elementy powiązać ze wskazanymi wyżej różnorodnymi typami czynników kontekstowych. Ponieważ obejmują one ogromną ilość informacji, mówiący musi wybrać sposób nich takie, które ukierunkują stworzenie przez niego metafory. Decydujące wydaje się uwzględnienie przez niego określonego znaczenia domeny docelowej, które chce on wyrazić w danej sytuacji komunikacyjnej. Mając na uwadze to znaczenie docelowe, uruchamia on doświadczeniowej zawartości swego modelu kontekstu właściwe przeniesienia z domeny źródłowej do docelowej.

Jako przykład takiego kontekstowego torowania może posłużyć przeprowadzona przez Semino (2008) analiza metafory zastosowanej w relacji ze spotkania członków grupy G8 w Szkocji w 2005 roku, odbywającego się równolegle z koncertem rockowego zespołu Live 8. Wyrażając negatywną ocenę nikłych skutków spotkania G8, jego komentator stwierdził, że po „ryku” wywołanym przez koncert Live 8, grupa G8 wydała z siebie jedynie „szept” (after „the roar” produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered „a whisper”). Określenie „ryk” może być niemetaforycznym opisem dźwięków wydawanych przez tłum podczas koncertu, ale użycie „szeptu” w odniesieniu do spotkania na szczycie to jednoznacznie (negatywny) metaforyczny opis wyniku dyskusji oddany nazwą dźwięku pozbawionego głośności. Zatem kontrast w zakresie głośności pomiędzy dźwiękami określonymi jako „ryk” i „szept” został metaforycznie wykorzystany do przeciwwstawienia sobie siły uczucia zaangażowanych przez publiczność koncertową oraz braku determinacji i skuteczności liderów grupy G8. Zdaniem Kövecsesa, metafora „szeptu” wyłania się tu z fizyczno-spolecznego kontekstu, bo oryginalny konceptualizator, relacjonujący oba zdarzenia, wybiera z całego dostępnego mu bogactwa kontekstowego percepcyjną cechę kontekstu fizycznego (głośność koncertu i porównywalnie ciche spotkanie na szczycie), aby wyrazić zamierzone znaczenie.

2.4. Ścieżki konceptualne

„Szept” oraz „brak determinacji” i „skuteczności” wydają się odległymi od siebie pojęciami. Jednak, zdaniem Zoltana Kövecsesa, metafora „szeptu” została tu wybrana spośród wielu możliwych, ponieważ znaczenie „brak determinacji” (jako domena docelowa) daje się przez nią wyrazić dzięki temu, że można zbudować ścieżkę konceptualną (utworzoną z kilku metafor i metonimii pojęciowych) łączącą obydwa znaczenia: „szeptu” i „braku determinacji”. Taak niezbędną ścieżkę tworzą w tym przypadku następujące metafory i metonimie pojęciowe: **intensywność to siła skutków**, **reakcje emocjonalne za emocje**, **gniewne zachowanie za gniew/spór** oraz **emocja za determinację do działania**. Szczególnie ważna jest tu metafora **intensywność to siła skutków**, bo stanowi ona łącznik między stopniem głośności zachowań mownych a siłą determinacji do działania. W ten sposób w danej sytuacji nadawca wybiera spośród wielu dostępnych opcji określony rodzaj informacji (czy treści doświadczeniowych) i daną metaforę uzasadnioną kontekstowo (tu „szept” – **whisper**).

3. Wielopoziomowe spojrzenie na metafory pojęciowe

Metafory pojęciowe pojawiają się na czterech różnych poziomach schematyczności: od najbardziej abstrakcyjnych schematów wyobrażeniowych przez domeny i ramy, które łącznie stanowią część pamięci semantycznej, po przestrzeni mentalne będące indywidualnymi reprezentacjami dyskursu tworzonymi na żywo i obejmującymi konkretne metafory pojęciowe uzależnione od czynników kontekstowych.

W omawianym wyżej przykładzie konceptualizator spotkania grupy G8 konstruuje sytuację w przestrzeni mentalnej WARTOŚCIOWANIA przez metaforę „szeptu”, która z kolei opiera się na metaforze wyższego poziomu: **intensywność to siła skutków**, łączącej się z wieloma innymi metaforami.
i metonimiami pojęciowymi. Metafora językowa wylania się zatem jako rezultat wpływu sytuacji percepcyjnej na jej konceptualizację w trakcie dokonywanej na żywo reprezentacji zdarzeń, czyli na poziomie przestrzeni mentalnych.

Istnieje co najmniej kilka różnych podejść do badań nad metaforą pojęciową, które można powiązać z różnymi poziomami metafory i uznać za wzajemnie się dopełniające:

SCHEMATY WYOBRAŻeniowe – eksperymenty psycholingwistyczne i neurobiologiczne

DOMENY – podejście intuicyjne, badania korpusowe, podejście leksykalne i badania w rodzaju Framenet

RAMY

PRZESTRZENIE MENTALNE – analiza dyskursu, modelowanie komputerowe – psycholingwistyka i neurobiologia

4. Wnioski

Konceptualizatorzy tworzą metafory, korzystając z czterech typów doświadczenia: sytuacyjnego, dyskursywnego, pojęciowo-poznawczego i cielesnego. Czynniki kontekstowe przygotowują mówiącego do wyboru danej metafory w dyskursie, ale efekt torowania zachodzi tylko wtedy, gdy konceptualizator (zarówno nadawca, jak i odbiorca) jest w stanie zbudować właściwą ścieżkę konceptualną pomiędzy zamierzonym znaczeniem w domenie docelowej a określoną treścią doświadczoną. Dlatego badanie metafor pojęciowych nie powinno się ograniczać do tego, co ucieleśnione (korelacji między doświadczeniem sensoryczno-motorycznym a pojęciami abstrakcyjnymi).

Wielopoziomowe spojrzenie na metaforę – od najbardziej abstrakcyjnego poziomu schematów wyobrażeniowych po najniższy poziom przestrzeni mentalnych, uwarunkowanych kontekstowo – uzasadnia, że każdy z poziomów można badać różnymi metodami i nie ma metodologii dobrej dla wszystkich poziomów równocześnie, a najlepsze efekty przynosi analiza prowadzona metodami najwłaściwszymi dla każdego z tych poziomów.

Streszczenie przygotowała Agnieszka Mikołajczuk

BIBLIografia


5 Kövecses (2015b).


Worldview as cultural cognition

Worldview is defined in this study as the knowledge at the disposal of an individual or community and the point of view projected on the world with reference to that knowledge. An inquiry into worldviews, manifested in and transmitted through the use of language, is proposed. In accordance with a basic tenet of cognitive linguistics, language use is underlain by and describable with recourse to cognitive processes. However, because of the focus on the cultural, as well as cognitive underpinning of language, worldview is understood here as cultural cognition, the latter being characterised by its distributed nature and by the cultural content that feeds cognitions. The latter of these properties is exemplified in the paper through an analysis of two diverse reactions to the 2016 Nice terrorist attack: it is shown what meanings emerge when such parameters of construal as degree of specificity (granularity of viewing), mental scanning, focus selection, viewpoint, and attention to similarity vs. difference operate not on “raw” perceptual substrates, but on cultural concepts, such as political states, religions, or cultural areas.
1. **Worldview and Linguistic Worldview**

Before one engages in the analysis of specific data, it is usually imperative to introduce a few terminological distinctions and this study is no different in this regard. A full-length monograph on the problems that beset the approach to language represented here remains yet to be written; for now let me only sketch the background to the analytical part by briefly considering the notions of worldview and linguistic worldview, in this section, and that of cultural cognition in the next.

Worldview, a calque of the German *Weltanschauung* (dating back to Kant and Hegel), can in the most general terms be understood as what individuals or communities recognise as relevant for their functioning in the world they live in, as well as the way that content is organised, through a network of relationships, into a coherent representation. The coherence of the representation is necessarily subjective, although not necessarily in the negative sense of it being “biased” — but rather, in the technical sense of “subject-oriented.” In other words, a given worldview needs not to make sense to everyone; its role is to aid the individual or community that entertains it in the process of making sense of the world. Worldview is thus the cognitive orientation of an individual or a community, an understanding of the relationship between that individual or community and the world, which involves two aspects:

(i) the knowledge at the disposal of the cognising subject (again, an individual or a group), i.e., an awareness of the world and the way the world is or may be organised, plus

(ii) the point of view that the individual or the community projects on the world with reference to that knowledge.

This includes the awareness of what exists, what is important for the conceptualising subject, how that which exists is structured, and — most crucially — how the subject relates to it with regard to their interests and values.

As linguists, however, we are specifically interested in linguistic worldview, the view of the world as it is entrenched in language, with Humboldt’s *Weltansicht* as the obvious classic reference. This pseudo-definition is as general as it is vague, for what does it mean to be “entrenched in language”? Is the entrenchment harboured in the language system, language use, the language as it is cognitively processed in the mind of the speaker (each individual speaker or the community), or all of the above in various configurations? Can one reconstruct that worldview from language samples alone (the lexicon, grammatical patterns, discourse) or does one need to inquire through psycholinguistic experiments, interviews, and questionnaires into the way these samples are produced, understood, and interpreted (by native speak-
ers or all speakers of a language)? What is the role of evidence other than the strictly linguistic? The question concerns, for example, ethnographic information (cf. Palmer 1996, 2006, 2015) or what in Polish cognitive ethnolinguistics is called “co-linguistic data,” i.e. ritualised behaviours that accompany language use but do not themselves involve language (cf. Bartmiński 2012 /2009/: 34–35; Bielak 2013; Prorok & Głaz 2013).

These are only some of the questions relevant to this field, merely pointing to the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, different authors, even if in agreement about the major direction of their respective research programmes, would likely provide somewhat different answers. Bartmiński’s (2012 /2009/) cognitive ethnolinguistic approach accentuates the notion of the mental object (the idea or image in the speaker’s mind) and the tripartite System-Questionnaire-Text procedure of data elicitation. Underhill’s (2011) five-layer model focuses on metaphor in discourse and distinguishes between the communal, individual, and cross-linguistic aspects of worldview. Wierzbicka’s NSM approach (Wierzbicka 1997; Wierzbicka & Goddard 2014; Levisen 2012) is directed towards culturally salient concepts, expressed through “cultural keywords.” Palmer (1996, 2006, 2015) seeks motivation for grammatical patterns in the socio-cultural contexts, cultural scenarios, and beliefs of a given speech community. Finally (although this is hardly an exhaustive enumeration), Sharifian’s (2011, 2014, 2017) Cultural Linguistics enterprise is an attempt to coherently account for the use of language and the notions dear to its users through such constructs as cultural schemas, categories, and models. All of these approaches, in fact, require that linguistic worldview be understood as linguistic-cultural worldview. Indeed, another avenue for systematic exploration is the indisputable compatibility between the linguistic worldview conception and the notions of Friedrich’s (1989) linguaculture or its later modification, Agar’s (1994) languaculture.

However, a credible inquiry into the linguistic (or linguistic-cultural) worldview must also venture into another area characterised by inherent linkage, that of the culture-cognition interface. Linkage may not be the right word here, though: what in fact one may be dealing with is an inseparable culture-plus-cognition whole, divided only artificially for the sake of an easier identification of specific “local” foci.

2. Cultural cognition

It may thus be more appropriate to investigate, not the culture-cognition nexus, but cultural cognition. This is a key notion in Sharifian’s Cultural Linguistics, deriving from Hutchins’s (1995) integrated view, whereby culture is an inalienable aspect of cognition and cognition is a cultural process par excellence. Within his own framework, Sharifian defines cultural cognition as:

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\(^2\) An additional question is that of the appropriate worldview-related terminology. Struggles and debates within this realm have become somewhat legendary; for a systematic discussion of the problem in the Polish context cf. Tabakowska (2013).

\(^3\) Cf. also Schröter and Veniard’s (2016) study of cultural keywords inspired by, although not strictly following, Wierzbicka’s NSM approach.
... a property of cultural groups, and not just individuals. [It is] an emergent system [...] resulting from the interactions between the members of a cultural group across time and space. [...] Cultural cognition [...] is heterogeneously distributed across the minds in a cultural group. [...] Emergent properties of cognition at the group level supersede what is represented in the mind of each individual and arise from the interactions between the group members. Members of a cultural group may share some but not every aspect of their cultural cognition with other members, and the patterns are not exactly the same for all individuals across the cultural group. (Sharifian 2011: 21)

The author illustrates this with reference to the Australian Aboriginal English *This land is me* vs. Anglo-Australian English *This land is mine* (Sharifian 2011: 94). Australian Aboriginal people do not view land as anyone’s property, as something that cannot be owned and sold, but rather as something that has embraced the spirits of their ancestors. If, then, the living commune with their ancestors, as is believed by the people (Sharifian 2011: 59), land also embraces the living: they are one with the land, with reciprocal responsibilities of the two sides towards each other. The belief is consistent with the overall worldview of the community and even if some of its members do not share it, the notion is perpetuated through language and maintained at the level of distributed, cultural cognition.

However, cultural cognition’s distributed nature is only one of its aspects. Another aspect, or one that in fact marks its essence, is the *de facto* oneness of the cultural and the cognitive. Having done about four months of fieldwork onboard a navy ship studying its navigation procedure, Edwin Hutchins readily concludes that:

> [culture is] a human cognitive process that takes place both inside and outside the minds of people. It is the process in which our everyday cultural practices are enacted. I am proposing an integrated view of human cognition in which a major component of culture is a cognitive process [...] and cognition is a cultural process. (Hutchins 1995: 354)

By stating this in his groundbreaking proposal, Hutchins goes one step further than his colleague Roy D’Andrade (1981), for whom to study cultural linguistics means to divide the inquiry into cognitive processes and cultural content. In other words, cognitive processes do not (only) operate on “raw” perceptual substrates but on culturally construed, inherited, and maintained notions. It is precisely this kind of division, says Hutchins, that is misleading, for in reality none exists. His claim, hardly to be dismissed as ungrounded fancy, is corroborated with months of methodical fieldwork. Indeed, Hutchins’s integral view of culture-as-cognition and cognition-as-culture appears not only to open a promising avenue of inquiry but, I believe, may
well turn out to be the way to proceed in cultural (or cognitive-cultural) linguistics. The proposal below may therefore be castigated as a retrograde step back to D’Andrade’s scenario of integrating what is integral in its nature: cognitive processes and cultural content. Yet, I will be taking this step for two reasons. Firstly, with this kind of distinction, even if artificial, it is easier to see the mechanisms being investigated: cognition and culture may be one but because we have become accustomed to seeing them as distinct, the “integrating” (vs. integral) view caters for the implicit expectations that many of us might cherish and may in fact prove more effective in the argument it forwards. Secondly, the present study is an exercise in text analysis concerned with relatively small language samples and to do justice to Hutchins’s integral (vs. integrating) view one would probably have to proceed his way, i.e. through fieldwork. With those reservations in mind, I nevertheless hope to contribute to our understanding of how cultural cognition translates onto a linguistically expressed worldview, leaving a systematic follow-up on Hutchins for another occasion.

Finally, the last proviso that needs to be introduced before we launch the analytical rocket, is that language-encoded worldviews will in the present study be limited to individual perspectives of specific speakers-conceptualisers. They will thus perhaps approximate what Underhill (2011: 7) identifies as a given speaker’s relatively stable personal world, or possibly their more changeable perspective (cf. the doubts and commentary in note 12 below). Additionally, because the first of the analyzed samples (Sample 1) is a translation from Polish, another of Underhill’s parameters of worldview may be said to surface, that of a cultural mindset: a “worldview specific to a political [system] or religion” that can “migrate between language systems (as the spread of Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and communism clearly demonstrates)” (pp. 6–7). However, although Sample 1 is not robust enough for us to claim that we are actually dealing here with a cultural mindset thus understood, I would still consider it an instance of personal world and/or perspective, even if it is one that “migrates” from one language to another through the act of translation.

We have been witnessing attempts to construct a coherent cognitive-plus-cultural analytical toolbox that could be applied in analyses of specific data since at least the 1996 publication of Gary Palmer’s Toward a Theory of Cultural Linguistics. In that book, Palmer marked a pathway for the development of a cultural linguistics that would be grounded in, and would make use of the constructs proposed by Cognitive Grammar. In subsequent publications, he proceeded to add details to this general framework. For example, in Palmer (2006), he proposes that image schemas that derive from bodily experience and apparently have a universal status, are incorporated into cultural schemas, such that the latter are cognitive by definition, but also derive from mythology, social structure, everyday activities, or socially salient
rituals. Other authors have joined Palmer in his progress along this pathway, especially Sharifian (2011, 2014, 2017), in whose consistently developed framework the focus is shifted from allegedly universal cognitive processes to those involving cultural conceptualisations: cultural categories, schemas, metaphors, and models. In a similar vein, I hope to show below what kinds of meaning emerge from discourse when the cognitive processes that underlie it operate on cultural content, rather than on purely sensory input.

3. **Cultural cognition and worldview through language samples**

The analysis will concern two reactions to the terrorist attack in Nice, France, on July 14, 2016. According to Wikipedia, on the evening of that day...

... a 19 tonne cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injuring 434. The driver was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of France. The attack ended following an exchange of gunfire, during which Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was shot and killed by police. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Nice_attack, ED 7 Dec. 2016)

Unsurprisingly, the attack was extensively covered in the media, as well as being the subject of many heated debates and public speeches. One such speech that I had a chance to listen to is the source of Sample 1: it was delivered about six weeks after the event at the parish church in Janowiec, eastern Poland (regrettably, the identity of the speaker was not recorded and cannot be verified). It is rendered here in as faithful an English translation as possible. The other sample, Sample 2 (a–c), consists of three excerpts from an article in the *New Statesman*, published a day after the attack (Norris 2016). Both samples come from premeditated, nonspontaneous discourse and although they are of unequal length, I believe that the focus of the analysis and the kinds of conclusions drawn remain valid despite this asymmetry.

3.1. **Sample 1**

In the late summer of 2016, in a public performance related to the tragic Nice events, Speaker X said the following:

1. On the same day that the Nice attack took place, a mosque funded by Saudi Arabia was opened in the city.

[Polish org., quoted from memory: „W tym samym dniu, kiedy miał miejsce zamach w Nicei, otwarto w tym mieście meczet ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską.”]
What is the message in this short statement? We will look at two local points within it and assume that speakers select the content for their utterances with a certain intention and for a particular purpose. Naturally, there is no guarantee that the inferences on the listeners’ side will necessarily coincide with those intentions.

First, the expression the same day appears to be responsible for at least three effects:

(i) it suggests an evident link between the attack, Saudi Arabia, and Islam (indirectly, through reference to its institutionalised symbol, the mosque);

(ii) it effects what Ungerer and Schmid (2006: 262) call spatial compression: Nice and Saudi Arabia are distant geographically (a relative judgment, obviously) so an alleged link between one and the other calls for a conceptual compression of the distance;\(^5\)

(iii) it effects what I would call “conceptual compression”: driving a truck into a crowd apparently has something to do with Islam (cf. mosque), although the precise nature of the connection remains unknown.

Second, the statement that the mosque [was] funded by Saudi Arabia seems to imply that Islam, represented by its institutionalised place of worship, is alien to Europe and comes “from outside,” but not just from anywhere: it comes from affluent anti-democratic regimes.

Thus, if one reads between the lines, as is required if inferences are to be made, the speaker seems to imply that the responsibility for the attack (directly or indirectly) lies with Muslims because it is they who fund mosques and open them on the day that they (the same or other Muslims?) launch attacks. This very peculiar Weltanschauung is economical with the truth in several respects. First and most straightforward, the mosque was opened on 2 July, some 12 days before the attack.\(^6\) Second, no apparent connection between the perpetrator and Saudi Arabia has yet been established. Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel was Tunisian with a French residency permit and married to a French-Tunisian cousin. If there had been any attack-related dealings on his part with someone from an Islamic country other than Tunisia, it is much more likely to have been with an Algerian member of a Nice-based group affiliated to Daesh (ISIS).

The spatial and conceptual compression becomes even more radical now: Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are worlds apart, not only geographically, but also politically. Although both are predominantly Sunni Muslim countries, they differ tremendously in their political systems and practicalities of life. Most Tunisian Sunni Muslims belong to the Maliki School, some to the Hanafi School; there is also a sizeable number of non-denominational Muslims. In contrast, most of the populace of Saudi Arabia are Sunni Salafists. Politically, Tunisia is a representative democracy, whereas Saudi Arabia is an


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absolute monarchy. As a result, attitudes to religions and religious denominations are very different. In Tunisia, although the country’s official and promoted religion is Islam, other denominations are granted a measure of tolerance: about 1% of the populace are non-Muslims, religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution, and conversion from Islam to other faiths is legal (although in practice subject to social pressure or even ostracism). In Saudi Arabia, religions other than Islam cannot be practised openly and even the practising of Shia Islam (about 15% of the populace) is suppressed as a heresy. Conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. With these facts in mind, it appears that Speaker X’s reference to Saudi Arabia and the omission of the Tunisian connection of the attacker was far from random. Alternatively, it could also be based on an ignorance of the intricacies of Islam, as this is often part of the “us” vs. “them” dichotomisation, with “them” being reduced to a homogenous threat and with nuances downplayed.

Third, the attacker was never excessively religious and whatever religious activities he had engaged in prior to the attack had been perfunctory. Instead, he had had a family history of psychiatric treatment, had had a history of drug and alcohol use, had been charged with minor offences and violence (including domestic violence), and had led a rather erratic sex life. It is most likely that he had become self-radicalised, there being no solid evidence that organised religion had played any serious motivating role in the planning and perpetration of the attack: it was merely an artificial and non-spirituall garnish.

Given these contexts, the implicit suggestion from Speaker X that the Nice terrorist act had been steered, perhaps funded, and possibly performed by an “outside” Muslim unit is somewhat wide of the mark. The suggestion is inferable at discourse level, but it is rendered through an array of cognitive processes, of which I will mention four. No claims are made as to the completeness of the list or the exhaustiveness of the processes involved, at issue is rather the mechanism through which cognition and cultural content are channelled into a coherent complex.

1. **Degree of specificity or granularity of viewing** (cf. Langacker 2008: 55–57). In this case it is very low; only sufficient to project very crude and mostly underspecified distinctions, such as the following “make-shift” oppositions:
   - Europe vs. “others.” The identity of the others is indeterminate: is it the Middle East, (North) Africa, or the postcolonial Orient?
   - Christianity vs. Islam. Although there is no mention of Christianity, the reference to a mosque suggests this as an evident opposition. What renders this opposition dubious is that the July 14 celebrations in France are anything but religious; in fact, Bastille Day marks the


8 I thank Sam Bennett for pointing this out to me.

9 Although ISIS praised the perpetrator as “a soldier of the Islamic State” (cf. Birnbaum & McAuley 2016), they may have done so for publicity reasons.

10 The Orient is obviously a rich notion but especially in France it may embrace not only the Middle East and/or the Far East but also North Africa.
dawn of a secular state (officially established in 1905), a notion to which the French are very attached. Therefore, the crucial opposition appears to be:

- Europe vs. Islam. It is idiosyncratic, very low in viewing granularity, and as a result indiscriminate as to its geographical, religious, and cultural contexts.

2. **Viewpoint**, an exceptionally complex notion. With regard to what Simpson (1993; following Uspensky 1973 [1970]) calls *ideological viewpoint*, Sample 1 seems to encode the European stance. With regard to viewpoint as a cognitive operation correlated with the mental distance of the conceptualiser from the conceptualised, the position of the former is detached from the above-described scene in a bird’s-eye view manner. This can be inferred from three kinds of compression, already mentioned above:

- **temporal compression**: *the same day* renders the time gap between July 2 and July 14 null and void;
- **spatial compression**: southern France (Nice), Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia appear as “close” only on a small-scale map, a projection effected from a certain distance;
- **conceptual compression**: people of certain religions (Islam), cultural areas (Europe, Saudi Arabia, North Africa as cultural areas), and territories (the same but as territories) merge into an undifferentiated “other” or “them.”

These kinds of compression are only attainable with a fair degree of mental detachment and a disengaged view that pans across the whole scene.

3. A combination of mental scanning and focus selection (cf. Langacker 2008: 57–60, 82–85). An analogy is implicitly drawn between two events that apparently coincide in time, opening a mosque and perpetrating a terrorist attack, such that:

- both involve a period of preparation, culminating at a certain point;
- in both the focus is on that point of culmination;
- they have comparable consequences: death of people in the case of the attack, and purported “cultural death” or “death of European values” in the case of mosque opening (Figure 1; on the next page).

4. Finally, there are various degrees of attention to similarity and difference, basic cognitive operations responsible for the process of category construction (cf. MacLaury 1997). Attention to similarity (**S**) contracts the cognitive distance between the items being viewed; attention to difference (**D**) protracts that distance. Through various configurations of these reciprocally balanced strengths in various stages of the process, conceptualisers can effect categories of various shapes. In Sample 1, we are dealing with strong initial, category-internal attention to **S**.
prior to strong, inter-categorial attention to $D$. As a result, within the categories being constructed, the differences between their individual members are flattened out into homogenised wholes. An “us” category is thus formed through strong attention to similarity and weak attention to difference ($S$-$d$): it includes Europeans, non-Muslims, perhaps Christians. An analogous category of “them” originates from the same configuration of $S$-$d$ strengths: it includes Muslims, outsiders, non-Europeans from whatever territories and cultural areas (Saudi Arabia is mentioned, albeit factually unconnected; Tunisia may be taken as being implied through factual knowledge although unmentioned). Next, strong attention to $D$ between the categories polarises them into a stark division (Figure 2).

Crucially, these are ideological (cultural) projections: the cognitive processes here do not operate on raw, sensory perceptions but on cultural entities, such as religions (Islam), religious institutions/places of worship (mosque), cities and states (Nice, Saudi Arabia). It is these kinds of culturally-grounded cognitive operations that allow the speaker to construct and project a worldview.

3.2. Sample 2

Sample 2 (a–c), three short fragments excerpted from Norris (2016), is comparable to Sample 1 with regard to the underlying cognitive operations involved and yet is very different in the worldview it projects. In the article,
the author actually deconstructs the kind of worldview we have just identified for Sample 1, by exposing several flaws in its all-too-frequently accepted reasoning, and specifically by relating to:

- the lack of a terrorist record of the perpetrator;
- the simplicity of divisions into “us” and “them,” Muslims and non-Muslims, without any notice being taken of the so-called “grey zones of coexistence”;\(^{14}\)
- the fact that Daesh (a.k.a. IS or ISIS), in terms of numbers, kills more Muslims than non-Muslims;
- the corrosive tactic of sowing polarity and division, typical of every extremist group;
- the purposeful reinforcement of “the Otherness” of Muslims, at the expense of the “common humanity” view (terrorist attacks are crimes against humanity, questioning the value of life as such).

Amidst these explicitly expressed views, the author says:

(2) (a) For example, fewer than ten days ago, IS attacked Baghdad, with a suicide bomber killing 250 people. On 5 July, IS attacked three sites in Saudi Arabia, including the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. In May, IS killed 40 people in Yemen as they stood in line to enlist for national military service. IS kills countless people every day in Syria.

Let us consider, with regard to this excerpt, three out of the same four processes that were identified for Sample 1. Scanning and focus selection will not be considered. In Sample 1, they involve an implied analogy and because no comparable analogy has been identified for Sample 2, a comparison of the samples with regard to these parameters would lack a credible basis.

1. **Degree of specificity/ granularity of viewing** is emphatically greater here than in Sample 1. Details as to the time, place, and the number of victims are provided for each attack, in the original article all of them being hyperlinked to factual reports. There is no superficial fusion of terrorist activities (IS terrorism), religion (Islam), and institutional representation of that religion (the Prophet’s Mosque).

2. **Viewpoint.** On the one hand, the viewpoint here also seems to be detached from the scene(s) being conceptualised (as it is in Sample 1); on the other hand, because it is differently correlated with the third parameter, attention to similarity and difference, I discuss them jointly in the next point.

3. **Attention to similarity and difference** plus **viewpoint.** Instead of two broad S-dominated categories polarised by strong attention to D, in Sample 2(a) there is a stronger differentiation of small, “local” foci. Only then are they brought together into a loosely coherent category.

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\(^{14}\) In Norris’s article, this statement is attributed to “the journalist Murtaza Hussain,” whose article in The Intercept is referenced. This begs the question of whether Norris presents her own views or whether she represents a broader worldview. One solution is to say that the question need not be answered in a black-and-white fashion: Norris’s argumentation is framed as a coherent set of ideas that can be attributed to her, and/or the authors she quotes, and/or the general attitude of the magazine she writes for. In other words, “worldview as cultural cognition” needs not to be represented by a precisely specified individual or group, as long as the “architecture” of that worldview can be reconstructed. However, I will adopt another solution and assume that Norris draws on Hussain (and possibly other sources) to add credibility to views that we can safely assume are her own — and in this sense illustrate what Underhill (2011) calls personal world or perspective (cf. above).
of “attacks on Muslims by IS.” This is effected through initial stronger attention to $D$, followed by a somewhat weaker $s$ operating “across the board.” Thus, first the individual cases are distinguished from one another, and then the overarching “attacks on Muslims by IS” category is constructed. In Vantage Theory, this phenomenon is called the “spotlight effect” (MacLaury 2013: 90–92), as when one moves a spotlight away from the stage, which allows for panning the light across the stage and focusing on specific areas of it (Figure 3).

In other words, we are dealing here with a detached viewpoint, strong attention to $D$ (which produces multiple foci) followed by a relatively weaker attention to $s$ (which brings them together as examples of the same loose category — events on the same stage).  

At this point, however, we run into a problem that the cultural-cognitive linguistics I am advocating must be able to address. A continuation of this passage brings us back to the familiar polarity effect that we saw in Sample 1:

(2) (b) These attacks have been met with mostly silence in the West. Social media tributes and hashtags have been scarce. The fact that ISIS kills more Muslims than non-Muslims is rarely explored.

Here we also have two broad $S$-dominant categories of West vs. non-West, polarised through strong intercategorial $D$ (Figure 4; on the next page).

If cognitions are parallel, do we have to conclude that these two configurations (in Samples 1 and 2(b)) are essentially the same kinds of portrayals? Definitely not, for they are parallel only with regard to what happens on the cognitive, “mechanical” level. However, purely mechanical operations, deprived of cultural content, are in fact a fiction. Let us consider: in the context of the non-West category, there is reference to previous discourse, i.e. to the facts (the multitude of terrorist attacks) reported there in the spotlight-effect manner. Also, within the overall message of the article as a whole, the excerpt in 2(b) functions as an example of the worldview that is not accepted by its author; cf. 2(c):

\[\text{Figure 3. The } D-s \text{ category in Sample 2(a). Detached viewpoint and the spotlight effect (loosely inspired by Figure 2–15 in MacLaury 2013: 92)}\]
(2) (c) This is an example of a divisive boundary at work, where lives have different values depending on their geographical location.

With that statement, the author clearly distances herself from the $D$-$s$ induced categorial polarity. A more adequate representation would thus be that in Figure 5, where the stark contrast between West and non-West recedes to the background.

We thus conclude that the cultural aspect is indispensable in cognitions, since the cognitive processes “in between the ears” alone are not sufficient to account for the differences in worldviews but must operate on cultural entities. This is the second of the two parameters of cultural cognition identified in Section 2, but it also connects with the first one, namely with its distributed nature: the notions of religion, political state, or the value of human life are not shared in exactly the same manner among all members of a cultural group, but are salient for the group as a whole and function as content material in conceptualisation effected for the purpose of linguistic portrayal. Thus, similarity-vs.-difference attentional strengths, viewpoint construction, or focus selection and mental scanning are (and here we are back with Hutchins) manifestations of cognition as a cultural process.
4. A FINAL WORD

Up to this juncture, I have inquired into a view of cognition whereby cognitive construals of a scene operate on cultural content. I will now try to mark out several paths for further inquiry.

1. Given that only a few of the broad array of cognitive processes have been considered here, one would probably wish to compile a relatively comprehensive and coherent list of such processes, so that diverse language data could be approached in a comparable manner.

2. It remains to be investigated what dictates the adoption of a cognitive-cultural viewpoint: even if, as Hutchins proposes, we perform cognitions as culture and we engage in culture as cognition, should we still recognise cognitive processes at the fundamental level of perception and schema formation as prerequisites for cultural schemas to emerge? This is indeed what is suggested in Palmer (2006).\(^{16}\) This would mean that worldviews result from cognitions that are additionally equipped with cultural content, in that order, rather than an ideological stance entering the stage prior to (and independently of) cognitive operations. But this would probably be an unwelcome development: it would set the tone for further inquiry that would take us away from Hutchins’s integrated cognition model.

3. How can Hutchins’s view that joint, cultural activities are inherently cognitive and actually qualitatively different in this respect from the cognitive actions of individuals be corroborated with linguistic data? More precisely, what linguistic evidence is there for cultural cognition to be actually distributed? It is instructive to begin with Sharifian’s (2011) *This land is mine – This land is me* example (cf. Section 2 above) but at the same time vital to systematically collect more robust data and explain them away through recourse to cultural categories, schemata, and models.

One has reasons to believe that with a principled approach of this kind it will be possible to correlate more precisely the notions of cultural cognition and worldview. In the present study, an attempt was made to zoom in on relatively small portions of worldviews of individual speakers, but eventually what we want to be able to characterise are worldviews of communities and the idea that they are maintained and transmitted as cultural cognition seems to be a legitimate assumption.

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Streszczenie

Obraz świata jako poznanie kulturowe

Obraz świata to jego podmiotowy ogląd, gdzie podmiotem jest pojedynczy użytkownik języka lub społeczność, obejmujący dwa aspekty:

(i) wiedzę na temat świata w dyspozycji tegoż użytkownika lub społeczności oraz
(ii) punkt widzenia na świat z uwzględnieniem tej wiedzy.


Wszystkie te podejścia wskazują, że de facto mamy do czynienia z językowo-kulturowym obrazem świata.

Wiarygodny opis tego obrazu musi także wziąć pod uwagę całość poznawczo-kulturową, rozdzielaną wyłącznie w celu rozpoznania szczegółowych, „punktowych” zjawisk. Sharifian mówi tu o poznaniu kulturowym, takim, że „emergentne własności poznania na poziomie grupy wykraczają poza reprezentacje obecne w umysłach jej poszczególnych członków” (Sharifian 2011: 21). Pojęcie to wywodzi się z koncepcji poznania jako procesu par excellance kulturowego (Hutchins 1995).

 Drugim parametrem poznania kulturowego, stojącym w centrum uwagi w niniejszym studiu, jest kulturowa treść procesów poznawczych leżących u podstaw użycia językowego. W tym sensie poznanie kulturowe przekłada się na wyrażany językowo obraz świata (tu ograniczony do indywidualnych obrazów konkretnych użytkowników języka).

Analizie poddano dwie reakcje na zamach terrorystyczny, do którego doszło 14 lipca 2016 r. w Nicei. Pierwsza z nich (próbka 1), pochodzi z publicznego wystąpienia; natomiast trzy fragmenty składające się na próbkę 2 zaczerpnięto z artykułu w piśmie New Statesman (Norris 2016), lewicowym, polityczno-literackim tygodniku brytyjskim.

Próbka 1

(i) On the same day that the Nice attack took place, a mosque funded by Saudi Arabia was opened in the city.

[Tego samego dnia, kiedy miał miejsce zamach w Nicei, otworzono w mieście meczet ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską.]

Wyrażenie the same day ‘tego samego dnia’ ma potrójny efekt:

(i) sugeruje istnienie związku między atakiem terrorystycznym, Arabią Saudyjską i islamem (po-przez wzmiankę o meczecie);
(ii) świadczy o kompresji przestrzennej między dość odległymi od siebie Niceą i Arabią Saudyjską;
(iii) świadczy o „kompresji pojęciowej” – sugeruje się istnienie bliżej nieokreślonego związku między celowym wjechaniem w tłum ciężarówek a islamem.

Powtórę, stwierdzenie, że the mosque [was] funded by Saudi Arabia ‘meczet został ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską’ sugeruje, iż islam narzucany jest Europie przez bogate autokracje.
Tego typu szczególny obraz świata mija się z prawdą w kilku punktach: meczet otwarto 2 lipca, czyli dwanaście dni przed zamachem; nie stwierdzono żadnych znaczących powiązań zamachowca z Arabią Saudyjską; zamachowiec nigdy nie był osobą religijną, a bezpośrednio przed atakiem jego wzmózona religioznosność była powierzchowna.

Obraz świata, który wyłania się z próbki 1, powstaje w wyniku współdziałania kilku procesów poznawczych. Są to:

1. **Stopień uszczegółowienia / ziarnistość oglądu.** Ma ona tu bardzo niską wartość, co pozwala jedynie na dokonywanie, w postaci kontrastowych par, podstawowych i wątpliwych rozróżnień:
   - Europa – „inni”;
   - chrześcijaństwo – islam;
   - Europa – islam (pomieszanie kontekstów geograficznego, religijnego i kulturowego).

2. **Punkt widzenia.** Ideologiczny punkt widzenia (zob. Simpson 1993) jest tu umieszczony w Europie, natomiast jako parametr poznawczy punkt widzenia jest oddalony od postrzeganej sceny, co właśnie pozwala na kompresję czasową, przestrzenną i pojęciową.

3. **Skanowanie mentalne i wybór ogniska uwagi.** Przeprowadzona jest (w sposób domyślny) analogia między otwarciem meczetu a zamachem terrorystycznym — w obu wypadkach mamy do czynienia z okresem przygotowawczym, z koncentracją uwagi na końcowym punkcie tego okresu, z sugerowanymi podobnymi konsekwencjami (śmiercią ludzi i rzekomą „kulturową śmiercią” Europy).

4. **Podkreślanie podobieństwa lub różnicy.** Podkreślanie podobieństwa zmniejsza dystans mentalny między postrzeganymi elementami; podkreślanie różnicy ów dystans zwiększa. W próbie 1 mamy do czynienia z silnym wewnątrzkategorialnym podobieństwem na początkowym etapie (szerokie kategorie „my” i „oni”), po czym następuje silne uwypuklanie różnicy między tymi kategoriami. Procesy te jako swój przedmiot mają pojęcia kulturowe, takie jak religia, miejsce kultu religijnego, miasto, państwo – dzięki temu otrzymujemy określony obraz (lub ogląd) świata.

**Próbka 2**

Pierwszy z trzech fragmentów tworzących próbkę z brzuku następująco:

(2) (a) For example, fewer than ten days ago, IS attacked Baghdad, with a suicide bomber killing 250 people. On 5 July, IS attacked three sites in Saudi Arabia, including the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. In May, IS killed 40 people in Yemen as they stood in line to enlist for national military service. IS kills countless people every day in Syria.

Na przykład niecałe dziesięć dni temu ISIS przeprowadziło w Bagdadzie zamach samobójczy, zabijając 250 osób. 5 lipca zaatakowało trzy miejsca w Arabii Saudyjskiej, w tym Meczet Proroka w Medynie. W maju ISIS zabiło w Jemenie 40 osób czekających w kolejce na przyjęcie do armii.

Codziennie zabija niezliczoną liczbę osób w Syrii.

Analiza tego przykładu pod kątem trzech z czterech wymienionych wcześniej procesów poznawczych wygląda następująco:

1. **Stopień uszczegółowienia / ziarnistość oglądu** jest większy(-a) (por. szczegóły dotyczące każdego z zamachów).

2. **Punkt widzenia** (patrz pkt 3 poniżej).

3. **Podkreślanie podobieństwa i różnicy** oraz **punkt widzenia.** Mamy tu wyróżnienie większej liczby wydarzeń, zgrupowanych następnie w luźno powiązaną kategorię „ataki terrorystyczne ISIS na Muzułmanów” (początkowe silne uwypuklanie różnicy, następnie silniejsze, ale nadal stosunkowo słabe podkreślanie podobieństwa).

Następny przykład w ramach próbki 2 wywołuje podobny efekt polaryzacyjny, jak próbka 1 (dwie szerokie kategorie oparte na podobieństwie, wyraźna różnica między nimi):
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(2) (b) These attacks have been met with mostly silence in the West. Social media tributes and hashtags have been scarce. The fact that ISIS kills more Muslims than non-Muslims is rarely explored.

(2) (c) This is an example of a divisive boundary at work, where lives have different values depending on their geographical location.

Jednak obrazy w tych dwóch próbkach są inne ze względu na ich różną kulturową zawartość treściową oraz ogólny wydźwięk próbki 2 (gdzie wspomina się polaryzację na Zachód i nie-Zachód, lecz jej nie akceptuje):

Wnioskujemy stąd, że procesy poznawcze przekładają się na obraz świata, jeśli „działają” na treściach kulturowych.

Na końcu proponuję się kilka kierunków przyszłych badań:
1. Zaproponowanie w miarę wyczerpującej listy procesów poznawczych biorących udział w tworzeniu obrazów świata;
2. Próba określenia, czy o przyjęciu takiego, a nie innego obrazu świata decydują określone procesy poznawcze, czy treści, których dotyczą, nawet jeśli model poznania zintegrowanego (Hutchins 1995) uznamy za właściwy kierunek myślenia;

Ostatecznym celem jest opisanie obrazów świata jako poznania kulturowego nie tylko dla pojedynczych użytkowników języka, lecz także całych społeczności językowo-kulturowych.

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TRANSLATING MINDS: Cognitivism and translation

Translation is one of the most complicated mental operations performed by people. The article explains what makes translation so difficult and what makes it possible. In order to translate well we have to envisage the states of minds of the sender, the original recipients and the projected recipients of our translation. Thus, translators should be equipped with a high level of empathy and be able to expend much “effort after meaning” (to use Bartlett’s term). Taking into account the nature of the translation process, it becomes obvious that translation theory has to make use of cognitive theories of human communication.
One of the most famous quotations about translation comes from Ivor A. Richards, who said: “Translation may very probably be the most complex event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos” (Richards 1953: 250). Let me assure you that the statement is not an exaggeration.

What makes translation so complicated? There are four basic reasons:

1. the very nature of translation,
2. the nature of human communication,
3. structural differences between languages,
4. differences between cultures.

Translation is a unique activity because it aims to reproduce “the same product” using completely different material. Mission impossible? All translators know of course that “the sameness” is unattainable. Still, they strive to achieve some kind of “maximum similarity” though, naturally, they may understand the similarity in many different ways. We may call this desirable similarity whatever we like, I like to call it equivalence — first, because I am a traditionalist, second, because I do not think that choosing some other term solves any problem. Equivalence is the essence of translation. The difficulty lies in defining it. What is to be equivalent? How to measure or evaluate it? This difficulty made some scholars abandon the notion altogether or criticize it as “unscientific” (cf. Snell-Hornby 1995: 15–22). Critics of the notion of equivalence usually understand equivalence as identity (which it cannot be of course) or look for it on the surface of translated texts demonstrating how much they differ from originals (cf. Krzeszowski 2016). Equivalence cannot mean identity; it cannot be found on the surface of texts. These simple truths were understood by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, who based his definition of translation on the notion of equivalence: “The act of translation consists in formulating, in language B, of a text b which is an equivalent of the text a, previously formulated in language A” (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 121). He also explained what he meant by “equivalent”:

Text b, in language B, is an equivalent of text a, in language A, if text b evokes the same response (reaction, set of associations) as does text a. The wording “the same” must not be taken literally. Since no two men react identically to the same text, then strictly speaking no “equivalents” can be formulated. This is a problem that refers not only to translation but to communication in general. Since, on the other hand, languages do perform their communicative functions, the differences between individual persons in their reactions to the same text cannot be too great (though they change with the kind of text). The same applies to translations. Purely individual responses are disregarded, and stress is laid on certain statistical averages of reactions in definite language groups. Deviations from such averages may be greater for some kinds of texts (poetry) than for others (scientific books, commercial correspondence). (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 123)

Thus, equivalence is to be looked for in the minds of the recipients.
Human communication is based on inferences. We never “say what we mean,” we only imply it. Texts do not contain meaning; they are signals which are aimed to evoke meaning in the minds of the recipients. Thus, communication resembles a mental game: for example using the before a noun is like saying “you know what I mean” or rather “you should know — or guess — which object I have in mind.” Understanding any text requires interpretation, i.e. answering numerous questions, like “Who said it? To whom? In what circumstances? Why? What for? Was it serious or was it just a joke? Is it true? Is it polite? Is it likely to be effective?” etc. In typical situations we are not even aware of asking and answering such questions — we are practised in the art of interpreting, we are “communicative experts.” But translators often have to deal with atypical communicative situations. First of all, they are hardly ever the envisaged recipients of the text they are to translate. They rather resemble “eavesdroppers,” listening to other people’s conversations. Being only an eavesdropper additionally complicates the task of answering all the questions, i.e. reconstructing the minds of the sender and the recipients. Secondly, speakers of different languages may use different signals to evoke similar mental reactions, which means that translations may (at first glance) diverge considerably from the originals. Finally, the translator has to envisage the minds of the recipients of his/her product (TL text), which in numerous cases (e.g. translating a text for publication, to be read by many people) may not be a simple task at all. To conclude, equivalence (like “meaning”) is in the minds of the beholders, and translation is more about translating minds than texts.

Wojtasiewicz (1957) devoted much of his book to the problem of “untranslatability” (we would rather speak of “translation problems” or “translation difficulties”). The first group of causes of untranslatability that he described was connected with structural differences between languages. Wojtasiewicz enumerated and illustrated several grammatical categories which may cause translation problems. The first instance concerned grammatical gender. In his fictitious example Wojtasiewicz wrote about a short story which, in the English and Polish version respectively, starts with a sentence: “Astrid spoke first.” and “Astrid odezwala się pierwsza.” If the readers do not know that Astrid is a Scandinavian female name, then the Polish reader is immediately informed about the gender of the character, while the English reader lacks this information (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 31). To make the example even more realistic we could replace the name Astrid with an English name like Lou or Pat, which may refer to both sexes. A sceptical reader might argue that in most cases the gender will be revealed in the second sentence anyway, so there will be no real translation problem. But what if the author does not want to reveal the gender? Let us think about Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 18” and its Polish translations. The sonnet begins with the following two verses:
Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?
Thou art more lovely and more temperate.

Specialists claim that the sonnet belongs to “the male series,” but this cannot be deduced from the poem itself. The problem is that Polish adjectives are marked for gender so the Polish equivalents of *lovely* and *temperate* will of necessity be either male or female. Gender-marked are also Polish verbs in the past tense. All this explains why the Polish translator of *Written on the Body* by Jeanette Winterson, where the sex of the narrator is never revealed, surrendered and made the narrator female (explains but not justifies; see also Hejwowski 2015: 275–286).

Another problem mentioned by Wojtasiewicz (1957: 37–39) concerns articles. A seemingly innocent sentence *He is the man for the job.* will pose a translation problem because Polish lacks articles and the first *the* will have to be translated by means of some adjective (at least four possible versions). Other “structural problems” listed by Wojtasiewicz include: tenses and aspects of verbs (1957: 39–43), diminutives and augmentatives — practically non-existent in English but very popular in Polish (1957: 43–48), number (1957: 49–50). Even phonetic and graphic differences may become a translation problem (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 51–57). Wojtasiewicz (1957) does not mention the fact that also the frequency of certain forms may be troublesome in translation. English uses the passive voice and different forms of the verb *to be* much more often than it is advisable in Polish. Whole dialogues in English novels may be accompanied by just one verb *to say*; if you reproduce it in Polish using the most obvious equivalent of *to say* (*powiedzieć*), most readers will regard the result as bad style. In fact, any structural (or stylistic) difference between languages may, in certain situations, become a difficult translation problem.

Another group of translation problems is connected with differences between cultures (or maybe one should say eco-cultures?). Among those causes of “untranslatability” Wojtasiewicz lists “technical terms”, “erudite allusions” and “language allusions.” Technical terms are the names of different elements of SL country reality, like the names of plants and animals, geographical features and meteorological phenomena, weights and measures, buildings and their parts, vehicles, clothes, musical instruments and dances (particularly folk instruments and dances), food and drinks; posts, positions, terms connected with law and politics, administration (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 66–76). Of course, translation problems will be posed only by those technical terms that are unknown in the target culture (cf. Lewicki 2015); thus, it is not easy (though by no means impossible) to translate *żurek* into English or *Yorkshire pudding* into Polish.

Erudite allusions, as Wojtasiewicz understood them, are allusions to facts and ideas presumably well-known to the SL readers. When those allu-
sions concern SL culture and history, it is very likely that TL readers will not have the necessary knowledge to understand them. Then, according to Wojtasiewicz, the translator may explain the allusion but not “translate it” in the proper sense of the word (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 76–89). To give just one example of such allusions — in Truman Capote’s *Breakfast at Tiffany’s* we find the following sentence: “Never mind why, but once I walked from New Orleans to Nancy’s Landing, Mississippi, just under five hundred miles” (Capote 1961 /1958/: 96). Its translation will be completely irrelevant to the majority of Polish readers, who do not know that *nancy* may refer to a homosexual. Thus, the only reasonable thing a translator can do is to add a footnote with an explanation. Erudite allusions appear in any literary text (though not only in literary texts) and may be located on a scale “fully translatable — untranslatable”. For example, most names and surnames in Huxley’s *Brave New World* allude to real persons. Some of those allusions are quite obvious: Lenin, Marx, Trotsky, Darwin, Bonaparte. But some are not likely to be deciphered even by SL readers: Stopes, Kawaguchi, Bokanowski. Again, the translator may leave it to the reader to find out (which is much easier in our Internet world than it used to be in Huxley’s or Wojtasiewicz’s times) or provide an explanation.

By “language allusions” Wojtasiewicz (1957: 89–92) meant the use of dialects, jargons, slang, i.e. different varieties of SL, or elements of other languages in the source text. As he aptly noticed, geographical dialects are untranslatable not because of the linguistic differences but due to the associations they evoke in the readers. Thus, you cannot replace the dialect of Polish Podhale with the dialect of Scottish Highlanders because you will simply mislead your readers (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 90–91) or, as Berezowski (1997) put it, introduce different intertextuality.

To sum up all the translation difficulties connected with culture, it is best to quote Bronisław Malinowski. In his book *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, published in 1922, he presented two translations of a Kiriwina text. The first one was labelled “literal” (though we would rather call it “interlinear”):

> He might be first he fall down their canoe Tolabwaga, already he might be clear sea. Later on all chiefs, commoner their canoe they fall down behind. Supposing we fall down, we are first they might turn us spirits; we might go Dobu, no we find pig necklace.

Then a “free translation” followed:

> The Tolabwaga canoe would be launched first; by this the face of the sea is cleared. Afterwards, all the chiefs’, the commoners’ canoes are launched. If we would launch our canoes first, the spirits would be angry with us; we would go to Dobu and we would receive no pigs, no necklaces.
This translation was accompanied by two pages of explanations and a conclusion:

These considerations show convincingly that no linguistic analysis can disclose the full meaning of a text without the help of an adequate knowledge of the sociology, of the customs and of the beliefs, current in a given society. (Malinowski 1922: 454–459)

This clearly demonstrates that no translation is possible without a thorough knowledge of the culture in which the text was written.

Taking all the above factors into consideration, it becomes obvious that no translation can be a one-to-one reproduction of the original. Each translation is a compromise consisting of “better choices” and “lesser evils.” Each translation can be corrected ad infinitum, only deadlines make translations “finished.” This also explains the phenomenon of “translation series” (cf. Balcerzan 2010) — if each translation is just one of many possibilities, then it is always possible to try to produce a better or at least a different one.

If the arguments expressed so far have convinced the reader that translation is one of the most complicated intellectual tasks performed by human beings, then it is time to ask another question: what makes translation possible?

It seems that human beings are born with two basic mental characteristics: a need for well-being (including safety) and curiosity. The need for safety results in what Hans Hörmann (1981) called “sense constancy” — we need to see sense in what is going on around us to feel safe. Naturally, sense constancy may be reached on different levels; sometimes the first pseudo-explanation will satisfy the observer. On the other hand, curiosity produces — in some individuals — an urge to strive for sense, which was labelled “effort after meaning” by Frederic Bartlett (1932). People equipped with this quality to a large extent are never satisfied with the easiest explanations; they look for hidden meanings, read between the lines, discover nuances of meaning.

In the course of socialization another feature appears — empathy, the ability to identify with others, both emotionally and intellectually (if that is not extending the definition of empathy too much). As Eugene Nida put it, people have a “capacity for adjustment to the behavioral patterns of others [...] It would seem that we possess a kind of grid which we can employ to re-interpret experience in terms of some other conceptual framework…” (1964: 55). Needless to say, those qualities are developed to a different extent in different individuals. Nevertheless, I would like to claim that empathy and “effort after meaning” are absolutely basic requirements for a good translator.

If you take into account all that has been said so far, the role of cognitivism in translation studies hardly needs further explanation. If we are still interested in researching the translation process, describing the translator,
comparing translations with the originals, i.e. if we do not intend to limit our interests to studying “translations as facts of the target culture” (cf. Toury 1995; treated literally this postulate would change translation studies into some kind of sociology of culture), then we definitely need some cognitive theory to back us up.

I think that the choice of the theory depends to a large extent on the researcher’s personality and interests. No theory fully explains the reality. In the case of such complicated topics as the human mind and human communication, any theory can only illuminate some aspects of the field of study. Thus, the choice of one theory must also have — out of necessity — restrictive consequences.

The best known, and the most coherent, cognitive theories of translation are Ernst-August Gutt’s approach, based on Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s relevance theory (Gutt 1991; Sperber & Wilson 1986), and Elżbieta Tabakowska’s theory, based on Ronald W. Langacker’s “cognitive grammar” (Tabakowska 1993; Langacker 1987, 1991). The two approaches seem to be radically different. Relevance theory generalizes and looks for simple answers (sometimes too simple, perhaps). One almost gets the impression that with the help of this theory it is possible to explain and justify any decision of the translator. Cognitive grammar, on the other hand, concentrates on details, becoming an unwieldy tool for an ordinary translator (i.e. one who is not a linguist at the same time) though a very sensitive instrument for a translation critic.

My own approach, described in detail in earlier publications (Hejwowski 2004a, 2004b, 2015) is perhaps slightly eclectic, though it owes much to Charles Fillmore (e.g. Fillmore 1977) and his followers from the field of cognitive science (e.g. Schank 1982). We perceive and interpret the world around us (including the world described in texts) by means of certain mental categories. We classify the events as states, processes or activities, and we try to match them with the prototypical scenes stored in our memory. Such scenes have some participants and a certain setting, some of their elements are more salient, some remain in the background, they may also be accompanied by moral and/or aesthetic evaluation. Those scenes can, in most cases, be fairly easily expressed in words: we are usually able to name the participants, to find a verb expressing the type of event, to add evaluative adjectives. Thus, scenes activate certain words and — the other way round — words are associated with scenes in which they most commonly appear. Scenes can be organized in scripts — sequences of events, or in thematic networks. Translating means reconstructing the world in the source text, i.e. matching all the “in-text” events with scenes, organizing them into scripts and thematic networks, evaluating the author’s, the narrator’s, the character’s point of view, envisaging the source text reader’s reaction, and — only then — trying to produce a target language text that will presumably activate similar mental
structures and evoke similar reactions in target language readers. The whole process sounds complicated and the result may seem dubious and that is precisely why our ever faster and more efficient computers are still such poor translators. Incidentally, this also explains why there are no perfect translations. We cannot help losing some elements, aspects, qualities of the original. However, struggle against entropy is the essence of life. Even if we are bound to lose it in the end.

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Streszczenie

Tłumaczenie umysłów – kognitywizm i przekład

Jak zauważa Ivor A. Richards (1953: 250) w swoim słynnym cytacie na temat przekładu, tłumaczenie to prawdopodobnie jedno z najbardziej złożonych zdarzeń w dotychczasowej historii kosmosu. Wynika to z czterech podstawowych przyczyn:

1. samej natury przekładu,
2. natury ludzkiej komunikacji,
3. strukturalnych różnic między językami,
4. różnic między kulturami.


Wojtasiewicz (1957) poświęcił znacznać część swojej książki problemowi nieprzekładalności (my wolelibyszy tu jednak mówić o trudnościach z przekładem). Wyznają one z dwóch głównych przy-
czyn: różnic strukturalnych między językami i różnic kulturowych. Do pierwszej grupy Wojtasiewicz zalicza problemy związane z rodzajem gramatycznym, rodzajnikami, czasem i aspektem czasownika, zdrobnieniami i zgrubieniami, a także z fonetyką i grafią. Rozważmy jako przykład problemów z tłumaczeniem rodzaju gramatycznego Sonet 18 Szekspira i jego polskie przekłady. Sonet zaczyna się od następujących wersów:

\[
\text{Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?}
\]

\[
\text{Thou art more lovely and more temperate.}
\]

Specjaliści twierdzą, że sonet ten należy do „męskiej serii”, ale nie można tego wywnioskować z treści samego utworu. Problem polega na tym, że informacja o rodzaju gramatycznym jest obligatoryjnie wyrażana przez polskie przymiotniki, dlatego ewiwalenty \textit{lovely} i \textit{temperate} są z konieczności rodzaju męskiego lub żeńskiego. Także polskie czasowniki w czasie przeszłym muszą zawierać informację o rodzaju gramatycznym. Wszystko to wyjaśnia, dlaczego polska tłumaczenia powieści Jeanette Winterson \textit{Written on the Body}, w której narrator nigdy nie ujawnia swojej płci, poddala się i uczyniła narratora kobietą (wyjaśnia, ale nie usprawiedliwia, zob. także Hejewowski 2015: 275–286).

Wśród różnic kulturowych utrudniających przekład Wojtasiewicz wymienia terminy techniczne, aluzje erudycyjne i aluzje językowe. Terminy techniczne to nazwy różnych realiów kraju języka źródłowego, takie jak nazwy geograficzne, określenia roślin i zwierząt, zjawisk meteorologicznych, pojazdów, ubrań, instrumentów muzycznych i tańców, potraw i napojów, a także terminy prawne i polityczne (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 66–76). Oczywiście, trudności z przekładem dotyczą tylko terminów technicznych nieznanych w kulturze docelowej (por. Lewicki 2015), dlatego na przykład nie jest łatwo (choćb nie można tego uznać za niemożliwe) przetłumaczyć \textit{źurek} na angielski i \textit{Yorkshire pudding} na polski.

Aluzje erudycyjne, jak je rozmieści Wojtasiewicz, to aluzje do faktów oraz idei, które powinny być dobrze znane czytelnikom języka źródłowego. Jeśli te aluzje dotyka historii i kultury danego kraju, to jest bardzo prawdopodobne, że czytelnicy języka docelowego nie będą mieli wiedzy niezbędnej, aby je zrozumieć. Aluzje erudycyjne pojawiają się we wszystkich tekstach literackich (choćb nie tylko tam) i można je umieścić na skali całkowicie przetłumaczalne - nieprzetłumaczalne. Dla przykładu większość imion i nazwisk w \textit{Nowym, wspaniałym świecie} Huxleya zawiera aluzje do rzeczywistych osób. Niektóre z nich są całąk czywiste: Lenina, Marx, Trotsky, Darwin, Bonaparte. Inne prawdopodobnie sprawią trudności nawet czytelnikom języka źródłowego: Stopes, Kawaguchi, Bokanowski. Tłumacz może pozostawić czytelnikom trud odszyfrowania aluzji (co jest o wiele łatwiejsze w dobie Internetu niż było w czasach Huxleya i Wojtasiewicza) albo podać objaśnienie.

Przez aluzje językowe Wojtasiewicz rozumie użycie dialektów, żargonów, slangów i różnych odmian języka źródłowego lub elementów języków obcych w tekście źródłowym. Jak trafnie zauważa, dialekt są nieprzetłumaczalne nie z powodu różnic językowych, lecz skojarzeń, które wywołują u czytelników. Dlatego nie można zastąpić gwary podhalańskiej dialektem szkockich górali, ponieważ wprowadzi to czytelników w błąd (Wojtasiewicz 1957: 90–91) lub, jak to określa Berezowski (1997), przywoła inną intertekstualność.

Biorąc pod uwagę wszystkie powyższe czynniki, wydaje się oczywiste, że żaden przekład nie może być odwzorowaniem oryginału. Tłumaczenie jest kompromisem złożonym z lepszych wyborów i mniejszego zła. Każdy przekład może być poprawiany \textit{ad infinitum}, tylko terminy wydawnicze zmuszają tłumacza do zakończenia pracy.

Jeśli dotychczasowe argumenty przekonały czytelnika, że przekład jest jednym z najbardziej skomplikowanych zadań intelektualnych wykonywanych przez ludzkie istoty, to czas zadać kolejne pytanie: co sprawia, że tłumaczenie jest możliwe?

Wydaje się, że ludzie rodzą się z dwoma podstawowymi cechami umysłowymi: potrzebą dobrostanu (obejmującą bezpieczeństwo) i ciekawością. Potrzeba bezpieczeństwa prowadzi do tego, co Hans Hörmann (1981) nazywa trwałością sensu (sense constancy): musimy dostrzegać sens w tym, co nas otacza, aby czuć się bezpiecznie. Oczywiście, trwałość sensu można osiągnąć na różnych poziomach;
niektórym wystarczy pierwsze pseudoobjaśnienie. Z drugiej strony ciekawość prowadzi niektórych ludzi do zmagania o sens, co Frederic Bartlett (1932) określił jako wysiłek poszukiwania znaczenia (effort after meaning). Ludzie obdarzeni taką cechą w znacznym stopniu nie są nigdy zadowoleni z najprostszych wyjaśnień, poszukują ukrytych sensów, czytają między wierszami i odkrywają niuansowe znaczenia.

W toku socjalizacji pojawiła się jeszcze jedna cecha – empatia, zdolność identyfikowania się z innymi zarówno emocjonalnie, jako i intelektualnie. Chciałbym stwierdzić, że to właśnie empatia oraz wysiłek poszukiwania znaczenia są najbardziej podstawowymi warunkami decydującymi o tym, czy ktoś może być dobrym tłumaczem.

W świetle powyższych rozważań rola kognityzmu w przekładoznawstwie nie wymaga dalszych uzasadnień. Jeśli jesteśmy zainteresowani badaniem procesu tłumaczenia, opisem pracy tłumacza, porównywaniem przekładów z oryginałami, innymi słowy – jeśli nie zamierzamy ograniczyć naszych zainteresowań do studiowania „przekładów jako faktów kultury docelowej” (por. Toury 1995), potrzebujemy nieodwołalnie wsparcia jakiejś teorii kognitywnej.

Wybór teorii zależy w dużej mierze od osobowości badacza i jego zainteresowań. Żadna teoria nie wyjaśnia w pełni rzeczywistości, więc każdy wybór niesie ze sobą różne ograniczenia.


Streszczenie przygotowała Agnieszka Libura

**Bibliografia**


Onstage or off, or somewhere in between?

Intersubjectivity markers in Dawkins and Lennox’s debate “Has science buried God?”

The “mutual apprehension of other minds,” which is a “central if not a defining feature of intersubjectivity” (Langacker 2007: 182) is not directly observable. However, it can be analysed through language use, particularly the pronouns I, you, we (Langacker 2008: 78). These pronouns put the Speaker/Hearer “onstage” through explicit mention. Hence, an analysis of how debaters use personal pronouns may shed light on how the (inter)subjectivity inherent in public debates is expressed through language.

This paper looks at the use of you and its derivatives in the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox “Has science buried God?” held at the Oxford Museum. While this debate has already been analysed in terms of cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska forthcoming, 2016), it is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of different perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways those perspectives may be construed. Specifically, it considers how the choice to (not) use personal pronouns affects both the argument and the speaker’s relationship with their interlocutor. This debate in particular is an ideal source for such a study as, in exit interviews, members of the audience recognized this debate to be one in which the opponents not only listened to each other, but also seemed to exhibit mutual respect. Thus, it seems safe to assume that each speaker was making a conscious effort to invite his opponent and the audience to see the universe and the meaning of life from his own vantage point. This presupposes awareness of the other minds involved in the debate; hence, fertile ground for an analysis of intersubjectivity.

The analysis shows that Dawkins and Lennox use second person pronouns for different purposes. This raises questions for future research; for example, are these differences related to Dawkins’ and Lennox’s individual debate styles or are they characteristic of scholars who share their distinct worldviews?
1. Introduction

The issue of intersubjectivity, or the “mutual apprehension of other minds” (Langacker 2007: 182), is of interest both for theoretical cognitive linguistics and discourse analysis. While all texts assume some level of intersubjectivity, the debate, by nature, requires a heightened awareness of the other person’s mind or thinking process. Moreover, the format allows the participants to use various means of including his/her interlocutor in the debate or even putting him/her “onstage” through the use of personal pronouns.

This study looks at the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox “Has science buried God?” held at the Oxford Museum. While this debate has already been analysed in terms of cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska forthcoming, 2016), it is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways these perspectives may be construed. As such, this paper is part of a larger project that will attempt to analyse the linguistic markers of intersubjectivity in debate.

The participants of a debate fit the canonical viewing arrangement in that they are usually in a 1-1 Speaker/Hearer (S/H) relationship, located in the same place and at the same time (cf. Langacker 2007). However, there are certain unique elements that affect the nature of this type of 1-1 dialogue. The most obvious, perhaps, is that this conversation has an audience and, very often, a moderator who controls and directs the discussion with questions. At the same time, the debaters represent philosophically different viewpoints. Their goal is to convince the audience, and perhaps even their interlocutor, to view the issue, in this case, if science has made belief in God superfluous, from their own philosophical vantage point.

This article begins with a brief review of the notions of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity from the perspective of cognitive linguistics with a focus on Langacker’s definitions and applications of the terms. Then the research aims, debate context and methodology applied are presented. These sections are followed by the results, which include statistical information regarding the use of second person pronouns by Dawkins and Lennox as well as a qualitative analysis of excerpts from the debate. The paper concludes with a discussion followed by ideas for future research.

2. Theoretical foundations

The terms subjective and objective are commonly used in everyday English to mark the difference between opinionated (subjective) and unbiased/factual (objective) information. However, these words take on different meanings...
in different academic disciplines. Thus, it is crucial that we establish the linguistic definitions that will be used in this project so that these non-linguistic salient meanings do not interrupt analysis (cf. Giora 1999).

The issue of subjectivity and objectivity is complex and raises controversy even within linguistic theories. For instance, Langacker (2007), Verhagen (2003) and Closs-Traugott (2010) all draw attention to new perspectives on speech acts and the calculation of implicatures provided by looking at these “pragmatic” puzzles from the perspective of intersubjectivity. However, they do so from different theoretical approaches to the relationship between language, cognition and social interaction. Langacker highlights the importance of understanding the construal of “I” (canonical speaker) and “you” (canonical listener) as dependent on an intersubjective relationship that can be analysed as a blend. Verhagen focuses on the argumentative — or persuasive — nature of communication and states “the process of verbal communication involves partially shared and partially divergent experiential-conceptual content, that communicating subjects attempt to coordinate on by means of (the speaker) attempting to influence the other’s inferences and (the addressee) assessing such attempts” (Verhagen 2008: 307). Although Closs-Traugott (2010) accepts the importance of the speaker’s consideration of the hearer, she sees meanings as encoded in language and transferred, as opposed to negotiated. As a result, she suggests analysing linguistic markers that index subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This differs distinctly from work by cognitive linguists, who view intersubjectivity as something that is primarily conceptual and only secondarily reveals itself in language. Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned authors, despite their different philosophical approaches to language, would agree that “the very fact of communicating with another person entails general intersubjectivity” (Traugott 2010: 30).

According to Verhagen (2005: 4–5), despite the variety of publications and linguistic theories mentioned above, three distinct uses of subjectivity/objectivity can be found in the literature:

1. as a way of distinguishing between the viewer (subject) and object under investigation,
2. as a way of distinguishing between information that is personal (subjective) and publicly available (objective),
3. as elements of construal (per Langacker’s description of Cognitive Grammar).

Verhagen claims that Langacker’s approach provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with the other two definitions “simultaneously and in an integrated way.” He cites Langacker’s (1987: 487–488) definition of the construal relationship, which is worth repeating here: “The relationship between a speaker (or hearer) and a situation that he conceptualizes and portrays, involving focal adjustments and imagery.” This corresponds to Langacker’s viewing

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2 A review of these different perspectives can be found in Nicolle (2007).
Onstage or off, or somewhere in between?

arrangement in which the S/H use language to focus the other’s attention on the same object of conceptualization. For this reason, and because Langacker is specifically interested in the use of personal pronouns as markers of objectivity and (inter)subjectivity, it is his definition of the terms as part of Cognitive Grammar that I describe below and apply in analysing the transcript.

2.1. Subjectivity/objectivity

Within the framework of Cognitive Grammar, subjectivity/objectivity refers to the degree to which S/H, or other elements of the ground, are put “onstage,” or made objective, through implicit or explicit mention. Langacker (2008: 78) explains:

In their tacit role as subjects of conception, the speaker and hearer are always part of the conceptual substrate supporting an expression’s meaning. If that is their only role, they are always implicit and construed with maximal subjectivity. To varying degrees, however, they can themselves function as objects of conception, in which case they are more salient by virtue of being construed more objectively. The extreme is to put them onstage as the focus of attention: with the first- and second-person pronouns (I, you, we, and their variants), the speaker and hearer are profiled, explicitly mentioned, and objectively construed.

Hence, the terms “subjective” and “objective,” in Langacker’s understanding, do not describe definite categories, but extreme points on a continuum. Moreover, subjectivity is not construed as the speaker’s opinion, but the extent to which the speaker is present in the utterance. This is a crucial difference from the understanding of subjectivity/objectivity in other discourses and disciplines, where it is viewed as a difference between fact and opinion or public and personal knowledge, as has been mentioned in the previous section, and deserves emphasis.

For me [Langacker], however, it is a matter of perspective. Moreover, only a particular entity (not an expression overall) is said to be subjectively or objectively construed. Whether boor means “farmer” or “crude person”, for example, its profiled referent is the onstage focus of attention, hence objectively construed, whereas the speaker remains an implicit locus of judgement and is thus construed subjectively. This is not to deny that the speaker’s attitude becomes more evident in the later meaning, the primary content being evaluative, but the speaker carries out this evaluation without becoming the focused target of conception. (Langacker 2008: 78)

Langacker gives the example of boor, which, although it may have a negative connotation, is fully objective as a discrete unit. It only becomes subjective when the speaker includes the ground (S/H and their context) in the conversation. This can be achieved through several grounding devices.
including tense and deixis markers. Figure 1 places possible utterances on Langacker’s continuum. Only nouns are truly objective. The middle sentence is subjective to the speaker and hearer: it is grounded in the given discourse context through the use of the, which requires that both S/H know what cat is being talked about, and the location behind, which places S/H on the other side of the fridge. Present tense also places the utterance and the situation/picture in the same moment. The far-right utterance further objectifies the hearer by placing him/her onstage, within the S/H conceptualization of the event.

Langacker (2007: 181) suggests that another way of understanding this continuum is through analysing what elements are onstage and off stage in different imperatives. He gives three examples with the verb leave, which I have graphed in Figure 2.

In the first utterance, only the act of leaving is placed onstage; the speaker and hearer are fully subjective. In the second utterance, both the hearer and the act of leaving are objectified. In the third example, both S/H, as well as the actions of ordering and leaving, are onstage and fully objective. This is an important distinction from the uses of subjective and objective in other fields of study.

2.2. INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Intersubjectivity is unique to the human species (Tomasello 2000) and realized in language through the use of, e.g., personal pronouns (Langacker 2007), negatives (Verhagen 2005), epistemic complementation constructions (Almeida & Ferrari 2012; Verhagen 2005), determiners (Langacker 2007), and imperatives (Langacker 2007).

Personal pronouns play a pivotal role in “the mutual apprehension of other minds,” which Langacker argues is a “central if not a defining feature of intersubjectivity” (2007: 182). He argues (Langacker 2007: 185) that the intersubjectivity inherent in face-to-face dialogue is the result of a multi-space blend (after Fauconnier & Turner 2002). One input space contains a blend of S and H, in which the roles are constantly reversing during the course of the conversation, a second input space is the situation
in which S(H’) is the object of conceptualization and a third has H(S’) as the object of conceptualization. In the blend, both S and H are objects of conceptualization in the onstage region and subjects of conceptualization in the ground. This interaction can be schematically illustrated according to Figure 3.

While the blending of S/H as the subject/object of conceptualization is implicit in all communication, which is intersubjective by nature, it is made explicit through the use of I and you. Thus, in the examples with leave in Figure 2, it is important to note that while S/H are fully objective in the third utterance — I order you to leave — they are also fully subjective.

3. Research aims

The aim of this paper is to analyse the use of you, and its derivatives, in the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox “Has science buried God?” Previous analysis of this debate has included cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska 2015, 2016). This particular debate has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, both participants are experienced debaters and have encountered each other before. Secondly, in exit interviews, members of the audience recognized this debate as the one in which the opponents both listened to each other and seemed to exhibit mutual respect. Thirdly, given the context and setting, it can be assumed that each speaker was making a conscious effort to invite his opponent and the audience to see the universe and the meaning of life from his own vantage point. Finally, this desire to invite others to accept one’s viewpoint presupposes the awareness of the other minds involved in the debate; hence, fertile ground for an analysis of intersubjectivity.
This research project focuses on the following questions:
1. How frequently do the speakers use second person pronouns?
2. What discursive effect do these pronouns have?
3. What differences in second person pronoun usage, if any, can be seen in Dawkins’s and Lennox’s debate styles?
4. How does this choice affect
a. the argument?
b. the speaker’s relationship with their interlocutor and audience?

It is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways those perspectives may be construed.

4. **Context**

Before discussing the lexicalization of (inter)subjectivity in the debate, it is necessary to establish the ground, that is, the context in which the debate occurs and the debaters, moderators, and (possibly) audiences shared knowledge. Both Dawkins and Lennox can be considered as experienced debaters and apologists for their personal worldviews.

Richard Dawkins is an evolutionary biologist, ethologist, and author. He earned his MA and DPhil in zoology at Oxford University. From 1995 to 2008 he was the Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University. He has written many books on evolution and what he believes to be the theory’s incompatibility with belief in God including *The Blind Watchmaker* (1996 /1986/), *The Magic of Reality* (2011) and the autobiographical *A Brief Candle in the Dark* (2015). He is a fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal Society of Literature (https://richarddawkins.net/richarddawkins/ ED September 2016).

John Lennox is a mathematician, philosopher, and author. He earned his MA, MMath and PhD from Cambridge University, DSc from the University of Wales in Cardiff, MA and DPhil from Oxford University, and MA in Bioethics from the University of Surrey. He is currently a professor of Mathematics at the University of Oxford and Emeritus Fellow in Mathematics and the Philosophy of Science at Green Templeton College, Oxford (among other places). His books focus on the necessity of God’s handiwork in the process of evolution and include *God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?* (2009 /2007/) and *Gunning for God: Why the New Atheists Are Missing the Target* (2011) (http://www.johnlennox.org/about/). The debate, organized by Fixed Point, borrows the title from Lennox (2009 /2007/).

Due to the complexity and frequent false dichotomies in debates concerning faith and evolution (cf. Barczewska 2017), I would like to emphasize the similarities between Dawkins and Lennox. Both are professors in their given
field: Dawkins in zoology and Lennox in mathematics and philosophy. Both are Oxford professors. Both are recognized debaters for their positions. Both accept evolution. In other words, this is neither “creationism vs. evolution,” nor “theologian vs. scientist.” Questions raised in the debate include the following:
- Can evolution be explained by purely natural/random processes?
- Is it more probable that we will find a natural or supernatural cause for the fine-tuning of the universe?
- If we are the product of purely natural/random processes, how can we trust our own reasoning?
- Is it reasonable to believe in God?

In presenting their arguments and questioning their opponents, the participants exploit greater and lesser degrees of objectivity, thereby inviting their interlocutor and audience to interact on different levels of (inter)subjectivity. It is these similarities and differences that are analysed in this paper.

5. Methodology

The transcript of the debate was taken from the automatic captioning on YouTube, which proved to be error-ridden. Hence, it was edited/completed by Aleksandra Górska and Shala Barczewska (unpublished). I annotated the transcript according to speaker and used WordSmith Tools 6 (Scott 2017) to search for the pronouns you, your, yourself, yours for each speaker. Each instance of a pronoun was marked according to its place on the objective/subjective/inter-subjective continuum. The markings used for this stage of analysis are provided in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P2_OS</td>
<td>2nd person onstage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_CL</td>
<td>2nd person clarification/questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_DM</td>
<td>2nd person discourse marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_EP</td>
<td>2nd person epistemic (mental activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_EP_NEG</td>
<td>2nd person epistemic negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_EXP</td>
<td>2nd person experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_H</td>
<td>2nd person, hypothetical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_RS</td>
<td>2nd person reported speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>impersonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>repeated/deleted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Tags for second person pronouns

4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0UIbdoeLxw
5 This edited version also contains Górska’s markings included for the conversational analysis.
6 The research project also includes we, our, ours, ourselves; however, it was decided to keep this paper focused on the use of you.
To provide a better understanding of these tags, a sample of how the transcript was marked is provided in Table 2. Some markings require further explanation. OS designates situations where the speaker places himself or his interlocutor onstage as a part of his argument in the debate. RS (reported speech) differs from EP (epistemic) in that EP identifies instances where the speaker attributes a perspective belief or feeling to his interlocutor which is not necessarily grounded in what has been said. Repeated phrases, which could indicate a stutter or mis-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Discourse marker</td>
<td>D: &lt;P1_DM&gt; I mean, that is, that is deeply against the spirit of science. L: but we know of no other conceivable way of it being generated &lt;P2_DM&gt; you see […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Clarification</td>
<td>D: &lt;P2_CL&gt; you really think that the, the creator of this magnificent edifice of the universe, these- the expanding universe the galaxies L: don’t let me put words in &lt;P2_CL&gt; your mouth, of course that would be unfair (1.0) but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Onstage</td>
<td>D: &lt;P2_OS&gt; you- we- we- both of us are faced with the problems of saying how did things start L: I find &lt;P2_OS&gt; your writings so fascinating because of the metaphors and images &lt;P2_OS&gt; you use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Epistemic (mental) verb</td>
<td>D: I mean &lt;P2_EP&gt; you think &lt;P2_H&gt; you’re going to survive &lt;P2_H&gt; your own death I gather L: &lt;P2_EP&gt; you believe, (.) that this universe is just freak accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXP</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>D: well &lt;P2_EXP&gt; you must talk to different historians than the one I talked to L: in &lt;P2_EXP&gt; your world (3.0) where is justice (4.0) to be found?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identifying</td>
<td>D: &lt;P2_ID&gt; you as a scientist will explain that by gravity L: By definition as an atheist &lt;P2_ID&gt; you must reject that, there’s no but- mind behind this language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Reported speech</td>
<td>D: Well John, &lt;P2_RS&gt; you said that &lt;P1_EP&gt; I believe that the universe is L: When &lt;P2_RS&gt; you say it’s anti-scientific, I don’t think it’s anti-scientific at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2_H</td>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
<td>D: &lt;R&gt; you could, &lt;P2_H&gt; you could possibly persuade &lt;P1_EP_H&gt; me that there was some kind of creative force in the universe L: I get the impression that, &lt;P2_EP_NEG&gt; you’re not taking history really seriously. Otherwise, &lt;P2_H&gt; you’d interact with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>D: So, so &lt;P3&gt; you don’t jump over the cliff because &lt;P3&gt; you understand the meaning of jumping over a cliff is that &lt;P3&gt; you’re going to die. L: That’s exactly true. &lt;P3&gt; you wouldn’t recognize if dead people were popping up all over the place, &lt;P3&gt; you wouldn’t think it was very special but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Repeated/deleted</td>
<td>D: Well &lt;R&gt; you’ve the… &lt;P2_RS&gt; you’re asserting there’s no way. L: &lt;R&gt; you use words like- &lt;R&gt; you lose- &lt;P2_RS&gt; you use words like blind and automatic this watch is blind and automatic but it’s been designed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Onstage or off, or somewhere in between?

start are not tagged as an additional occurrence of, e.g., a discourse marker; instead they are marked R and not included in further analysis.

6. Results and analysis

6.1. Statistical overview of pronoun usage

Table 3 lists the number of occurrences for each word according to speaker. Raw numbers as well as a standardized ratio (per 1000 words) is provided. A quick glance at the table shows that you is used slightly more often by Dawkins (per 1,000 words) and your — more often by Lennox; however, these differences are not statistically significant. Despite this apparent similarity between the debaters, the way these pronouns are used differs substantially.

The first thing we observe (Figure 4 and Figure 5) is that the intensity with which these pronouns are used varies according to speaker as the debate progresses. Dawkins begins with a relatively limited use of second person pronouns, intensifies his use mid-debate and continues using them through to the closing. Conversely, although Lennox is consistent in using second person pronouns throughout the debate, his use is most concentrated in the very beginning, in his opening statement, which we will analyse in the following section. It almost appears as if the two plots are mirror representations of each other, as Dawkins increases his use of the second person pronoun, Lennox, particularly in his closing, decreases his. One possible explanation is that the debaters, consciously or subconsciously, were attempting to adjust to the other person’s debate style.

![Figure 4. Dispersion plot of Dawkins’s use of you](image1)

Table 3. Occurrences of first and second person pronouns according to speaker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dawkins (4681 words)</th>
<th></th>
<th>LENNOX (5336 words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Word</strong></td>
<td><strong>Occurrences</strong></td>
<td><strong>Per 1,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>Word</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOU</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>20.51</td>
<td>YOU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOUR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>YOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOURSELF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>YOURSELF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>22.43</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 5. Dispersion plot of Lennox’s use of you](image2)
Differences also occur in the way these pronouns are used. The pie charts in Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrate these differences graphically. The results are discussed after each.

Dawkins’s debate style favours using *you* to refer to a generic, unspecified individual or to ask his interlocutor to consider some hypothetical situation. He rarely uses *you* to refer to his opponent’s thoughts or beliefs; however, he does use *you* in discourse markers and to report what Lennox has said earlier in the debate.

Lennox’s use of *you* differs. He frequently employs second person pronouns to comment on Dawkins’s thoughts/beliefs and to report or clarify what Dawkins has said.
Two of these differences are statistically significant: Lennox’s use of *you* to place his interlocutor onstage (p = 0.01093) and Dawkins’s use of *you* as a third person pronoun (p = 0.03457). The excerpts in the following section will demonstrate how these uses affect the debater’s style in terms of (inter)subjectivity.

### 6.2. ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSIVE ROLE OF THESE PRONOUNS

In this section, we will look at two excerpts from the debate and observe how each debater uses these personal pronouns to put themselves and/or their interlocutor on/off stage. The first excerpt comes from Dawkins’s introductory comments.

D: **John Lennox** is a scientist who believes that Jesus turned water into wine (.) a scientist who believes that Jesus somehow influenced all those molecules of H2O, and introduced proteins and carbohydrates and tannins and alcohol (.) and turned it into (.) wine. **he** believes that Jesus (.) walked on water. [...] I had been accustomed to debating with sophisticated theologians (.) and I come across **John Lennox** who’s a scientist who believes in all those things in particular (hh) **he** believes that [...] 9

The first thing we notice is that Dawkins chooses to use the third person, rather than *you*, to refer to Lennox. This has the discursive effect of creating distance between the debaters. Apart from Dawkins’s reference to his own experience, he keeps himself off-stage. At the same time, despite recognizing that Lennox is a scientist, it is Lennox’s beliefs, not his experience, that Dawkins chooses to put onstage (cf. Górska 2016).

Conversely, Lennox addresses Dawkins directly in his response, placing his interlocutor and his beliefs onstage.

L: (2.0) Well Richard, erm, thank <P2_DM>*you* for explaining so clearly at least in part what I believe, erm (.) I’m glad to hear <P2_RS>*you* saying that (hh) <P2_RB>*you* feel a good case could be made out that there is rationality behind the universe <P2_RS>*you* said it’s not something <P2_RS>*you* personally accept.

So, <P2_RB>*you* believe, (.) that this universe is just freak accident, there’s no mind behind it, and yet here <compliment>*you* are with one of the best minds in the world.

So <P2_RB>*you* believe a number of things that I as a scientist find very difficult to believe.

Lennox engages Dawkins at the intersubjective level with discourse markers that address his interlocutor, while at the same time using reported speech and reported beliefs to place Dawkins’s opinions onstage. His strategy seems to be to attempt to directly engage Dawkins, at times even complementing him — *with one of the best minds in the world* — before criticizing him — *you*

8 P values were calculated using the occurrences of second person pronouns as the base, if the total word count for each debater is used, the p-values suggest even greater significance (p = 0.009719 and 0.01228, respectively).

9 For an in-depth analysis of the discursive role of *scientist* in this debate, see Barczewska (2017) and Górska (2016).
believe a number of things that I as a scientist find very difficult to believe. This final statement accomplishes a number of things at the level of intersubjectivity. First, it places Dawkins, his intelligence, and his opinions onstage for examination. Secondly, it does so without belittling them. Thirdly, when Lennox places himself onstage with Dawkins to criticize Dawkins’s position, he does so from the perspective of a scientist, thereby reversing the belief-science relationship presupposed by Dawkins in the first exchange (cf. Górska 2016).

The second fragment that we will look at is Dawkins’s explanation of what truth is. Just as the previous fragment provided a representative illustration of how Lennox uses second person pronouns, this excerpt illustrates Dawkins’s usage. Notice that his use of you does not refer to Lennox or the audience, but to any or all individuals. Thus, it is hard to view this as evidence of intersubjectivity.

D: Truth is what happens, an animal that er that was attempting to survive, and it didn’t recognize truth or falsehood in some sense, at whatever level is appropriate for the kind of surviving that it has, it wouldn’t survive. I mean truth just means that you’re living in the real world, and <P3> you behave in the real world in such a way as things make sense. In the real world when <P3> you see a rock in your way you don’t go charging into it. You’d die if you did that. You jump over a cliff you die. That’s truth. It’s perfectly obvious that natural selection would favour, in any animal, a brain that behaves in a, in a way that recognizes truth, and acts upon it.

The final excerpt that we will look at involves Lennox putting both himself and Dawkins onstage as objects of conceptualization. This constitutes part of his argument for the personal/relational aspect of the God of the Bible, whom Lennox worships.

L: yes, but (therefore) the question to be decided then, (.) is (.) is there a God, and has he revealed himself? And that’s where again I think this pettiness needs to be pushed aside. Because (.) I can’t get to know you as a person. You’re not just a scientific object. I can look at you through a- a- a- telescope or a magnifying glass I could even dissect you and so and so forth, but because you are a person I cannot get to know you unless you’re prepared to reveal yourself to me. So, (.) the fact (.) that (.) the claim of Christ to be the truth to be the God incarnate, that makes perfect sense to me […] so one of the very important questions to ask is, is that really true or is this simply myth and fantasy?

The dialogue continues with a short rebuttal from Dawkins; however, what is interesting here is that Dawkins responds to Lennox’s attempt at personalizing the debate.

D: (1.0) well, myth and fantasy for me (3.0)

Then Lennox, while keeping the intersubjective nature of the debate in the foreground, adds historical evidence to his personal arguments and
Onstage or off, or somewhere in between?

asks Dawkins to link the two. In other words, he keeps Dawkins onstage, but moves the debate from the hypothetical to the historical.

36:54 L: Yes well (1.0) d’you know, that disturbs me for the following reason, reading your book. The God Delusion. you say that (.) it’s under scholarly dispute among historians that Jesus actually existed. Now, I’ve checked with the ancient historians. that is not so. (.) and it disturbed me. History is not natural science. But- what I don’t understand is this, why you would write something like that

[...]

37:37 D: Um, well, there are one or two, but I don’t really care actually because it, precisely because it’s petty. I mean I cannot repeat, you could, you could possibly persuade me that there was some kind of creative force in the universe, there was some kind of uh physical mathematical genius who, who created everything the expanding universe devised quantum theory, relativity and all that. You could possibly persuade me of that, but that is radically and fundamentally incompatible with the sort of god who cares about sins, the sort of god who cares about what, what you do with your genitals the sort of god who, who, who is interested in, who has the slightest interest in your private thoughts, wickednesses and things like that. Surely you can see a god who is grand enough to make the universe is not going to give a truepenny cuss about what it what, what you’re thinking about him and your sins and things like that

The exchange in this excerpt is one of the few in which Dawkins readily uses first and second person pronouns to place himself onstage or to directly interact with Lennox. At the same time, it is still possible to observe a shift in meaning from the personal to the impersonal.

7. Discussion

In summary, statistically speaking, there is no significant difference between the number of times each debater uses second person pronouns. Both Dawkins and Lennox use hypothetical situations and the impersonal you to put the issues onstage and provide some distance between themselves and their argument; however, Dawkins uses this strategy more often and that difference is statistically significant. Dawkins’s use of you* is frequently impersonal or somewhere on a continuum between referring to his co-debater or the audience and an impersonal, unknown, hypothetical individual. Lennox uses you* more often to engage Dawkins directly and put him and his views onstage. When given the opportunity to respond in these contexts, Dawkins often chooses to switch to the third person and talk about the opinions of an unspecified populace (cf. Górska 2016). Despite this tendency, the plot diagram in section 6.1 suggests an increase in Dawkins’s use of second person pronouns during the course of the debate and a decrease in Lennox’s use. However, there is insufficient data to
suggest whether the change is internal to the speaker’s individual debate styles or represents a subconscious or conscious attempt to adapt to the other’s strategy.

8. **Conclusions and Future Research**

This study raises several questions that could serve as springboards for future research. Firstly, are these differences due to Lennox’s and Dawkins’s individual debate styles, or do they fit into a larger pattern? For instance, are they topic specific (God inspired/enabled science vs. naturalistic science) or viewpoint specific (Christian vs. atheist)? Secondly, do other debates exhibit tendencies of one interlocutor adopting the style of the other. If so, when does this occur? Finally, how do the different ways in which intersubjectivity is lexicalized affect the audiences’ reception of the debaters’ arguments? These are just a few of the directions that future research could take.

**References**


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Streszczenie

Na scenie, poza sceną czy gdzieś pomiędzy? Znaczniki intersubiektywności w debacie Dawkinsa i Lennoxa „Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga?”


W tym artykule zajmiemy się użyciem you (‘ty’) i jego wariantów w debacie między Richardem Dawkinsem i Johnem Lennoxem, która odbyła się w 2008 roku w Muzeum w Oksfordzie jako druga z czterech debat pomiędzy tymi uczonymi (Taunton 2014). Debata ta była przedmiotem analizy pod kątem metafor kontekstualnych (Drogosz & Górka w druku) i strategii retorycznych (Górka 2015, 2016). Uważamy jednak, że uwzględnienie w analizie (inter)subiektywności pozwoli na pogłębienie rozumienia różnych perspektyw ujmowania relacji pomiędzy nauką a religią, jak również sposobów konstruowania tych perspektyw. W szczególności pozwoli na uwzględnienie wpływu (nie)użycia zaimka osobowego zarówno na argumentację, jak i relację między mówiącym i jego rozmówcą. Wspomniana debata dostarcza idealnego materiału do tych badań. Widzowie podkreślali, że uczestnicy debaty nie tylko słuchali się wzajemnie, ale także okazywali sobie wzajemny szacunek. Można więc założyć, że każdy mówiący starał się zaprosić swojego oponenta i widownię do spojrzenia na świat i sens życia z jego perspektywy, a to z kolei zakłada uwzględnienie innych umysłów uczestniczących w debacie i, w konsekwencji, znakomity materiał do analizy intersubiektywności.

W związku z częstymi pozornymi dychotomiami w dyskusjach na temat religii i nauki, a w szczególności ewolucji (por. Barczewska 2017), konieczne jest przedstawienie dodatkowych informacji na temat uczestników debaty i pytań, które w tej debacie stawiano. Zarówno Dawkins, jak i Lennox są doktorami nauk w swoich dyscyplinach — Dawkins w dziedzinie zoologii, a Lennox w dziedzinie matematyki i filozofii; obaj są autorami licznych publikacji na tematy związane z wiarą i nauką; obaj szeroko propagują swoje stanowisko; obaj uznają istnienie ewolucji. Innymi słowy, nie mamy do czynienia z opozycją „kreacjonizm/ewolucjonizm” czy „teolog/naukowiec”. Pytania podniesione w debacie obejmują następujące kwestie: 1) Czy można wyjaśnić ewolucję jedynie jako działanie naturalnych i nieukierunkowanych procesów; 2) Czy jest bardziej prawdopodobne, że znajdziemy naturalną czy nadprzyrodzoną siłę jako przyczynę działania wszechświata; 3. Jeżeli jesteśmy produktem działania naturalnych i nieukierunkowanych procesów, to jak możemy opierać się na naszym rzeczywistym; 4. Czy wiara w Boga jest racjonalna?

Wystąpienia you, yours, yourself zostały otagowane w odniesieniu do ich roli w dialogu (np. jako znacznik dyskursu, jako odniesienie do doświadczenia, do czynności umysłowej, jako generencyczny znacznik 3. osoby i jako opis sytuacji hipotetycznej). Dzięki temu udało się ustalić, że Dawkins i Lennox używają zaimków 2. osoby (you, yours, yourself) do innych celów. Analiza pokazała, że ponad 25% użyć Dawkinsa ma charakter bezosobowy, tj. słowa te nie odnoszą się bezpośrednio do jego rozmówcy. W przypadku Lennoxa jest to 9%. Styl debaty Lennoxa obejmuje proszenie rozmówcy o ocenę jego stanowiska w kategoriach bezpośredniego doświadczenia, co często oznacza umieszczenie rozmówcy na scenie. W związku z tym Dawkins staje się częścią argumentacji, w której Lennox przedstawia swoje poglądy. Przykładem tego może być fragment, w którym Lennox opowiada się za koniecznością wcielenia w sensie religijnym, opisując, czym dla niego byłoby „poznać” Dawkinsa.

I can’t get to know you as a person. You’re not just a scientific object. I can look at you through a-a-telescope or a magnifying glass I could even dissect you and so and so forth, but because you are a person I cannot get to know you unless you’re prepared to reveal yourself to me.

[Nie mogę poznać cię jako osobę. Nie jesteś tylko obiektem badań naukowych. Mogę patrzeć na ciebie przez teleskop lub szkło powiększające, mogę cię rozłożyć na czynniki pierwsze i tak dalej, ale ponieważ jesteś osobą, nie mogę poznać cię, dopóki nie będziesz gotowy otworzyć się przede mną.]

Jest to odpowiedź na powtarzane przez Dawkinsa stwierdzenie, że kwestia istnienia Jezusa jest mało istotna, a jego wcielenie irracjonalne. Konstruując swoje argumenty, Lennox umieszcza zarówno siebie, jak i swojego rozmówcę na scenie, zlewając podmiot i przedmiot konstruowania.

Z drugiej strony, Dawkins często używa 3. osoby w odniesieniu do Lennoxa. Często od tego zaczyna swoją wypowiedź, opisując poglądy Lennoxa i przedstawiając ich ocenę. Kiedy Dawkins de-cyduje się na you, najczęściej odnosi się ono do hipotetycznej lub nieokreślonej 3. osoby. Na przykład, kiedy wyjaśnia sens słowa meaning:

So, so you don’t jump over the cliff because you understand the meaning of jumping over a cliff is that you’re going to die.

[Tak więc nie skaczesz z klifu, ponieważ rozumiesz znaczenie skakania z klifu, wiesz, że zginiesz.]

Podobnie jak w przykładzie Lennoxa, you jest umieszczona na scenie, jednak w tym kontekście nie odnosi się ani do rozmówcy, ani do widzów, ale do ludzi w ogólności.

Nawet w kontekstach, kiedy Dawkins jest zmuszony użyć you w odniesieniu do swojego rozmówcy, jak w przypadku obrony wcielenia przez Lennoxa, stara się on zmienić znaczenie you. Jego pierwsze użycie zaimka odnosi się do Lennoxa, ale już drugie i trzecie użycie nie wskazuje bezpośrednio na Lennoxa, ale na bezosobowego, hipotetycznego „innego”:

Surely you can see a god who is grand enough to make the universe is not going to give a truepenny cuss about what it what, you’re thinking about him and your sins and things like that. (Zapewne zgodzisz się, że bóg na tyle wielki, aby stworzyć świat, nie będzie się interesował tym, co się o nim myśli, naszymi grzechami i tym podobnym.)

Chociaż Dawkins angażuje się bardziej bezpośrednio niż Lennox, zwłaszcza pod koniec debaty, jego ogólna strategia polega na umieszczaniu na scenie swojego poglądu na sens życia, na obronie
tego poglądu, a następnie na zostawieniu słuchaczowi decyzji co do przyjęcia czy odrzucenia takiego konstruowania. Sprawa ma się inaczej z Lennoxem, który używa zaimków 2. osoby, aby objąć Dawkinsa i nakłonić go do spojrzenia na sens życia z jego perspektywy.

Powyższe obserwacje otwierają dalsze pytania badawcze, np. czy te różnice wynikają z indywidualnego stylu debaty Dawkinsa i Lennoxa, czy też są cechą charakterystyczną badaczy podzielszących ich poglądy.

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The paper is concerned with the use of corpus-based methods to deal with issues in cognitive semantics. It presents an overview of the main strands of research combining corpus-based methodology with the theoretical perspective of cognitive linguistics (i.e. behavioral profile approach, collostructional analysis). In particular, the paper presents an attempt to assess the applicability of corpus-based methods to studying schematic constructional meanings. Using highlights from Kaleta’s 2014 research on English clausal complementation, it pinpoints the strengths and limitations of corpus methodology as a tool for investigating the meanings of abstract syntactic categories. The paper emphasizes the importance of corpora and the methods associated with them for descriptive analysis of syntactic constructions. For example, it shows how the method of distinctive collexeme analysis can be effectively applied to investigate subtle differences in meaning between nearly-synonymous gerundive and infinitival constructions. However, the paper also highlights the limitations of the corpus-based methods when it comes to explanatory analysis. As has been argued, the problematic areas include the high degree of abstractness of syntactic meanings, on the one hand, and the lack of direct correlations between corpus frequencies and abstract mental representations of language, on the other.
1. COGNITIVE SEMANTICS, THE USAGE-BASED MODEL AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS: SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

For almost four decades of its presence on the linguistic scene, cognitive linguistics (henceforth CL) has managed to establish itself as a viable theoretical framework for linguistic analysis. This is evidenced by an ever increasing community of linguists categorizing themselves as ‘cognitive’ and an ever growing number of cognitive linguistic events ranging from small scale, regional conferences to large international congresses gathering both seasoned and novice researchers from all parts of the world. Throughout these four decades of its persistent development, CL (in all its shapes and forms) has brought to our attention many non-trivial aspects of language structure and use, which have not been given due priority in mainstream linguistic research (e.g. in formal approaches). Most notably, cognitive linguistics has put meaning in the center of linguistic enquiry arguing that “meaning is what language is all about” (Langacker 1987: 12). An important implication of this view is that meaning is not an exclusive property of lexical items but that it is also an inherent property of syntactic structures of different degrees of complexity or specificity, including the most abstract syntactic patterns such as the ditransitive or dative construction.

However, the conception of meaning, as entertained by cognitivists is quite distinct from the conception of meaning as held by the advocates of formal approaches or even by functionalists. More specifically, cognitive linguistics emphasizes the conceptual and imaginistic character of meaning. Central to this conception is the notion of construal, understood as our ability to portray the same situation in alternate ways (cf. Langacker 1987: 110). Importantly, rather than being an autonomous faculty in the human mind, linguistic construal is a part of general human cognitive processes, such as those involved in the processing of knowledge, perception or motor activities. Thus, seen from this perspective, meaning is “a mental phenomenon that must eventually be described with reference to cognitive processing” (Langacker 1987: 99).

This conception of language, and linguistic semantics in particular, poses a significant methodological challenge, that is, it raises important questions concerning the methods or procedures with which meanings, as defined by CL, could be effectively studied in a systematic and verifiable way. Much of the research in CL has been informed by individual researchers’ intuitive judgments and by theory-internal considerations. However, there is also a substantial body of experimental research — apart from psycholinguistic experimentation based on elicited data, we can observe an increased interest in corpora and analytical methods associated with them, which hold the promise of ‘scientific objectivism’ and verifiability (cf. Gries 2006). The

1 The term cognitive linguistics is used here broadly, as a cover term for all strands of cognitive research, including Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008) as well as constructional approaches (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006).
interest in corpora can also be attributed to the usage-based thesis of CL, which assumes that mental representations of language arise as a function of language use (rather than being a product of an autonomous mental faculty). In other words, mental grammar is formed by an abstraction or generalization over specific utterances (Barlow & Kemmer 2000; Langacker 2000; Tomasello 2003; Bybee 2006). Langacker (1987: 46) specifies the mental representation of a usage-based grammar as follows:

The grammar lists the full set of particular statements representing a speaker's grasp of linguistic conventions, including those subsumed by general statements. Rather than thinking them an embarrassment, grammarians regard particular statements as the matrix from which general statements (rules) are extracted.

Given this emergenist, non-reductive and bottom-up structure of language, observational data, such as those that can be obtained from linguistic corpora, appear to represent an important source of data for cognitive linguists. In particular, usage-based linguists tend to emphasize the importance of frequency data for the analysis of grammar. There is a wealth of recent results indicating that frequency of occurrence has an enormous impact on the development of linguistic structure and on language use (cf. Bybee 2006, 2010). Bybee (2006: 711) describes the connection between grammar and language use in the following way:

While all linguists are likely to agree that grammar is the cognitive organization of language, a usage-based theorist would make the more specific proposal that grammar is the cognitive organization of one's experience with language. [...] Certain facets of linguistic experience, such as the frequency of use of particular instances of constructions, have an impact on representation that we can see evidenced in various ways, for example, in speakers' recognition of what is conventionalized and what is not, and even more strikingly in the nature of language change. The proposal [...] is that the general cognitive capabilities of the human brain, which allow it to categorize and sort for identity, similarity, and difference, go to work on the language events a person encounters, categorizing and entering in memory these experiences. The result is a cognitive representation that can be called a grammar. This grammar, while it may be abstract, since all cognitive categories are, is strongly tied to the experience that a speaker has had with language.

The main goal of the present paper is to explore the question of how and to what extent the 'non-objectivist' framework of cognitive linguistics can benefit from 'objectivist', frequency-based methods. More specifically, the main focus of the paper is on constructional meanings, i.e. the meanings of abstract syntactic constructions, which appear to pose the greatest meth-
corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics: an ideological challenge for the combined corpus-cognitive approach. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief (and necessarily selective) overview of the state of the art of corpus-cognitive research. Section 3, on the other hand, focuses on one specific aspect of English grammar — English clausal complementation — making it a test case for assessing the extent to which corpus-based methods provide a useful methodological framework for research into constructional meanings. It begins with a brief outline of the previous work on English complement constructions (section 3.1.), which is followed by a section presenting the results of Kaleta’s (2014) corpus-based study on quasi-synonymous constructions with verbs accepting two different complement types (e.g. *start to* vs. *start ing*). These results are subjected to critical examination in Section 4, which discusses the merits and limitations of the frequency-based approach to the meanings of abstract syntactic constructions.

2. **Cognitive linguistics meets corpus linguistics: an overview of corpus-based approaches to issues in cognitive semantics**

Corpora usage has been present in cognitively oriented research from its very inception. The early studies have been concerned mainly with lexical phenomena, exploring the ways in which various lexical concepts or sets of semantically closely related concepts carve up (structure) conceptual space (cf. Dirven et al. 1982; Dirven & Taylor 1988; Geeraerts 1993 a, b; Rudzka-Ostyn 1995, 1996). These studies relied mainly on simple counts, raw frequencies or percentages. Over time, however, more and more attention has been given to the issue of statistical validation or assessment of raw frequencies. Consequently, the methods used by usage-based linguists have become more advanced and sophisticated in terms of statistical analysis. One of the methods allowing for incorporation of different statistical techniques is the so-called ‘behavioral profile approach’, developed mainly to study issues in lexical semantics (Divjak 2006; Divjak & Gries 2006; Gries & Divjak 2009). It begins with the retrieval of the search items from the corpus in the form of concordance lines, which are annotated for many different features: morphological, syntactic, semantic, and sometimes also discourse-pragmatic. Next, all these features are together subjected to statistical evaluation by various statistical techniques such as pairwise differences of percentages, some correlational statistics or the most recommended for this types of research cluster analysis. All these statistical procedures are exploratory in nature, that is they allow to detect structure in complex, multidimensional datasets. For example, Divjak and Gries’s (2006) study of nine Russian verbs meaning ‘to try’ employs hierarchical cluster analysis to determine the number of semantic
classes that the synonyms fall into. Gries and Divjak (2009), on the other hand, apply behavioral profile approach to a comparative study of English and Russian near-synonyms, showing how the statistical technique of computing differences between percentages can provide information on subtle cross-linguistic formal/semantic differences that underlie lexical choices in different languages. Examples of behavioral profile studies of polysemy include Gries’s (2006) analysis of the many senses of to run and Berez and Gries’s (2009) analysis of the highly polysemous to get.

A similar approach can be found in studies dealing with grammatical constructions, and, in particular, with syntactic alternations. It should be emphasized that most corpus-based cognitive work on syntax has worked from the idea of a construction, as used in both Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1991, 2002). Seen from this perspective a construction is any linguistic expression that is directly associated with a particular meaning. As argued by Golberg (2006: 5),

Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with sufficient frequency.

Language is thus viewed as a vast inventory of successively more abstract constructions (form-meaning pairings), ranging from words to various multi-word expressions (variable or fully fixed) to abstract syntactic templates such as the passive or the ditransitive construction.

This idea of the construction underlies most corpus-cognitive work on syntax, one strand of which resembles behavioral profile approach, as briefly outlined above. More specifically, it involves coding instances of quasi-synonymous constructions for a variety of semantic and formal features which are subsequently submitted to statistical evaluation with a view to determining the factors responsible for the choice of one construction over the other one. This type of analysis can be found in Gries’s (2001) study of alternations involving shifts in particle placement (e.g. She put the book down vs. She put down the book). Using a regression like method called linear discriminant analysis, Gries attempts to determine the factors that best predict the speaker’s constructional choices. Other examples of this line of research include Grondelaers, Speelman, and Geeraerts (2002), Bresnan et al. (2007), Szmrecsanyi (2010), and Levshina (2012).

Another method dedicated specifically to studying syntactic constructions is collostructional analysis, as developed by Stefanowitsch and Gries (2003), Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004). It is a collocation-based method, which is aimed at studying semantic properties of schematic (abstract) con-
Corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics:

structions by examining how the words filling constructional slots fall into semantic classes. The main idea behind this approach is that:

[...] a word may occur in a construction if it is semantically compatible with the meaning of the construction (or, more precisely, with the meaning assigned by the construction to the particular slot in which the word appears). (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2003: 213).

The method measures the degree of attractions that words (the so-called collexemes) exhibit to constructional slots in which they occur. The most common statistics used for this type of analysis is Fisher-Yates exact test. Collostructional analysis subsumes three different, albeit closely related methods:

- collexeme analysis which deals with measuring the degree of association between a particular lemma (a collexeme) and a slot in a construction (cf. Stefanowitsch & Gries 2003);
- distinctive collexeme analysis which is specifically geared towards investigating semantic properties of pairs of semantically similar grammatical constructions (syntactic alternations). Its main aim is to identify lexemes that exhibit a significantly higher preference for one member of the pair than for the other (cf. Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004);
- covaring collexeme analysis which serves to investigate the interrelations between the words filling two different slots in the same construction (cf. Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005).

To date, collostructional analysis has been employed to investigate the semantic range of various syntactic constructions, and in particular, to spell out subtle semantic differences between syntactic quasi-synonyms. Examples of this type of analysis include Wulf (2006), Hampe (2011), Hoffman (2011), and Kaleta (2014). Noteworthy is also Guilquin’s (2010) extension of distinctive collexeme analysis to multiple distinctive collexeme analysis which distinguishes between several closely related constructions rather than just two alternative forms. Collostructional analysis has also been used to study diachronic development of nearly synonymous constructions (cf. Hilpert 2006, 2008; Colleman 2009; Noël & Colleman 2010).

Succinct and selective as this overview may be, it shows that quantitative methods have been enjoying considerable popularity among cognitively-oriented researchers, who do not give up on their attempts to introduce new analytical techniques and refine the old ones. The two methods, as outlined above (i.e. collostructional analysis and behavioral profile approach) are illustrated in Section 3 with examples from Kaleta’s (2014) corpus-cognitive study of quasi-synonymous complement constructions with verbs that accept two (or more) different complement types. However, first a brief look is taken at how complement constructions have been described and analyzed in cognitive linguistic literature.
3. English clausal complementation

This section begins with a brief outline of the main theories of English post-verbal complement constructions: the infinitive, the gerund, and finite *that* clauses. A special emphasis is given to the functional/cognitive theories according to which the distribution of complement categories is not random or arbitrary, but motivated by schematic meanings of these categories and (or) by the iconic principle of conceptual distance between the main clause event and the complement event.

3.1. Cognitive approaches to English clausal complementation

Much cognitive research into the semantics of complement constructions has been influenced by functionalist approaches, especially by work of Bolinger (1968, 1974), Givón (1980, 1985), and Wierzbicka (1988). For example, Langacker (1991: 445–446) agrees with Wierzbicka that the to-infinitive expresses futurity, while the gerund codes temporal overlap between the main clause event and the complement clauses event, with the reservation that these may be only prototypical characteristics of these two complement types. However, in line with his theory of Cognitive Grammar, Langacker goes on to propose a more schematic characterization of these two complement types. He argues that the gerund has the same function as the progressive construction, i.e. it imposes a restricted, internal perspective on the complement process. The to-infinitive, on the other hand, encodes the PATH image-schema, that is, it construes the complement scene as a path leading to its completion (Langacker 1991: 446). The PATH theory, of course, has historical grounding — it draws on the view that the infinitival to derives from the prepositional to meaning ‘toward’. While the idea that the infinitival complementation is motivated (in one way or another) by the PATH imagery has been widely accepted by researchers working within the cognitive linguistics framework, the simultaneity ascribed to the gerundive complement has been more contentious. Another perspective is that the function of the gerundive complement is merely the general process of conceptual reification, which involves construing the complement scene as an abstract ‘thing’ (Duffley 2006; Kaleta 2014). Thus, from this perspective, the gerundive -ing is much like the nominalizing -ing (a view that also has its etymological roots).

As for finite *that* clauses, the dominant view is that they represent epistemic judgments and conceptions of reality rather than actual occurrences (cf. Langacker 2008). Another (complementary) view appeals to the notion of iconicity, and specifically, to the idea that the choice of the complement type by a given verb depends on the degree of conceptual distance between the main clause event and the complement event. This distance correlates with
the phonological distance between the two clauses — it is greatest with *that* and shortest with bare infinitive complements (cf. Givón 1980; Verspoor 2000). Thus, the verbs that refer to pure reasoning typically select *that* clauses, whereas the verbs that suggest some direct interaction between the main clause subject and the complement event take the infinitival complement (e.g. *make, see*).

The theories of English complementation, as sketched above, have been derived largely through introspective analyses seeking to determine the connections between the shared semantics of different types of verbs and the unitary semantic value of their respective complementation patterns. While it has yielded a number of interesting observations, this approach seems to lose its appeal when it comes to more subtle semantic differences like those that accompany alternations where the same matrix verb accepts two or more complement types, with no obvious differences in meaning. A corpus-based approach appears to represent a promising alternative to introspection-based analyses in such cases. This point is further developed in the next section, which looks specifically at the applications of corpus-based methods to syntactic alternations between *-ing* and *to*-infinitive complements.

### 3. 2. A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH TO ENGLISH COMPLEMENT CONSTRUCTIONS AT WORK

This section illustrates the application of corpus based-methods to issues in cognitive semantics using examples from Kaleta’s (2014) research on nearly synonymous complement constructions. First, a look is taken at the method of distinctive collexeme analysis, which has been applied to non-finite complementation of English verbs of aspects and verbs of like (and dislike). Next, the results of the behavioral profile approach are illustrated with some examples from the studies on verbs accepting both non-finite complements and finite *that* clauses.

#### 3.2.1. DISTINCTIVE COLLEXEME ANALYSIS OF TO-INFINITIVE AND -ING ALTERNATIONS

Kaleta (2014) has applied the method of distinctive collexeme analysis to investigate subtle semantic differences between infinitival and gerundive constructions, as they occur with aspectual verbs (*begin, start, cease, continue*) and verbs of like and dislike (*like, love, hate, prefer, dread*). The analysis has revealed some distinctive distributional preferences of the nearly-synonymous constructions. By way of illustration, let us consider the 20 top collexemes of *start to Verb* and *start Verb ing*. The collexemes are listed in descending order of their strength of attraction to the infinitival and gerundive slots (the smaller the Fisher’s *p* value the higher the strength of attraction of a given verb to the construction).

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2 All the analyses presented in this section have been carried out using the British National Corpus and Sketch Engine software.
As can be seen, **start to Verb** and **start Verb ing** show clearly different collocational preferences: **start to Verb** preferentially co-occurs with state or change-of-state verbs, while **start Verb ing** significantly attracts action verbs. The only exception is the collexeme *thinking*. However, it occurs in the gerundive slot only in the agentive sense ‘to consider sth in one’s mind.’ Similar results have been obtained for other aspectual verbs, which may be taken as indicative of a stable semantic contrast between the two complement types. Given this distribution, Kaleta (2014) concludes that the infinitival constructions (**start to**, **begin to**, **cease to**) prototypically denote a change or transition into a new state, while their gerundive counterparts profile the onset, continuation or cessation of ongoing processes.

The question that arises at this point is how this distribution fits into the broader picture of **to-infinitive** and **ing** complements, as outlined in the section above, or, in other words, how it can be accounted for in a cognitively plausible way. It is clear from the distinctive collexeme analysis that the temporal notions of futurity and simultaneity, as postulated by Wierzbicka (1988), are insufficient to deal with the alternations in question. Thus, a more general characterization is needed and Langacker’s (1991, 2008) description of the **to-infinitive** in terms of the **PATH** image schema appears to fulfill this requirement. As argued in Kaleta...
Corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics: (2014), the notion of a change and that of motion towards a goal, as encoded in the PATH schema, are linked metaphorically, that is via the (well documented) MOTION IS CHANGE conceptual metaphor. In other words, the ‘change' meaning constitutes a metaphorical extension or elaboration of the schematic notion of the PATH, which provides a unitary, schematic characterization of the infinitival complement. Of course the notion of futurity does play an important role in the distribution of the infinitival complement, and it is clearly compatible with the PATH schema in that moving towards a target destination is correlated with ‘a shift’ in time (i.e. a target location is ‘later’ than a source location). However, the case of aspectual constructions shows that ‘futurity’ is not the only and definitely not a self sufficient explanation for the distribution of the infinitival complement and that this explanation must be sought at a deeper level of cognitive schemas and metaphorical processes. The same conclusion seems to extend to the gerundive constructions. As has been observed, these constructions tend to evoke the notion of an ongoing process. However, this notion is not an inherent property of the gerundive construction, as has been postulated by some linguists, but rather a result of the process of re-temporalization of the complement event. That is, aspectual verbs appear to have a function similar to that of the be operator in the progressive construction — they re-temporalize the atemporal (nominal) construal imposed by the gerundive complement, which gives rise to the notion of ‘ongoingness’ or a ‘progressing’ event.

As another example, let us consider the results of a distinctive collexeme analysis of like to Verb and like Verb ing. The tables below present the fifteen most distinctive collexemes of the two constructions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKE_TO</th>
<th>Fisher exact</th>
<th>LIKE_ING</th>
<th>Fisher exact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>think (293:11)</td>
<td>1.1E-094</td>
<td>being (311:759)</td>
<td>1.27E-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know (126:11)</td>
<td>1.2E-034</td>
<td>living (14:41)</td>
<td>1.53E-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see (391:51)</td>
<td>2.1E-031</td>
<td>doing (114:105)</td>
<td>6.10E-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call (77:6)</td>
<td>3.4E-022</td>
<td>going (92:73)</td>
<td>6.72E-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keep (84:14)</td>
<td>9.3E-019</td>
<td>talking (52:43)</td>
<td>7.00E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hear (59:11)</td>
<td>7.1E-013</td>
<td>watching (33:30)</td>
<td>2.91E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feel (45:7)</td>
<td>6.7E-011</td>
<td>working (48:38)</td>
<td>3.34E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>believe (18:0)</td>
<td>2.2E-007</td>
<td>paying (4:10)</td>
<td>6.11E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>admit (23:3)</td>
<td>1.7E-006</td>
<td>meeting (5:10)</td>
<td>1.39E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>show (23:4)</td>
<td>2.6E-006</td>
<td>playing (4:33)</td>
<td>2.35E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consider (20:3)</td>
<td>1.5E-005</td>
<td>driving (5:9)</td>
<td>3.55E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pretend (11:0)</td>
<td>8.5E-005</td>
<td>wearing (18:17)</td>
<td>4.60E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remind (11:0)</td>
<td>8.5E-005</td>
<td>shopping (2:6)</td>
<td>6.08E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spend (22:7)</td>
<td>2.9E-004</td>
<td>dealing (7:9)</td>
<td>1.19E-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>describe (8:0)</td>
<td>1.1E-003</td>
<td>losing (3:6)</td>
<td>1.41E-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Fifteen most distinctive collexemes of like to Verb and like Verb ing
As this analysis indicates, *like to Verb* preferentially co-occurs with cognition verbs (*think, know, believe, consider*), sense perception verbs (*see, hear, feel*) and speech act verbs (*admit, describe, maintain*). The gerundive construction, on the other hand, most strongly attracts state verbs *being* and *living*, with all the other slots being filled with common action verbs.

Interesting as these results may be from the descriptive perspective, they do not tell us much about the semantic factors motivating the choice of the gerund or the *to*-infinitive. However, a closer look into the contextualized uses of the significant collexemes of the two constructions does reveal some tendencies that confirm the distinction made in the previous literature between the infinitival and gerundive complements of emotion verbs in terms of the ‘desire’ and ‘enjoyment’ meaning, respectively (cf. De Smet & Cuyckens 2005). Let us consider some examples of the infinitival constructions filled with cognition verbs:

1. She *likes to think* of herself as coming from a higher social class.

2. Frenchmen still *like to believe* they’re the world’s greatest lovers.

As these examples show, *like to Verb* is not confined solely to the enjoyment meaning but introduces an additional, volitional component, which, in the cases under consideration, takes the form of ‘wishful thinking’. Apart from state verbs, the infinitival construction co-occurs with action verbs, in which case the overall meaning of *like to Verb* seems to appeal to the general notion of habituality, i.e. a regular occurrence of an event. Consider the following examples:

3. At times I *like to speak* English, but not for a very long time.

4. How do you *like to spend* your spare time?

5. I *like to show* people I’ve got guts, although I’ve been scared at times.

It should be pointed out that the enjoyment meaning, as encoded by the matrix predicates, is still present in the infinitival constructions, i.e. the notions of volitionality and habituality tend to overlap with that of enjoyment, forming a kind of semantic blend. However, when negated, agentive uses of *like to Verb* no longer evoke habituality — they typically refer to a single act of ‘not wanting to do sth’. For example:

6. Colonel, I *do not like* to remind you of this, but I saved your son’s life.

7. Juliet *didn’t like* to admit that the same thought crossed her own mind.

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3 All the examples included in this section are taken from the British National Corpus.
Gerundive uses contrast with the infinitival ones in that they denote pure ‘enjoyment’ without introducing any additional semantic components. For example:

(8) She likes talking about her brother. She hasn’t many other pleasures.

(9) [...] I like being in the company of a pretty girl, even if she looks only twelve.

(10) As for me, I liked going to tea with Mr. and Mrs. Wilson. I loved the orderliness of their little bungalow, and their well-kept garden.

In sum, while the overall meaning of like Verb ing is consistent with the lexical semantics of the matrix predicate, like to Verb shows a tendency to evoke additional semantic components, i.e. those of volitionality and habituality. Importantly, these meanings are not random or arbitrary — they appear to be metonymically related to the basic enjoyment meaning of like. The connection is straightforward: if we enjoy doing something, we want to do this, and we want to do this often/repeatedly (cf. De Smet & Cuyckens 2005).

While the corpus data provide an insight into the usage and meanings of specific constructions with verbs of like (and dislike), the explanation of this usage requires some analytical reasoning. Specifically, the volitional component, as traced in the infinitival constructions, appears to be linked to the PATH image schema via the common conceptual metaphor GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. It should be noted that this use of the infinitival complement is not an idiosyncratic fact but rather a confirmation of the general tendency of the to-infinitive to combine with verbs which have in their semantic structure the notion of ‘wanting’ (cf. Wierzbicka 1988). As regards the gerundive constructions, the observed tendency of the constructional meanings to coincide with the lexical meanings of the matrix predicates (enjoyment) appears to confirm the hypothesis that the gerundive complement does not contribute any specific semantic content apart from the general function of imposing atemporal, nominal construal on the complement scene.

So far we have seen how collostructional analysis can be applied to the analysis of constructional meanings. However, given that the scope of this method is limited to studying constructions with fixed syntactic slots, more variable complement constructions, like the ones introduced with that clauses, have been studied using the method of behavioral profiles, which is illustrated in the following section.
3.2.2. Finite vs. non finite complements: a behavioral profile approach

The procedure, as followed in Kaleta (2014), consists of two steps: annotating sample concordances of the constructions being studied for a variety of features (formal and semantic), and statistical evaluation of the corpus frequencies of these features with a chi-squared test in order to determine the features that distinctively differentiate one construction from the other one. To exemplify, let us briefly consider two quasi-synonymous uses of promise, i.e. promise followed by the to-infinitive and promise followed by the that clause with a subject co-referential with the main clause subject (e.g. He promised to do this vs. He promised that he will do this). Seen from the cognitive linguistic perspective, these two constructions represent a shift from subjective to objective construal in the sense of Langacker (2008: 77–78). The main aim of the study has been to determine the factors responsible for the choice of one perspective over the other one. This analysis has shown that promise that is distinctively associated with the presence of a direct object (promise sb. that), the first person subject (I), and the present simple tense (I promise). Unfortunately, the import of this distribution becomes more apparent only in the course of a qualitative evaluation of these significant patterns. This evaluation has revealed that promise that is distinguishable from promise to mainly on the basis of its emphatic properties. That is, promise that tends to impose an emotional and involved perspective on the complement scene, which contrasts with a much more neutral perspective of promise to. Consider the following examples:

(11) Please, Alice. Please promise me you’ll phone.

(12) I warn you that I will take steps to prevent you or I promise that I will be there on time.

The presence of a strong emotive component in the construal of the complement scene makes the infinitival complement much less likely:

(13) ?? Please, Alice. Please promise me to phone.

(14) ?? I warn you that I will take steps to prevent you or I promise to be there on time.

Finally, let us briefly consider the case of that and ing alternations, as represented by admit Verb ing and co-referential admit that. As for the former, the corpus analysis has revealed its significant association with action verbs denoting acts of unlawful or criminal behavior. The construction is also significantly skewed toward the third person subjects (typically personal names)
and the complement event is invariably anterior with respect to the time of the main clause event (admitting sth). The construction is most commonly found in reports of court proceedings. Here are some typical examples:

(15) In court 23 year old Colin Longmur admitted causing a breach of the peace at the couples.

(16) At Belfast Crown Court, Corry admitted murdering Mr Magee [...].

(17) Michael Sams, 51, has already admitted kidnapping 25-year-old Stephanie Slater.

Given this distribution, the meaning of admit Verb ing can be glossed as to ‘admit one's blame’. A comparison with a sample concordance of distinctive uses of admit that reveals a subtle shift of perspective. That is, the finite construction appears to evoke ‘the other oriented’ perspective in the sense of Wierzbicka (1988). Specifically, under this construal the complement situation has an ‘objective’ existence, i.e. it is accessible to other conceptualizers and can be assessed for validity. The subject referent takes the position of someone who accepts (or does not accept) what others think or believe to be true. Thus, the meaning of this construction can be glossed as ‘to accept the truth of’. This conclusion has been derived from a qualitative assessment of event types distinctively coded by admit that, which include states and agentive events other than acts of unlawful behavior. Compare examples (15)–(17) with the following ones:

(18) He has put on 4.5 stone, and at 13 stone admits he is now overweight.

(19) And what do you mean, I've met her? I admit I came close, the night I delivered flowers.

(20) For one the Halifax was following others: it admits that it paid too much at the wrong time.

Having exemplified how corpus-based methods have been employed to study English complement constructions, in the next section I discuss the capabilities and limitations of the corpus approach to constructional meanings.

4. Discussion and conclusions

A systematic application of corpus-based methods to study constructional meanings has a number of advantages. First and foremost, it provides a detailed insight into the full range of distributional properties of syntactic constructions, allowing an insight into the subtleties of linguistic usage that could
remain inaccessible to purely intuitive analysis. This is of course of particular importance to studying quasi-synonymous constructions, which represent subtle (yet important from both descriptive and theoretical perspective) shifts in meaning. For example, none of the introspection-based approaches have accurately captured the range of use of alternating aspectual constructions (e.g. *begin to Verb* vs. *begin Verb ing*), which, in turn, has led to some misconceptions concerning the semantic function of the gerundive and infinitival complements. It should be clear that collostructional approach has opened new perspectives in the research on nearly-synonymous constructions, enabling a more accurate delineation of their distribution and thereby providing a clearer understanding of their semantic (or conceptual) content.

Another important advantage of corpus-frequencies is their utility in isolating prototypical uses from more peripheral ones. As argued by usage-based linguists prototypicality is closely correlated with frequency of occurrence (cf. Barlow & Kemmer 2000; Schmid 2000). Thus, frequencies of occurrence provide an important clue to distinguishing more typical functions of a construction from the more peripheral ones. In particular, they are an important tool in capturing the gradient or scalar nature of linguistic categories. As pointed out above, this is of particular importance to studies on nearly-synonymous constructions, which, more often than not, are a matter of degree rather than all-or-nothing distinctions. As a matter of fact, all the constructional pairs discussed in the section above are only partially exclusive, that is, they all have subsets of overlapping uses. For example, both *start Verb ing* and *start to Verb* can be used to express agentive events. However, the corpus frequencies clearly show that the former is more likely to denote change-of-state situations, while the latter is typically used to refer to dynamic, ongoing situations.

As vital as it is, descriptive analysis of linguistic usage is not an end in itself. Apart from the important question of ‘what language is like’, equally important or even more important is the question of ‘why language is the way it is’. Thus, the ultimate goal of linguistic research is that of explaining language structure and use. It is this explanatory aspect of linguistic research that poses the greatest challenge to corpus-cognitive approach. The difficulty arises, naturally, from the very conception of language, as proposed by cognitive linguists. It should be clear that a frequency-based approach must encounter difficulties when faced with a conception of language which assumes that grammar is conceptualization and that it involves active construal rather than a passive reflection of an objective world. Furthermore, as cognitively-oriented research shows, the ultimate explanation for language structure and use must be sought at the level of general cognitive structures and operations. This appears to be particularly true of syntactic constructions, whose meanings are characterized by a high degree of schematicity or abstractness. Thus, the essential question that needs to be addressed at this point is whether corpus frequencies do actually reflect
mental representations of language. The answer to this question seems to be in the positive, however with the reservation that the link between frequencies of occurrence and mental representations of linguistic structures is often indirect or at least much less direct than many corpus-based cognitive linguists believe it to be or would like it to be. A distinction has to be made at this juncture between lower-level (more specific) constructions and higher-level, that is, more schematic, constructions. For example, *start Verb to* and *start Verb ing*, as discussed in the section above, represent the more specific end of the constructional continuum (due to the presence of lexical fillers), with the infinitival and gerundive complements representing a higher-order schemata. In the network model of linguistic structure, as proposed by Langacker (2002: 271), the more specific uses are seen as instantiations or elaborations of more schematic constructions, which entails that the former cannot be satisfactorily accounted for without gaining an insight into the latter. The problem that this view creates for a corpus-based approach is that of operationalization of abstract syntactic meanings. This can be clearly seen in the case of the infinitival and gerundive constructions — while there are strong arguments, particularly historical/etymological ones, in favor of the thesis that the English *to*-infinitive is motivated by the PATH imagery and that the function of the gerund is merely that of imposing an atemporal/nominal construal on a scene, it should be clear that structures of this kind do not lend themselves easily to frequency-based verification. The presence of metaphorical and metonymic processes in the structure of these two complement types additionally complicates such verification.

Also, as we have seen, the characterization of finite *that* clauses in terms of epistemic construal and conceptions of reality poses a challenge for a frequency-based approach. This theory has a strong basis in the general distribution of *that* complements, which combine mainly with predicates expressing knowledge or information (cf. Langacker 2008; Wierzbicka 1988). However, the verification of this theory in the context of minimal pair constructions with a single verb alternating between the *that* complement and a non-finite complement is by no means a straightforward task. Of course, corpus data provide a number of important clues to the semantic structures motivating particular constructions, yet these are only ‘clues’ rather than direct indicators of semantic content. For example, the observed strong tendency of co-referential *promise* *that* to express emphatic, emotional construal can be taken as indicative of the presence of epistemic component in that the committed (emotional) attitude represents a kind of epistemic attitude or stance. A similar indirectness can be observed in the case of *admit Verb ing* and co-referential *admit that*, as briefly discussed in the section above. While the corpus frequencies provide a reliable picture of the distributional profiles of the two constructions, the explanation of these profiles/patterns requires a more analytical, top-down approach. More specifically, the patterns in question lend themselves to the explanation along
the lines proposed by Langacker (2008: 441–444), who accounts for the general contrast between non-finite and finite complements in terms of ‘occurrences’ and conceptions of reality, respectively. That is, admit Verb ing, with its meaning ‘to admit one’s guilt’, profiles the ‘effective’ level (‘occurrences’) — it merely suggests that the subject referent committed a crime or was responsible, in one way or another, for the complement event. Admit that, on the other hand, with its propositional meaning ‘to accept the truth of something’ enters into the epistemic domain of conceptions of reality.

The picture that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that syntactic categories (and complement constructions in particular) represent a complex reality, the full understanding of which requires different sources of data and the application of different methods of analysis (both bottom-up and top-down ones). As has been seen, corpus frequencies provide a useful tool for descriptive purposes, yet their explanatory power is subject to certain limitations. The issue of operationalizing abstract/schematic meanings and, in particular, the indirectness of the link between corpus-frequencies and mental representations of language appear to be the biggest challenge for a combined corpus-cognitive approach. Also, the fuzziness and fluidity of linguistic/conceptual categories provide an obstacle for this approach. However, these limitations do not undermine the applicability of frequency based methods to studying constructional meanings. They merely show that a frequency-based approach to semantics may not follow exactly the same logic as empirical work in ‘hard sciences’, that is, it may not achieve the same degree of scientific rigor and objectivity. This, however, is not the fault of the method (which is functional, as far as it goes), but rather a natural consequence of the complex and multifaceted nature of linguistic meanings, which are not subject to the same ‘laws of predictability’ as other aspects of human behavior. This, of course, in not to say that no new improvements or refinements can and should be expected in the methodological field. Quite to the contrary, it seems that more conscious effort should be directed towards methodological progress in the empirical study of linguistic meanings, and, in particular, in corpus-based studies of constructional meanings, as defined by CL.

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Streszczenie

Metody korpusowe w semantyce kognitywnej na przykładzie angielskich konstrukcji dopełnieniowych

Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie przydatności metodologii korpusowej w badaniach nad semantyką struktur składniowych, prowadzonych w ramach językoznawstwa kognitywnego. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. Pierwsza z nich to Wstęp, który wprowadza podjętą tematykę, kreśli to teoretyczne prace, a w szczególności zwraca uwagę na aspekty kognitywnej koncepcji języka, które stanowią szczególne wyzwania metodologiczne. Jednak zasadniczą część Wstępu dotyczy tych aspektów kognitywnej teorii języka, które wydają się kompatybilne z celami i metodami językoznawstwa korpusowego. Najważniejszą z nich jest teza o uzusie językowym, zgodnie z którą mentalne reprezentacje języka stanowią pochodną użycia języka, aściśle mówiąc powstają na drodze uogólnień poczynionych na podstawie przypadków rzeczywistego użycia języka. Zatem korpusy językowe, które gromadzą znaczne zasoby rzeczywistych użyc języka, można uznać za naturalne źródło danych dla językoznawstwa kognitywnego.

Druga część artykułu zatytułowana Językoznawstwo kognitywne spotyka językoznawstwo korpusowe: przegląd podejść korpusowych do zagadnień z semantyki kognitywnej stanowi przegląd najważniejszych kierunków badawczych łączących metodologię korpusową z teoretyczną perspektywą językoznawstwa kognitywnego. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na dwie wiodące metody badawcze: tzw. metodę profili behawioralnych (ang. behavioral profiles) oraz analizę kolostrukcyjną (ang. collocutional analysis). Pierwsza z nich bazuje na szczegółowej anotacji pozyskanych z korpusu form językowych stanowiących przedmiot analizy. Anotacji podlegają zarówno aspektów formalno-składniowych, jak i semantyczne, a uszczegółane na tej podstawie dane ilościowe poddawane są analizie statystycznej w celu uzyskania wglądu w typowe (statystycznie istotne) dla danej formy językowej tendencje dystrybucyjne. Metoda ta znalazła swe zastosowanie głównie w badaniach nad relacjami synonimii i polisemii leksykalnej. Analiza kolostrukcyjna z kolei została opracowana z myślą o badaniach nad semantycznymi aspektami konstrukcji składniowych. Opiera się ona na przekonaniu, że znaczenia form składniowych są zbędne ze znaczeniami leksemów współwystępujących lub „wypełniających” dany schemat składniowy. Podejście to znalazło zastosowanie w badaniach nad semantyką schematycznych form składniowych (takich m.in. jak konstrukcja ditranzytywna), a w szczególności nad subtelnymi różnicami znaczeniowymi pomiędzy quasi-synonimicznymi konstrukcjami składniowymi.

Trzecia część niniejszego artykułu zatytułowana Angielskie dopełnienie zdaniowe ilustruje zakres i sposób użycia wymienionych wyżej metod na przykładzie badań nad anglojęzycznymi konstrukcjami dopełnieniowymi. Ta część artykułu rozpoczyna się od krótkiego przeglądu kognitywnej koncepcji konstrukcji dopełnieniowych (podpunkt 3.1).

W kolejnym podpunkcie (3.2) zaprezentowano przykładowe wyniki dystynkcyjnej analizy koleksemicznej (ang. distinctive collexeme analysis) dla quasi-synonimicznych konstrukcji bezokolicznicowych i gerundialnych występujących z czasownikami aspektualnymi i czasownikami emocji.
Corpus-based methods in cognitive semantics:

(np. start to Verb / start Verb ing; like to Verb / like Verb ing). Analiza ta pozwoliła na określenie statystycznie istotnych różnic dystrybucyjnych pomiędzy analizowanymi konstrukcjami. Uzyskane wyniki, w połączeniu z dotychczasową wiedzą na temat procesów conceptualizacyjnych obecnych w języku, pozwoliły z kolei na wyciągnięcie wniosków dotyczących semantycznej motywacji w użyciu bezokolicznika i gerundium. Stwierdzono, że na najbardziej schematycznym (uogólnionym) poziomie reprezentacji semantycznej bezokolicznik z to jest motywowany schematem wyobrażeniowym ŚCIEŻKI, gerundium natomiast pełni uogólnioną funkcję reifikacyjną (nominalizacyjną). Z kolei na poziomie bardziej szczegółowych reprezentacji, konstrukcje bezokolicznikowe z czasownikami aspektualnymi (np. start to Verb) przedstawiają opisywaną sytuację w kategoriach zmiany lub przejścia w nowy stan, natomiast odpowiadające im konstrukcje gerundialne (np. start Verb ing) designują początek czy też kontynuację ciągłego (dynamicznego) procesu.

W odniesieniu do czasowników emocji takich jak like czy love subtelna różnica znaczeniowa pomiędzy formami bezokolicznikowymi (np. like to Verb) a gerundialnymi (np. like Verb ing) sprawdza się do kontrastu pomiędzy pojęciem wolicjonalności (chęci zaistnienia danej sytuacji czy wydarzenia) a wyrażaniem pozytywnego (lub negatywnego) stosunku emocjonalnego do wydarzenia zdania dopolnienia. Zatem w tym drugim przypadku semantyka formy dopolnienia pozostaje zbieżna ze znaczeniem leksykalnym czasownika głównego; w przypadku bezokolicznika natomiast mamy do czynienia z dodatkowym elementem semantycznym, który stanowi pochodną użycia znacznika to. W artykule wykazano metaforyczne i metonimiczne związki łączące schematyczne reprezentacje semantyczne z ich bardziej szczegółowymi odpowiednikami.

W ostatnim podpunkcie tej części artykułu podano przykład zastosowania metody profilu behawioralnego. Na przykładzie promise i admit wskazano na różnicę znaczeniową pomiędzy bezokolicznikowymi a gerundialnymi użyciami tych czasowników (promise to Verb, admit Verb ing) a ich odpowiednikami współwystępującymi ze zdaniami indykatywnymi (promise that, admit that). Dane dystrybucyjne pozyskane w toku przeprowadzonych badań pozwoliły na zidentyfikowanie czynnika emotywnego różnicującego użycie promise to i promise that. W przypadku konstrukcji z admit natomiast stwierdzono statystycznie istotny związek admit Verb ing z pojęciem przyznania się do winy (tj. do popełnienia przestępstwa lub wykroczenia), natomiast admit that z propozycjonalnym pojęciem akceptacji prawdziwości danego twierdzenia.

Przedstawione w punkcie trzecim przykłady zostały wykorzystane do sformułowania kilku ogólnych wniosków dotyczących przydatności, a także ograniczeń związanych z użyciem metod korpusowych w badaniach nad semantyką konstrukcji składniowych. Zostały one zaprezentowane w ostatnim punkcie artykułu zatytułowanym Dyskusja i konkluzje. Jak podkreślono, metody korpusowe umożliwiają wgląd w tendencje dystrybucyjne jednostek językowych. Ponadto pozwalają precyzyjnie określić częstotliwość występowania badanych konstrukcji, a tym samym umożliwiają odróżnienie prototypowych użyć od bardziej peryferyjnych konstrukcji. Szczególnie ważną rolę mają one do odegrania w badaniach nad quasi-synonimicznymi konstrukcjami, w przypadku których metody introspekcjonalnie często okazują się niewystarczające. Jednak pomimo swej przydatności, w zderzeniu z semantyką kognitywną metody korpusowe napotykają na istotne trudności. Jak zauważono, trudności te dotyczą głównie aspektu wyjaśniającego, a wynikają one głównie z wysokiego stopnia schematyczności (abstrakcyjności) znaczeń reprezentowanych przez kategorie składniowe oraz ich dynamicznego i elastycznego charakteru. Istotnym wyzwaniem dla metod ilościowych jest również często obserwowany brak bezpośrednich korelacji pomiędzy częstotliwościowymi i schematycznymi reprezentacjami językowymi. W końcowej konkluzji podkreślono, że pomimo swych ograniczeń metody korpusowe wnoszą istotny wkład w badania nad semantyką konstrukcji składniowych, choć badania te zazwyczaj są skazane na mniejszy stopień rygoru badawczego, niż ma to miejsce w przypadku empirycznych badań w tzw. „naukach twardych."
The present article studies some figurative instances of the XYZ construction, specifically those exhibiting items *Bible*, *oasis*, *flagship* and *minefield* as the element Y. Although they leave the impression of being metaphor-like, the analysis of their context of use shows that they do not exhibit the sort of behaviour expected of prototypical metaphors. Even though all the four items are found in a wide range of situations associated with conceptual domains that are very distinct and distant from the domains that these elements come from, they do not exhibit the sort of polysemy that might be expected of widely used metaphorical vehicles. The data show that these lexical items follow a similar path of semantic development in the course of which they gradually lose specific elements of their meanings and develop a figurative meaning that is quite general and is in all cases coupled with intensification. It is claimed in the article that their development was guided by metonymic shifts. I also show that they share many traits with another member of this construction family, viz. the XYZ construction with proper nouns as Y, which is based on metonymic paragon models. In both cases the end result is a complex intensifier, i.e. an expression that compresses into a single lexeme both the intensification and the property being intensified.
1. INTRODUCTION

Intensifiers are defined in Quirk et al. (1985) as “linguistic devices that boost the meaning of a property upwards from an assumed norm.” According to Bolinger (1972: 17), intensifier is “any device that scales a quality, whether up or down or somewhere between the two.” As for the form by means of which intensification can be achieved, we could, simplifying things to a degree, say that there are two major possibilities.

On the one hand, intensification can be brought about by means of repetition, i.e. by simply adding another instance of a given expression (or even more than one). The effect of syntactic repetition is often claimed to be almost purely communicative or rhetorical, viz. we can overcome interruptions in discourse (de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981: 58ff), or place more emphasis on what is repeated, as in (1):

(1) Not only was Hoover very old when he died, he was very very old (Watt 1968).

The other possibility is to use some sort of construction (not necessarily one specialized for intensification). We should also bear in mind that sometimes the two strategies can converge, and that we have repetition within a construction, which is again very iconic. Some of these are clearly syntactic reduplications, the repetition taking place here at the level of a clause element or phrase:

(2) Besides saying “Every day in every way I am getting better and better”, what are some other positive affirmations I can say daily to improve my life?

Some other reduplication constructions are clearly morphological structures, the repetition apparently taking place at the level of word, or below it, as in the case of lexical reduplication:

(3) (a) quick-quick ‘very fast’ (Zambian English, Crystal 1995);
(b) sweet-sweet ‘very sweet’ as in Don’t always eat sweet-sweet things;
   bitter-bitter ‘very bitter’, as in Why the veggie got bitter-bitter? (Colloquial Singapore English, Lim & Wee 2001: 91);
(c) bík-bík ‘very big’ (West African Pidgin English, Schneider 1967).

It should of course be noted that reduplication exhibits a wide range of functions, not just intensification. Across languages we find reduplications expressing plurality, collectivity, iteration, continuity, diminution, etc.
There are of course also constructions whose effect is intensification, but which do not involve any repetition. One of the simplest cases is when an adverbial phrase such as *very* is added to an adjectival phrase functioning as modifier of a noun within a noun phrase, or as a subject complement following the copula verb.

We also note the figurative use of nominal expressions embedded within particular constructions that have an intensifying effect. There are, for example, some nouns used in the so-called typical partitive expressions (Quirk et al. 1985: 250) not only make abstract non-countable nouns following them in the *of*-phrase, but also indicate an extremely small or an extremely large quantity:

(4) (a) Take your time to read this document because it will save you heaps of time later.²

(b) And in case anyone failed to get the memo first time around, Mrs May clarified what she meant at this week’s “Brexit brainstorm” at Chequers, sweeping away the last crumbs of hope from the Remainers by stating that there would be no attempts to “stay in the EU by the backdoor” either.³

(c) Do you have any studies or statistics to back that, or any shreds of evidence at all?⁴

All the above examples of partitive expressions involve a metaphorical extension. *Time, hope* and *evidence* are metaphorically conceived as physical objects that can then have certain smaller parts (*TIME IS AN OBJECT, EMOTIONS ARE OBJECTS*, cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 214). In other words, it is not the partitive expressions themselves that are used metaphorically here, but the nouns following them in the prepositional phrase, i.e. in the construction NP₁ of NP₂, it is NP₂ that is used metaphorically. Lexical items *heap*, *crumb* and *shred* all belong to the source domain of physical objects.

However, although the examples that follow below also exhibit figurative intensification and have basically the same structure, NP₁ of NP₂, the situation in them is different:

(5) Adam Smith was an economist and philosopher who wrote what is considered the “bible of capitalism,” *The Wealth of Nations*, in which he details the first system of political economy.⁵

(6) The property occupies a generous site and is enhanced with cast iron gates, off-street car parking, mature shrubbery and rockery to the front. The rear garden is simply stunning, a real oasis of tranquility, features include; south facing aspect, extending approx 30 m in length, natural stone paved patio area, raised decking area and many more!⁶
NP2 is here certainly not used metaphorically. What is more, unlike in (4), the *of*-phrase may be omitted without losing figurativeness:

(7) When the doors opened at Chicago’s *Northside College Prep High School* in the autumn of 1999, it was the first new public high school built in the city in 20 years. *Northside* is the **flagship** for Mayor Richard Daley’s plan to keep talented students in the public schools and retain middle-class families in the city.7

(8) The federal meaningful use program remains a **minefield** that providers are carefully stepping through to avoid losing out on incentives or being hit with the ever-increasing Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services penalties for failing to file timely attestations of use.8

The structural similarity between (4) and (5–8) is just superficial. Unlike (4), the latter are instances of the so-called XYZ construction (first discussed in Turner 1991 and Fauconnier & Turner 1998 and 2002). In its fully spelled version, this construction consists of a nominal element X functioning as the subject that is followed by a copula verb, which is followed by a nominal element headed by Y, which is in the majority of cases followed by a preposition (not only *of*) and the nominal element Z, where the complex YpZ functions as the subject complement. I will return to this point in Section 3.

Metaphor is often used to explain metonymy in cognitive linguistic literature by contrasting the two phenomena. It is usually pointed out that conceptual metaphors are cases of cross-domain mappings, while metonymies involve only a single domain and its parts, i.e. subdomains. As a consequence of this, metaphorical sources and targets are conceptually more distant from each other than metonymic sources and targets. Generally speaking, source domains are more specific than target domains, the former tend to come from the physical world, while the latter are more abstract and tend to belong to social and mental world. Discussing the scope of metaphor, Kövecses (2010/2002: 136) shows that the range of target domains to which a given source concept applies can be considerable. The above examples are apparently used as metaphorical sources applied to target domains that are clearly distinct and conceptually distant from the source domain.

Another consequence of the above mentioned difference in conceptual distance, though less immediately obvious, is that if a lexical item associated with a source concept is applied metaphorically to several target domains that are conceptually distinct and distant, the item in question will exhibit more polysemy of an ad hoc or irregular type. Of course there are many lexical items associated with a given source domain that can be used metaphorically in just one sense, even if the domain itself can be applied

to several target domains, e.g. *money* seems to be used metaphorically only in the conceptual metaphor *time is money*. However, there are also lexical items that can be used metaphorically in connection with more than one target domain, and they can then exhibit polysemy. Thus, if *battle* is used metaphorically, depending on the target domain, it can mean something like ‘intense competition, struggle’ (as in *the battle for voters, the battle for the leadership of the party, a battle of wits, a legal battle over the custody of a child*), or ‘a situation in which one is trying very hard to deal with a difficult situation’ (as in *to win a battle against a disease*). Lexical items belonging to the same domain tend to behave differently, they may be associated with target domain(s) different from the ones in the examples above, and the range of meanings they then exhibit need not bear any similarity to the above. Similarly, *flower*, when used metaphorically, can mean ‘the best example or representative’ (as in *the flower of our generation*), ‘the prime, peak’ (as in *the flower of his youth*), or ‘natural development or outgrowth’ (as in *His attitude was simply a flower of his general good nature*). This is in contrast to metonymy which often produces regular polysemy, such that similar lexical items functioning as metonymic source will exhibit links to similar metonymic targets (cf. Brdar, Zlomislić, Šoštarić & Vančura 2009), e.g. a lexical item denoting some material is most likely to be used metonymically to denote an object made from that material, plants, most notably trees, are most likely to be used metonymically to denote their fruits, etc.

As already pointed out, what the examples in (5–8) also share, in addition to being metaphor-like, is that they describe situations in which the qualities conveyed by the lexical items in focus above and attributed to their targets (underlined in the above examples) apply to the maximum, or at least close to the maximum. It is my intention in this article to show that the expressions in question actually function as a type of intensifiers and that the intensifying effect is in significant ways due to metonymy (and not to metaphor as such). In Part 2, I analyse some further instances of such intensifying figurative uses of the *Y* element in the *XYZ* construction, showing that they do not behave like prototypical metaphors. In Part 3, I argue that they exhibit many traits of the so-called metonymic paragon models.

### 2. From the Bible of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory to the Minefield of Authentic Data

In this section I propose to take a closer look at a selection of lexical items that can function as the *Y* element in the *XYZ* construction. These are the items that are actually introduced in the initial set of examples above, viz. *bible, oasis, flagship* and *minefield*. The set could be expanded, but it will
suffice to bear out my points concerning the interaction between metaphor and metonymy (effectively precluding any need for invoking conceptual integration).

As pointed out above, Kövecses (2010 /2002/: 136), a sort of the Bible of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, notes that the scope of a conceptual metaphor can be variable and that in some cases one and the same metaphorical source may be applied to a high number of target domains. This seems to be corroborated by the following set of examples, which illustrates a selection of environments in which the word bible is apparently used in a figurative sense:

(9) (a) This is the Bible of linguistics blogs.\(^9\)
(b) The Bible of Barbecue, a beautiful book that you can keep on your shelf or tear to pieces to make the perfect barbecue.\(^10\)
(c) The Silver Spoon is the bible of Italian cooking and it has just been revised. Although it has over 1,500 pages of recipes I was still pleasantly surprised to find a perfect BBQ recipe by an Australian chef amongst all the pasta and risotto.\(^11\)
(d) How To Write The Bible Of Wine: Karen MacNeil On The Craft Of Writing
This past weekend’s Wine Blogger’s Conference in Corning, New York attracted more than 200 participants from across the online wine landscape. Primary among them was keynote speaker Karen MacNeil, author of The Wine Bible, which has sold more than 500,000 copies since its publication in 2001.\(^12\)
(e) Dave Campbell’s Texas Football has long been the state’s foremost guide to college and high-school football. It’s often referred to as “the Bible of Texas football,” particularly serious praise in Texas, where the Bible is held in fairly high regard.\(^13\)
(f) Today, Allen is known as the “grandfather of basketball coaches,” and his first book, My Basketball Bible, explains his devotion to the game.\(^14\)
(g) David Portnoy’s Barstool Sports is the bible of bro culture. Rude, crude, sexist and often mean-spirited — even Howard Stern has complaints — the site has become a go-to for young men who say they are disenfranchised by the mainstream media.\(^15\)
(h) For years, the diagnosis of mental illness has largely relied upon one book — the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM. ... Today, the DSM is widely referred to as the “bible” of psychiatry — but not everyone is a believer.\(^16\)
(i) Super System, written by Doyle Brunson, the grandfather of poker, would have to be as important to poker as the first television broadcast was for

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\(^12\) http://bit.ly/2ztTQPT (ED: 3 December 2016).
TV. Super System is nothing else than a milestone and, in short, it is the Bible of Poker.\textsuperscript{17}

(j) The bible of vegetable gardening in the San Francisco Bay Area has been revised and updated.\textsuperscript{18}

(k) Copies of Jane's on weapons and shipping were shuffled with satellite imagery and intelligence memos across her desk. Jane's was a spy's bible. The encyclopedia of weapons and war machines contained the specifics on every killing machine ever made.\textsuperscript{19}

(l) The Kama Sutra is the bible of human sexual behaviour written in Sanskrit literature.\textsuperscript{20}

(m) Fairchild introduced a new section, “The Eye,” to cover the international world of what he dubbed “the beautiful people” and it became the bible of the social set.\textsuperscript{21}

(n) The Jeweler’s Security Alliance (JSA) has published the second edition of what it calls the “Bible of crime prevention for jewelers”\textsuperscript{22}

(o) This book is widely considered the “bible” of Crime Scene Investigation.\textsuperscript{23}

The lexical item bible appears in all the examples above to qualify as a metaphorical expression: it is applied to a wide range of domains, from economy to food and drinks, to sports, psychiatry, gambling, spying, sexual behaviour, crime prevention and crime scene investigation, etc. But this is precisely what should make us suspicious.

According to the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff 1990), in the course of metaphoric mappings the topology and the image-schematic structure of the source domain are preserved in a way that is consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. In simplified terms, the relation between elements of the source domain and the elements of the target domain constrains the number of possible mappings. Arbitrary mappings between just any element of the source domain onto just any element of the target domain are not allowed. In particular, mappings cannot violate the image-schematic structure of the source domain (Lakoff 1990: 54), although, as pointed out by Brugman (1990: 257f), it seems that the structure of the target domain must also be preserved. Whatever the correct interpretation of the Hypothesis might be, it is obvious that there are some constraints on possible mappings.

At the same time, it seems that the Hypothesis has some further corollaries not recognized in the literature, viz. it follows from it that the number of target domains complying with the requirement that its image-schematic structure be consistent with that of the source domain is not unlimited. In practical terms, this means that the number of target domains for which a metaphorical source from a given source domain can be used may be high, but is not unlimited. In other words, a metaphorical source is not very likely to apply indiscriminately to just any target domain. However, we have noted

\textsuperscript{17} http://bit.ly/2AwqSyW (ED: 4 December 2016).
\textsuperscript{18} http://bit.ly/2yLAoCA (ED: 4 December 2016).
\textsuperscript{19} http://bit.ly/2zoBmDo (ED: 4 December 2016).
\textsuperscript{21} https://pmcwwd.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/wwd0302web.pdf (ED: 5 December 2016).
\textsuperscript{23} https://yhoo.it/2zJJoqM (ED: 5 December 2016).
above that the number of target domains in the case of bible is very high; the above set of examples is by no means exhaustive and can be further extended. However, the target domains seem to construe something as being amenable to codification.

In the source domain, the domain of Christianity and Judaism, the Bible (from Koine Greek τὰ βιβλία, tà biblia, “the books”) is a collection of scriptures or sacred texts in the form of a book or a set of books. Although it is divided into a number of books, chapters and verses for the ease of reference, the Bible, in particular in the Christian tradition, has been for centuries mainly available as one or two volumes (hand-written or printed), i.e. as physical objects called books. We should bear in mind that it is estimated that throughout the history over 5 billion copies were produced, and that the Bible is thus the best-selling book of all time. Most lexicographic sources take care of this close link between the contents of the work, i.e. the sacred writings, and its usual physical form, and list this metonymic extension from contents to form. So the American Heritage Dictionary (AHD) (5th edition, 2016) lists the following sense:

A particular copy of a Bible: the old family Bible.

In Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (OALD) the subentry:

a copy of the holy book of the Christian or Jewish religion

follows the two subentries that cover the non-physical book senses. This is often followed in most dictionaries by a metonymically extended sense (specific for generic) covering the sacred text of any religion, which explains the use of lowercase:

A book or collection of writings constituting the sacred text of a religion (AHD);

(often not capital) any book containing the sacred writings of a religion (Collins English Dictionary, 12th edition, 2014) (CED);

(often l.c.) the sacred writings of any religion (Webster College Dictionary 2010) (WCD).

All dictionaries contain reference to its figurative, metaphor-like sense, sometimes explicitly separated from the rest. They sometimes specify its form as a book:

a book considered authoritative in its field: the bible of French cooking (AHD);

(usually not capital) a book regarded as authoritative: the angler’s bible (CED);

(l.c.) a reference publication esteemed for its usefulness and authority: a bird-watchers’ bible (WCD);
a book containing important information on a subject, that you refer to very often: *the stamp-collector’s bible* (OALD).

Note that WCD identifies the target as a reference publication, while AHD refers to it as a document but provides a very specific description of its context of use:

A document containing in-depth details about a movie or television series that writers and production staff consult in order to avoid continuity errors.

It is obvious that in all the examples in (9) above, except for (e), (g), (k) and (m), the target to which the figurative expression applies is also a book. In (9e) and (k) it is a magazine, in (9m) it is a column in a periodical, while it is an internet blog in (9g). Generalizing over all this, it appears that over time the noun has come to mean something like ‘an authoritative, highly reliable reference resource.’ In actual reality, the authority seems to stem not originally from the book itself, but from the divine source associated with the tome, and with which it is metonymically related. In short, we can follow how its meaning is becoming more and more general, in the course of a process of semantic depletion, with elements that might serve as starting points for cross-domain mappings disappearing one by one from the picture. The semantic outcome of its figurative use has become almost predictable, i.e. we come very close to a regular sort of polysemy that is more characteristic of metonymies than of metaphors. This of course also explains why it is possible to apply this term figuratively to such a wide range of domains in spite of its becoming less and less metaphor-like. It is interesting to note what Kövecses (2013) finds to be taking place in the case with so-called “correlation metaphors” (cf. Grady 1997a and 1997b): they are claimed to emerge from a metonymic stage in the course of generalization or schematization.

Let us now consider some examples of the figurative use of the lexeme *oasis*. The literal meaning of the lexical item can be described as ‘a fertile or green area in a desert or wasteland, made so by the presence of water from a spring or well.’ Dictionaries note its figurative use that looks fairly metaphorical:

A situation or place preserved from surrounding unpleasantness; a refuge: *an oasis of serenity amid chaos* (AHD);

a place of peace, safety, or happiness in the midst of trouble or difficulty (CED);

a refuge, as from work or stress; haven (WCD).

Again, as in the case of *bible*, we note a large number of diverse targets. Needless to say, the examples below are just a selection of a wide range of possibilities:

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24 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this observation.
(10) (a) An oasis of peace, pleasure and entertainment.\(^{25}\)
(b) An oasis of creativity, calm and beauty. North Carolina boutique “Just Be” promotes ethical purchasing. All products are either locally-produced, made in the USA or fair trade.\(^{26}\)
(c) What used to be open rock decades ago is now covered by the invasive quagga mussels. Some native fishes — sculpin and darters — are missing, as are rooted aquatic plants.
Still, the shoal is an oasis of diversity, he said, wedged between stretches of flat sand home to less than a half dozen species.
In contrast, researchers identified 15 species of fish flitting in and out of the shoal’s algae-covered rock and rubble — and that was the winter count. Willink expects that number will grow during summer surveys, when natural life flourishes.\(^{27}\)
(d) Once you walk in, it’s an oasis of bathing suits in sizes and styles for the whole family.\(^{28}\)
(e) Lakeside’s Flagship an oasis of fish and specialty foods.
A visit to the new Flagship Specialty Foods & Fish Market at 14939 Red Arrow Highway offers a dizzying array of choices.
On a recent day, the chalkboard listing fresh seafood was jammed with everything from hot and cold smoked salmon, Avery Island oysters, diverse scallops and wild Florida grouper to king crab bites, gravlax, shrimp, Great Lakes whitefish filets and whole branzino.\(^{29}\)
(f) Reported Trump Treasury pick is “oasis of blankness” Steve Mnuchin.\(^{30}\)
(g) Austria is “an oasis of corruption,” said Florian Klenk.\(^{31}\)
(h) An Oasis of Horror in a Desert of Boredom.
Since 2009 Brian Maguire has travelled on a number of occasions to Ciudad Juárez in Mexico. Described as the most violent city on earth, this is a place where the most heinous of crimes are often met with impunity.\(^{32}\)
(i) Project Mater – an oasis of help for pregnant mothers.\(^{33}\)
(j) Creating an Oasis of Learning for Disadvantaged Students.\(^{34}\)

Surprisingly, and in sharp contrast to what dictionaries mention, the figurative sense of oasis can also be negative. It is positive only in the first four examples. Only the first two examples, (10a) and (b), come close to lexicographic stipulations. In (10a), which appears to illustrate the prototypical figurative use according to dictionaries, we have an initial shift that is based on metonymic reasoning. An oasis is of course primarily defined by its natural givens, but its functional aspect is equally important. As an area with water and shelter surrounded by a desert, it necessarily serves as a place of rest for travellers and their animals, and also an opportunity to replenish supplies, primarily of water. So, a place making something possible due to an abundance of something comes to stand for (lots of) what it makes possible, i.e. for

\(^{27}\) http://trib.in/2hefr6A (ED: 5 December 2016).
its function. Of course, rest is naturally associated with concepts such as calm, peace, etc. By means of further metonymic extensions this is linked to what it causes, pleasure, and this in turn can be metonymically associated with other phenomena that may cause it such as entertainment, creativity, beauty, etc.

Example (10c) is still sort of compatible with what dictionaries suggest, but in (10d) and (e) we cannot see any link with peace or calm, safety, or similar, and no unpleasantness is necessarily implied. In (10d), a situation in which bathing suits are not abundantly on offer might perhaps be conceived as unpleasant, but this would not be the normal way of seeing things. Admittedly, oasis comes here to mean something like ‘(extreme) abundance of something,’ as can be particularly well seen in the text following the headline in (10e). If in the first five examples we travel conceptually from the presence of something, which contrasts with its lack in the surrounding environment, to its abundant presence, we now witness a conceptual U-turn: there is an ironic abundance of emptiness in (10f), i.e. virtually absence of anything positive. The sense of oasis has now switched to absence. In (10g) and (h) we again have abundant presence of something extremely negative and abnormal, making the targets very different from their surroundings that may be more or less normal. This means that the meaning of the lexeme has been shifting for a while now, although most of this is still not recorded in lexicographic work. We may stipulate that the shift was made possible by the conceptual metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT, i.e. the place that made the difference or was the ‘cause’ of difference comes to stand for the effect (difference). In the literal use of the lexeme we have both the cause (the presence of water and vegetation) and the effect (the fact that a green, fertile oasis is just the opposite of its desert surroundings, i.e. this makes it different, unusual). In the course of time, the effect component becomes dominant, while the original cause component, the presence of something, becomes back-grounded, though still active. This semantic bleaching, virtually to no more than just ‘a place very different from its surroundings, which is just the opposite of this particular place’, makes it possible for oasis to accommodate wider contexts of usage. As a consequence, a sort of active zone must be named (either in the postmodifying of phrase or by a premodifier), i.e. we must specify in what respect it is different from its surroundings. If this specification makes reference to a massive presence of something negative, a metonymic inference from this is that oasis is used to describe an area in which no adequate measures are taken to curb the massive presence of negative phenomena. But when the specification mentions something that should reasonably be expected to be normal, as in (10i) and (j), the utterance with oasis becomes something of a double-edged statement: while it states that X is present at Y (oasis), we infer that it is not to the same (satisfying) degree present outside Y,
which means that it is unfortunately lacking, although its presence should be the default value.

Counterparts of oasis in other languages tend to exhibit similar developments, which seems to signal that this is not a pure chance. Cf. some examples from German (11), Croatian (12) and Hungarian (13):

(11) (a) Sonjas Genussladen ist **eine Oase von Schmankerln und natürlichen Köstlichkeiten.**

‘Sonja’s Enjoyment Shop is an oasis of titbits and natural delicacies.’

(b) Als kleine **kulturelle Oase** hat sich die Galerie mittlerweile in der Region etabliert.

‘As a small cultural oasis, the gallery has meanwhile established itself in the region.’

(c) Deutschland ist eine **Oase der Korruption und des Wirtschaftsbetrugs.**

‘Germany is an oasis of corruption and business fraud.’

(d) Ist Deutschland **eine Oase der Beschäftigung** in der EU?

‘Is Germany an oasis of employment within the EU?’

(12) (a) Popularni zagrebački kafić postao je **gurmanska oaza.**

‘Popular Zagreb café turned into a gourmet oasis.’

(b) Berlin je ostao i bio Brunina **umjetnička oaza** stvaranja i izražavanja.

‘Berlin was and still is Bruno’s artistic oasis of creativity and expression.’

(c) Ako je Irška postala **porezna oaza,** zašto ne bi to mogla postati i Hrvatska?

‘If Ireland became a tax oasis, why couldn’t Croatian also become one?’

(d) Jedno je, vrijeme, BiH bila **prava oaza prostitucije.**

‘For a while, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a real oasis of prostitution.’

(13) (a) Daisy, **a szépség oázisa** — Négy az egyben szolgáltatások. A Daisy Ésküvői Ruhaszalon teljes erőbedobással készül az idei bál szezonra.

‘The Daisy, an oasis of beauty – four in one services. The Daisy Wedding Dresses is fervently getting ready for the coming ball season.’

(b) **A legjobb alapanyag oázisok** várják a gasztró kultúra szerelmeseit Budapesten.

‘Oases of best ingredients look forward to lovers of gastronomic culture in Budapest.’

(c) Bolgár belügyminiszter: az ország **a szervezett bűnözős oázisa.**

‘The Bulgarian Minister of Interior: the country is an oasis of organized crime.’

(d) Der Standard: Szeged **az emberség oázisa.**

‘Der Standard: Szeged in an oasis of humanity.’

When we consider some examples for the noun *flagship*, we find a familiar situation:

(14) (a) As the *flagship of the LEKTOR series*, the DALI LEKTOR 8 fills well both in size and sound, and with the LEKTOR 8 you get true hi-fi quality, whether you’re playing quiet jazz or punchy techno.47 (about a loudspeaker)

(b) Nokia Lumia 920: *The Flagship of Windows Phone 8.*

(c) I also agree with highlighting the Hilton Tokyo Bay. To me, this is the "flagship" of the Hilton chain and has set the standard for any hotel stay for me.49

(d) Sweden: *The Flagship of Multiculturalism.*

(e) Big Plans of a Small State — Singapore, *the Flagship of Global Climate Protection.*

(f) For example, *the flagship of counterculture conservative media*, Breitbart News, published an article reporting that radio talk show host Michael Savage had been pulled off the air after discussing Hillary Clinton’s “delicate health.”52

(g) “They were not supporting peace in the abstract—they were in the arena. They lost their lives doing critical work in some of the most dangerous and difficult places on earth,” the UN chief said.

“Peacekeeping remains the *flagship of the United Nations enterprise*,” he added.53

(h) Renzi, who has recently marked 1,000 days of his government in office—one of the longest-lived of the republic—has made this constitutional reform the *flagship of his mandate.*54

Apart from its literal meaning that could be described as ‘a ship that carries the fleet or squadron commander and bears the commander’s flag,’ most dictionaries also mention at least one figurative sense. WCD recognizes two, the first being described as ‘the main vessel of a shipping line,’ The shift from a military to just any vessel, which precedes other shifts, can be attributed to the workings of the specific for generic metonymy. From there extension to a number of domains becomes possible, as in (14a), (b) and (c). Lexicographers describe this sense as ‘the most important one of a group or system’ (WCD), ‘the chief one of a related group: the *flagship of a newspaper chain*’ (AHD), ‘the finest, largest, or most important one of a series, network, or chain *<the company’s flagship store>*’ (Merriam Webster). OALD is more specific: ‘the most important product, service, building, etc. that an organization owns or produces: *the company’s flagship store in Paris.*’ The fact that these definitions mention not only material objects such as products or buildings, but also services makes it clear that further extensions take place in the direction of concepts described in (14d) through (h). The service,
but also the product, can metonymically link to the activity (service/product for activity). As a result, we again have a very general intensifying meaning in the end, something like ‘best, finest, most important’, which makes possible the application of the item to a huge number of very different domains.

Finally, looking at the lexeme minefield, it can be concluded that most dictionary definitions start from it denoting an area where bombs have been hidden under the ground or under water. While Merriam Webster seems to suggest that its figurative use is metaphorical (‘something resembling a minefield especially in having many dangers or requiring extreme caution’), other lexicographic works, including WCD, appear to converge on the potentiality of some dangers or problems:

- a situation or subject that is very complicated and full of hidden problems and dangers (CED);
- a situation or process with many possible problems or dangers (Macmillan Dictionary);
- a situation fraught with potential problems or dangers: a legislative minefield facing the city council (WCD).

This shift from a hidden but real danger towards a potentially dangerous because highly complex, situation (ACTUALITY FOR POTENTIALITY) can be easily detected in the following representative examples:

(15) (a) The Internet of Things: A Legal and Professional Minefield
(b) Pensions needn’t be a minefield if you think ahead!
(c) Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?
(d) Physicians and the minefield surrounding informed consent.
(e) …and this week is a minefield of mixed signals and misunderstandings.

What we have seen in all these examples is that certain metaphorical vehicles seem to be applied across a wide range of target domains, but nevertheless exhibit less polysemy than expected. What is more, they all appear to have just one very general figurative meaning that makes it possible for them to function as intensifiers. These nouns are not unique in developing such a general figurative meaning. Some adjectives can apparently be used in a similar fashion. Cf. the use of sexy in the following:

(16) (a) Andy Cole believes Liverpool are playing “sexy” attacking football this season. But the former Manchester United striker claims the Reds’ defence reminds him of another of his old sides — Newcastle.

Jurgen Klopp’s team have scored 18 goals and won five of the opening seven games of their Premier League campaign, but their high-energy style has come at a cost, with 10 goals also conceded.\(^6\)

(b) It is maybe a *sexy* theory, it provides pragmatic policy instruments, but it’s incoherent.\(^6\)

### 3. **Intensification in XYZ Constructions and Metonymic Paragon Models**

The figurative expressions of the type illustrated in (5–15) are just one subtype within the family of XYZ constructions.\(^6\) As mentioned in Section 1, typical realizations of the construction family exhibit the following constructional schema:

\[
(17) \text{Rodney Mullen} \text{ is the Einstein among skateboarders}.
\]

where Z is introduced in most cases by the preposition *of*, though other prepositions are also possible (e.g. *among*, as in 17).

In addition to these three elements, Turner and Fauconnier point out that there is also an element W that is normally not mentioned explicitly but which relates to Y in the same way that Z relates to X:

\[(18) \text{Jones is the Ronaldo of MMA, whereas Anderson is Zidane.}\]

Fauconnier and Turner claim (2002: 147) that these constructions are paramount examples of blending, where “[a] suitable but unspecified Y–W relationship (...) is to be projected to the blend and integrated there with the X and Z projections.” Our examples so far, as well as the ones that follow, clearly show working out W in the cases of paragons is not problematic at all, to say the least, and that invoking blending seems to be a sort of conceptual overkill.

This construction is ubiquitous and has many subtypes. There is also a biclausal variant:

\[(19) \text{“Soleimani is to terrorism sort of what Trump is to real estate,” Hewitt said.}\]

Turner and Fauconnier include here also some subtypes that are more or less perfectly literal:
(20) Elizabeth II is the queen of England.

Examples of XYZ construction in (17–19) are figurative just like (5–15), but the two sets may be assumed to realize two different subtypes, as in (17–19) element Y is realized as a proper name, while in (5–15) it is realized as a common noun.

As pointed out by Veale (2015), some XYZ constructions are congruous, while some are incongruous. In the former, X and Y belong to domains that are in an analogous relation. In our examples, most of these are cases where both X and Y refer to human beings. This is also true of (21) because both X and Y are objects:

(21) (a) Milk a is the Mercedes of chocolates.\(^66\)  
(b) Valrhona, keenly sought by patissiers for its purity, is known as ‘the Ferrari of chocolates’ and available up to 85pc cocoa butter.\(^67\)  
(c) They exist to cater to the so called ‘gamer market’, which is basically marketing amazingly over-priced hardware to people willing to pay anything to feel like they’ve gotten the Ferrari of computers.\(^68\)

However, it is also possible for the elements X and Y to belong to disparate domains and thus qualify as incongruous, e.g. X can denote an object, an animal, a plant, or even a place, as happens in the following examples:

(22) (a) Peanut Butter is the Miley Cyrus of spreadable edibles.\(^69\)  
(b) Betty the Crow (sadly deceased) was an Einstein among birds. She not only used tools but made them herself, for example creating a hook out of a straight piece of wire for fishing.\(^70\)  
(c) This mountain is pretty, but not stunning. Despite not being a huge peak, Mount Rose is underrated. The personality of the trail and the summit make it all worth it, enough so that I refer to this as the Sandra Bullock of Mountains.\(^71\)  
(d) Coriander is the Gwyneth Paltrow of the herb world — some people love it, some people don’t!\(^72\)

It will be seen that there are differences between these examples. Some of these neatly follow the pattern, and the element W can easily be inferred, if it is not explicitly mentioned in the context. Cf. examples (18–19) above, or (23) below:

(23) Humboldt is the Shakespeare of travellers — as much superior in genius to other travellers as Shakespeare to other poets.\(^73\)
These are cases of the so-called metonymic paragon models. According to Lakoff (1987: 87), a paragon is an individual member or a set of individual members of a category “who represent either an ideal or its opposite.” Needless to say, paragons can be based not only on humans, but also on organizations and inanimate objects. A paragon model is essentially metonymic (just like stereotypes, etc.) as an ideal member of a category stands for the whole category. Barcelona (2003, 2004: 364) improves on Lakoff’s analysis as he demonstrates that the model is based on two metonymies, first the name of the bearer of a given outstanding property comes to stand for the property in question, which is followed by the ideal member of a category for the whole category. Thus, the paragon Shakespeare stands for the class of writers that have an immense literary talent. As a result, Shakespeare becomes a class name and is in part coded as a common noun as far as its grammatical behaviour is concerned. As pointed out in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007), the axiological notions ‘best of’ and ‘worst of’ as the most problematical in the paragon model arise in another metonymic tier due to the imposition of a scalar model (Israel 1997, 1998) on these contrastive properties. The scalar model allows the metonymic mappings of the type whole scale for upper/lower end of scale (cf. Radden & Kövecses 1999: 32), whereby the property is interpreted as being exhibited to the maximum, either in the positive or negative sense. The scalar model and this type of metonymy have been shown to motivate a number of hyperbolic expressions in Brdar-Szabó and Brdar (2005, 2010), but also lexical reduplications (Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2011) as well as some intensifying adjective compounds (Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2013).

On the other hand, the Ys in (22a), (c) and (d) seem to be creative, novel expressions. It could be hardly claimed that Ys in these examples have attained the status of anything close to paragons in the above sense — there is simply no unique property with which they could be identified. Rather, speakers seem to be creating an ad hoc quasi-paragon model, the reasons for which (mostly ephemeral) are typically explicitly stated in the context. In a manner of speaking, these are attempts at creating some cultural models that are open and dynamically structured in the sense they are open to revisions and additions. Metaphorically speaking, they are as open as Wikipedia, anybody can contribute her or his bit, which is always open to revision by other participants in the project. While paragons may be said to belong to offline, archived collective memory that is not in need of checking and re-checking (e.g. when the mention of Shakespeare activates one’s knowledge about his works, and vice versa, the mention of Hamlet, or a scene from Hamlet, readily activates the domain of Shakespeare) these quasi-paragons are part of online collective memory that must be kept alive unless it perishes or gets transformed into something more permanent. Cf. some more examples of this type:
(24) (a) Is sad singleton Vladimir Putin the Jennifer Aniston of European politics? Since splitting with his wife, Lyudmila (VladMila called it a day in June 2013), the unlucky-in-love leader has healed his heart by focusing on his passions—mainly shirtless horseriding, waging war in Ukraine and predicting the recovery of the rouble. At his annual press conference on Thursday, however, Vlad finally opened up about his heartache. “Everything is fine — do not worry,” he reassured the concerned journalist.

Putin is not the only statesman to have been taken off guard by a sudden interest in his love life. The irrelevant yet ubiquitous former PM Tony Blair—the Kerry Katona of European politics?—probably hoped the interview in The Economist would focus on his vision for peace in the Middle East and various charitable endeavours. Alas, all anyone really wants to know is this: was he schtupping Mrs Murdoch or what?

(b) But carrots? They’re just out there, shrieking, “Hi, we’re some carrots! Love us for it!” They never have to prove themselves. They are the Gwyneth Paltrow of the food world. They’d make the most stylish vegetable list, even wearing a pink ballgown three sizes too big.

(c) The mushroom-stuffed ravioli was the Gwyneth Paltrow of pastas: smooth, blond and lightweight, paired with white asparagus spears, poached quail eggs…

(d) Heartbeat is simple, sophisticated and cool. It’s the Gwyneth Paltrow of handbags.

Finally, note that some of the above examples, notably (21) and (22b), resist being resolved into biclausal variants, and that strictly speaking no element W proper (the one that is expected to identify the domain of Y) can be identified. Admittedly, we can identify the domain Y originally comes from, but the point is that Y is not used in a way suggesting that it is wholly compatible with W. Rather, it is used in a way that signals that it has actually been semantically severed from its original domain because it has outgrown it, and in this respect it is extremely similar to what we have seen in the course of the analysis of examples with Bible, oasis, flagship and minefield in Section 2. In view of this semantic bleaching, we might call this a post-paragon model.

Strictly speaking, Einstein could be said to belong to the domain of science, more specifically of (theoretical) physics. The skateboarding skill of Rodney Mullen can be seen to parallel the contribution of Albert Einstein to physics, as he is credited with inventing numerous skateboarding tricks, inventiveness is not found only in theoretical physics, but is rather an individual, personal trait. The other example with Einstein is again different. The proper name Einstein is used here to denote a genius possessing extremely
high intelligence, a property that is in a way independent of his being a physicist. Cf. some further examples with Einstein:

(25) (a) Who is the Einstein of Chili? Chili Cook Off Rules.\(^76\)
(b) To our blog readers, he’s the “Einstein of Ice Cream.” To everyone here at Turkey Hill, he’s Ernie Pinckney — the friendly, smart, funny and charming guy who oversees pretty much everything that happens in the Dairy when it comes to making our drinks and ice cream.\(^77\)
(c) “I call him the Einstein of horses.”\(^78\)
(d) The Einsteins of the Deep [the title of an article about dolphins].\(^79\)
(e) Octopi: The Einstein of Invertebrates\(^80\)

The idea of extreme genius can be occasionally even used hyperbolically and ironically:

(26) (a) But Wolfowitz is perfectly incompetent. He is the Mozart of ineptitude, the Einstein of incapacity. To be sure, he has his virtues, the foremost of which is consistency. He has been consistently wrong about foreign policy for 30 years.\(^81\)
(b) James Dolan is the Einstein of incompetence. The Nureyev of nepotism. He’s Fredo Corleone, without the charisma. New York City is flush with homeless people, none of whom could possibly mismanage the Knickerbockers — or present a more slovenly physical appearance, for that matter — any worse than the 58-year-old Dolan. There is true genius at work here. Seriously.\(^82\)

Similarly, Mercedes and Ferrari are used to express nothing more specific than just the idea of extreme quality resulting in the extreme prestige of the products in question. In this respect these are again similar to Bible, oasis, flagship and minefield as it is used as a complex intensifier, an expression that compresses into a single lexeme both the intensification and the property being intensified. Note that items from both groups when used as such intensifiers need not be followed by the prepositional phrase:

(27) (a) Mourinho has had it his own way for so long perhaps he is not used to taking his medicine. How much easier it would be were he able to see wrong in himself, and good in others. He is no Einstein obviously.\(^83\)
(b) ...ask yourself if there is an Einstein in your special education class.\(^84\)

This is also true of the lexical items studies in Section 2. Cf. some examples:

(28) In Japanese cooking circles, this is their Bible. Which, I was super encouraged that it was written by a non-Japanese lady (maybe I “can” do this!).\(^85\)
(29) (a) You know, gaining some form of equitable supervision was a real minefield.\(^\text{86}\)

(b) Tech jargon is confusing at the best of times, but 4G is a real minefield.\(^\text{87}\)

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

My intention in the presented article was to study some metaphor-like instances of the XYZ construction, specifically those exhibiting items Bible, oasis, flagship and minefield as the element Y. All the four items have been found to apply to a wide range of situations associated with conceptual domains very distinct and distant from the respective domain that these elements belong to, which is just expected in case they are metaphors.

In spite of this, these four items do not exhibit the sort of irregular polysemy that might be expected in the case of widely used metaphorical vehicles, as described in Brdar, Zlomislić, Šoštarić and Vančura (2009). Instead, I have shown that these lexical items follow a similar path of semantic development in the course of which they gradually lose specific elements of their meanings, i.e. develop figurative meanings that are quite general, but in all cases include the idea that their referents possess a quality to an extremely high degree. In other words, they have acquired an intensification sense. Their development was crucially aided by a series of metonymic shifts. The situation described demonstrates the interaction between metaphor and metonymy, where the latter seems to prepare the ground for the former.

I have shown that they share many traits with another member of the construction family, viz. the XYZ construction with proper nouns as Y, which is based on more or less dynamic metonymic paragon models. In both cases the end result is a complex intensifier, i.e. an expression that compresses into a single lexeme both the intensification and the property being intensified. This also means that XYZ constructions need not necessarily be analysed as results of conceptual integration, as suggested in Turner (1991), Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002), or Veale (2015). An approach based on a series of incremental metonymic steps leading to semantic bleaching seems to yield a more parsimonious analysis.

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Streszczenie

Intensyfikacja i metonimia w niektórych konstrukcjach typu XYZ — od Biblii do Einsteina

Intensyfikatory to wyrażenia wzmacniające znaczenie danej jednostki języka w stosunku do pewnej normy. Wzmocnienie to może zachodzić dzięki powtórzeniu słowa (bardzo bardzo stary) lub poprzez użycie określonej konstrukcji.

Na przykład w wyrażeniach partyjnych efekt wzmocnienia może nastąpić dzięki przenosznemu użyciu jednostek nominalnych. W wyrażeniu heaps of time ‘mnóstwo [dol. górę] czasu’ rzeczownik time użyty jest metaforycznie, natomiast słowo heaps należy do domeny źródłowej. Jednak poniższych przykładach sytuacja jest inna:

1. Adam Smith ... wrote what is considered the “bible of capitalism,” The Wealth of Nations...
   [Adam Smith napisał The Wealth of Nations, książkę uważaną za „bibliję kapitalizmu”...]
2. The rear garden is simply stunning, a real oasis of tranquility...
   [Ogród z tyłu jest po prostu zachwycający, prawdziwa oaza spokoju...]
3. Capitalism i tranquility nie są tu użyte metaforycznie, a konstrukcję z of można pominać bez straty dla przenośnego sensu całości:
   (3) Northside is the flagship for Mayor Richard Daley’s plan to keep talented students in the public schools...
   [Szkoła Northside to wizytówka (dol. okręt flagowy) w planie burmistrza Richarda Daleya, mającym na celu przytrzymanie zdolnych uczniów w szkołach publicznych...]
4. The federal ... program remains a minefield that providers are carefully stepping through...
   [Program federalny to w dalszym ciągu pole minowe, po którym dostawcy usług stąpają bardzo ostrożnie...]

Są to przykłady konstrukcji typu XYZ, w skład której wchodzą: grupa rzeczownikowa X w funkcji podmiotu, łącznik, grupa rzeczownikowa z członem głównym Y, po czym w większości wypadków występuje przyimek i element nominalny Z, a wyrażenie YpZ pełni funkcję orzecznika.


Podejrzenia powinien wzbudzić fakt, że w użyciach tych słów jedna domena wyjściowa może być wykorzystywana w metaforach o wielu różnych domenach docelowych, np. the Bible of linguistics blogs ‘Biblia blogów językoznawczych’, the bible of Italian cooking ‘biblia włoskiej kuchni’, the Bible of Texas football ‘Biblia futbolu amerykańskiego w Teksasie’, the bible of human sexual behaviour ‘biblia zachowań seksualnych człowieka’, the bible of Crime Scene Investigation ‘biblia’ wykonujących czynności na miejscu zbrodni’. Zgodnie z Hipotezą Inwariancji proces metaforyzacji musi zachowywać topologię i strukturę schematów wyobrażeniowych w domenie źródłowej i docelowej. Wydaje się, że liczba domen docelowych spełniających ten warunek jest ograniczona – a w wypadku słowa bible jest ona bardzo duża.
Biblia to zbiór świętych ksiąg judaizmu i chrześcijaństwa, jednak słowniki notują także zna-
czenie powstałe dzięki metonimii Eczemplarz za Catunek, tzn. 'święty tekst jakiejkolwiek religii, co 
tłumaczy stosowanie malej litery w pisowni słowa. Odnoszą to także przenośne znaczenie 
'książka lub dokument zawierający ważne informacje na jakiś temat'. W naszych danych odnajdujemy
odniesienia do książek, czasopism, felietonów w czasopismach i blogów internetowych. Semantyka
rzeczownika Bible stopniowo się zubaża i generalizuje – w tej chwili oznacza on 'autorytatywne, wysoce
wiarygodne źródło informacji' i używany jest w wielu różnych kontekstach.

Dosłowne znaczenie słowa oasis to 'żyzny lub zielony teren na pustyni lub pustkowiu, powstały 
dzięki wodzie pochodzącej ze źródła'; jego podstawowe znaczenie przenośne to 'miej-
sce spokoju, bezpieczeństwa lub szczęścia pośrodku kłopotów lub trudności' (CED). Znów notujemy
dużą liczbę często zaskakujących zastosowań: an oasis of peace 'oaza spokoju', an oasis of creativity 
'oaza kreatywności', an oasis of diversity 'oaza różnorodności', an oasis of bathing suits 'oaza strojów 
kapielowych', an oasis of fish and specialty foods 'oaza ryb i potraw będących specjalnością zakładu', an 
oasis of blankness 'oaza jądrości / braku wyrazu', an oasis of corruption 'oaza korupcji', an oasis of help 
for pregnant mothers 'oaza pomocy dla kobiet w ciąży', an Oasis of Learning for Disadvantaged Students 
'oaza możliwości edukacyjnych dla uczniów z trudnościami'. Zaszkują w tym zestawieniu konteksty
negatywne. W niektórych wypadkach mamy także do czynienia ze znaczeniem '(ogromna) obfitość 
czegoś', a także z jego przeciwieństwem (czyli brakiem czegoś). Na skutek procesu 'semantycznego 
wybielania' słowo to może oznaczać ogólnie 'miejsce bardzo różne od otoczenia'.

Przykłady użycia słowa flagship obejmują: the flagship of the LEKTOR series 'wizytówka serii
LEKTOR', Nokia Lumia 920: The Flagship of Windows Phone 8 'Nokia Lumia 920: „okręt flagowy” systemu
Windows 8', the ‘flagship’ of the Hilton chain 'okręt flagowy' sieci Hilton, The Flagship of Multicultura-
lism 'wizytówka wielokulturowości', the Flagship of Global Climate Protection 'okręt flagowy' globalnej
ochrony klimatycznej, the Flagship of counterculture conservative media 'okręt flagowy kontrkulturow-
ych mediów konserwatywnych', the flagship of the United Nations enterprise 'okręt flagowy projektu
ONZ', the flagship of his mandate 'wizytówka jego działalności politycznej'. Mamy więc serię rozszerzeń
semantycznych i metonimii od dosłownego znaczenia 'okręt, na którym znajduje się dowódca floty i
który płynie pod jego banderą' do – ostatecznie – bardzo ogólnego znaczenia intensyfikującego 'coś
najlepszego, najważniejszego', dzięki czemu słowo występuje w wielu różnych użyciach.

Mamy w końcu słowo minefield, które oznacza 'obszar lądowy lub wodny z ukrytymi pod po-
wierzchnią bombami', a przenośnie 'potencjalne zagrożenie lub problemy'. Typowe przykłady: A Legal
and Professional Minefield 'prawne i zawodowe pole minowe', pensions needn't be a minefield 'emerytury
nie muszą być polem minowym', a minefield of mixed signals and misunderstandings 'pole minowe nie-
jest jednoznacznych przekazów i nieporozumień'. Pokazuje to, że wyrażenia służące za podstawę metafor
mogą mieć jedno bardzo ogólne znaczenie przenośne i funkcjonować jako intensyfikatory.

Zilustrowane powyżej wyrażenia to podtyp konstrukcji typu XYZ, którą opisać można nastę-
pusującym schematem:

(5) Rodney Mullen is the Einstein among skateboarders
     \hspace{1cm} X \text{ ŁĄCZNIK} \hspace{1cm} Y \hspace{1cm} Z

\[\text{[Rodney Mullen to Einstein wśród skateboardzistów]}\]

Z to konstrukcja posywa w dopełniaczu lub wyrażenie przyimkowe. Może także wystąpić nie-
obecny na powierzchni, lecz dający się łatwo zrekonstruować element W:

(6) Jones is the Ronaldo of MMA, whereas Anderson is Zidane
     \hspace{1cm} X \hspace{1cm} Y \hspace{1cm} Z

\[\text{[Jones to Ronaldo mieszanych sztuk walki, a Anderson to Zidane]}\]

\[\text{X (Jones) \hspace{1cm} Y (Ronaldo) \hspace{1cm} Z (mieszane sztuki walki)}\]

\[\text{W (piłka nożna)}\]

Z to konstrukcja posywa w dopełniaczu lub wyrażenie przyimkowe. Może także wystąpić nie-
obecny na powierzchni, lecz dający się łatwo zrekonstruować element W:
Konstrukcje tego typu uznano w literaturze za reprezentatywne przykłady integracji pojęciowej, podczas gdy tu proponujemy zinterpretować je inaczej. Są to przykłady wzorcowych modeli metonimicznych (metonymic paragon models), a spotykamy także kreatywne, jednostkowe wyrażenia będące modelami pseudo-wzorcowymi (quasi-paragon models): Is sad singleton Władimir Putin the Jennifer Aniston of European politics? [Czy smutny singel Władimir Putin to Jennifer Aniston europejskiej polityki?]

Podsumowując, w niektórych przykładach konstrukcji XYZ uchodzących za metafory, w szczególności tych, gdzie występują słowa Bible/bible, oasis, flagship lub minefield w pozycji Y, obserwujemy uzyskiwanie przez te słowa funkcji intensyfikującej. Konstrukcje te mają też wiele cech wspólnych z konstrukcjami, gdzie elementem Y jest nazwa własna – te drugie interpretujemy jako wzorcowe modele metonimiczne. W obu wypadkach efektem końcowym jest powstanie złożonego intensyfikatora (wyrażenia wzmacniającego), a to oznacza, że konstrukcje tego typu nie muszą być uznawane za przykłady integracji pojęciowej.

Streszczenie przygotował Adam Głaz
Kontekstowe innowacje słowotwórcze w internetowych tekstach publicystycznych i w ich komentarzach. Studium przypadku

W opisie przyjmuje się dwie perspektywy oglądu innowacji: (1) jako rezultatów kreatywności nadawcy, który sięgnąwszy do potencjału językowych środków słowotwórczych, zrealizował cele założone w danym akcie komunikacyjnym; (2) jako obiektu intelektualnych działań odbiorcy lub odbiorców tego aktu, do którego klucz stanowi tekst internetowej wypowiedzi publicystycznej. W drugim przypadku chodzi o refleksję: jakie możliwości mają użytkownicy języka, gdy chcą rozumieć formalnie i lub semantycznie złożone innowacje słowotwórcze, zwykle użyte w funkcji perswazyjnej w konkretnej wypowiedzi, a więc w określonym kontekście.
1. Założenia, cel, zadania badawcze

Spojrzenie na tekstowe wyrażenia słowotwórcze, tworzone lub przywoływane przez nadawcę świadomego ich złożoności i związku z kontekstem, w jakim się pojawiły, pozwoli – jak sądzę – z perspektywy odbiorcy zdać sprawę z właściwych człowiekom umiejętności niezbędnych do odczytania realnej treści nowego wyrazu pochodzącego słowotwórczo, zwłaszcza o skomplikowanej motywacji semantycznej. Zdolność ta przejawia się w właściwym (tj. zgodnym z intencjami nadawcy) wnioskowaniu odbiorcy (czytającego), wrozumieniu tekstu, a więc i nowych struktur słowotwórczych na podstawie danych językowych oraz tekstowych (również kontekstowych i interkontekstualnych).

W analizie innowacji słowotwórczych zwracam uwagę na: (a) istotną rolę wiedzy o świecie obecnej w umyśle nadawcy/odbiorcy (jej odpowiednie uruchomienie, przywołanie), (b) wartości aksjologiczne zawarte w wyrazie motywiącym i motywowanym, a także (c) rolę kontekstów (werbalnego i niewerbalnego) w interpretacji jednostek słowotwórczych. Umiejętności te są szczególnie ważne w przekazywaniu/odczytywaniu sensów niewynikających ze struktury derywatu, tj. z konwencjonalnego (kodowego) znaczenia jego elementów składowych.

2. Przedmiot opisu w kontekście innych technik multimodalnych

W niniejszym artykule koncentruję się na ukazaniu różnorodnych treści wyrażonych w skomponowanej ad hoc innowacji słowotwórczej użytej w jednym memie – przedstawiam go w następnym punkcie rozważań. Innowację tę omawiam zarówno jako zjawisko stricte językowe, jak i element współtworzący tzw. multimodalny przekaz nadawcy najprawdopodobniej będącego jej kreatorem².

Od razu dodam, że stosowane w memach techniki, przywodzące na myśl kolaż, są dobrze znane. Na przykład w zebranym przeze mnie materiaле masowo dziś adaptowanych do polszczyzny compositów z członami bio- i eko-³ znalazły się również takie, które występowały w kontekście wiżualnym (ikonicznym), tworząc całościowy przekaz multimodalny. Por. zamieszczone na okładce tygodnika Uważam Rze (5, 2015) compositum ekoterroryści – Rycina 1.

Sens niniejszego przekazu oprócz wyrażenia ekoterroryści współtworzą: kontekst językowy Zieloni specjaliści od kradzieży i wymuszeń (odsyłający do ludzi skupionych w partiach i ruchach ekologicznych określanych jako Zielone) oraz fotomontaż, który stanowi wieloelementowy przekaz ikoniczny.

2 O złożoności komunikacji w mediach, jej charakterze multimodalnym jest mowa w bogatej literaturze dotyczącej tej tematyki; por. np. Zinken (2007); Opilowski, Jarosz, Staniewski (red.) (2015); Müller (2008); Libura (2012); Górska (2014); Wojtak (2015).
Oba wymagają od odbiorcy aktywności: uruchomienia ciągu skojarzeń semantycznych (związanych z barwą zieloną, roślinnością, zaciśniętą dłonią, pieniądzmi, dźwigiem, budowanymi domami, autostradami) i opartych na nich wniosków.

Przedstawiony przykład przekazu multimodalnego niewątpliwie świadczy o kreatywności nadawcy w sposobie ukazania treści za pomocą oryginalnego doboru elementów składających się na wyrażony przez tę ilustrację koncept: ‘ekolodzy są terrorystami – stoją ponad prawem, są silni; ich siła wyraża się w bezwzględności kierowanych do firm budowlanych żądań i wymuszeń finansowych, w których się wyspecjalizowali’.

Słowotwórczej innowacyjności tu nie ma. Przywołane z zasobu leksyki internacjonalnej compositum ekoterroryści podobnie jak zapożyczenie eko-terroryzm należy do licznej serii analogicznie zbudowanych formacji z czlonem eko-, niedookreślonych treściowo jednostek, zyskujących znaczenie w użyciu (w konkretnym kontekście)⁴. W wyrażeniu ekoterroryści negatywnie nacechowany drugi człon nabiera dodatkowego znaczenia w połączeniu z eko– (wskazującym na ekologię – dziedzinę działalności subiektów, określonych mianem terrorystów), zaś cała struktura jest czytelna zgodnie z intencjami nadawcy dopiero w kontekście, który decyduje o profilu znaczeniowym pierwszego segmentu. Ten w zaprezentowanym na okładce użyciu wskazuje na następujące treści: ‘walczący o czystość środowiska naturalnego (m.in. protestujący przeciw zanieczyszczeniu natury przez urbanizację) są uznawani przez przeciwników owych działań za złodziei’.

Kontekst ikoniczny pomaga odbiorcy właściwie odczytać nie tylko skomplikowaną treść, jaką niesie człon eko-, lecz także intencje nadawcy, jego nega-

Rycina 1. Kontekst językowy i ikoniczny compositum ekoterroryści⁴
tywną ocenę zjawiska, którego dotyczy przedstawiona na okładce tygodnika wieloelementowa kompozycja. Jak widać, formalna przejrzystość struktury omawianego compositum związana z „rozpoznawalnością” segmentu eko-, nie idzie w parze z niedookreślonymi treściami, które on wnosi do derywatu. W konsekwencji znaczenie całej formacji jest nieprecyzyjne, niezrozumiałe bez kontekstu.

3. **Rola analogii jako mechanizmu formalnego i mentalnego. Kreowanie znaczeń w kontekście**

Rozwijane od lat 80. językoznawcze badania o nachyleniu kognitywnym przyczyniły się do pogłębiania spojrzenia na analogię jako na jeden z ważniejszych mechanizmów działalności mownej, za pomocą którego mogą powstawać nowe jednostki, a stare podlegać rozmaitym przekształceniom⁶. Por. jedną z wypowiedzi na ten temat Je. Kubriakowej:

[…] u podstaw analogii leży tworzenie jednej formy według typu i na podobieństwo innej (innych), a więc i mentalne uogólnienie sposobów tworzenia określonych form według znanej reguły (podaję za: Kubriakowa 2010: 15).


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*Więcej na ten temat piszę w artykule poświęconym analogii w słowotwórstwie tekstowym – por. Waszkowa (2012).*

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Twórcy omawianej teorii jako formalne amalgamaty (ang. *formal blends*) interpretowali asystemowe composita typu *Chunnel* 'tunel pod kanałem La Manche', powstałe poprzez integrację (scalenie, stopienie) dwu leksemów: pierwszego członu nazwy własnej *Channel la Manche* i *tunnel* 'tunel', przy jednoczesnej nieregularchnej dezintegracji segmentu *annel* w leksmie *Channel*; te formalne rezultaty scaleń – widoczne na powierzchni języka kontaminacje jednostek – łączyli z mechanizmami integracji pojęciowej (Fauconnier & Turner 2001: 178, 200)³.

Bez cienia przesady można powiedzieć, że innowacje leksykalne w postaci asystemowych compositów są dobrze znane użytkownikom Internetu; wcale nierazado używane w nagłówku mają przyciągnąć uwagę odbiorcy, aby prostym kliknięciem otworzyć okienko i przeczytać tekst. Wolno sądzić, że nadawcy uważają tego typu nierregularnie konstruktory tekstowe za kreatywne (pozwalające syntetycznie wyrazić zamierzone treści), a także za zabawne, zwłaszcza te w memach.

4. **Użycie innowacji słowotwórczej w przekazie multimodalnym**


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³ Teoria amalgamatów zainspirowała wielu badaczy zajmujących się interpretacją formalną i semantyczną tekstowych innowacji morfologicznych. Dla ujęć tych charakterystyczny jest ogląd tego typu compositów w perspektywie dynamicznej zarówno od strony formalnej, jak i pojęciowej; więcej na ten temat zob. Waszakowa (w druku).
Mem ten jest dla niniejszych rozważań interesujący z tego względu, że w wyrażeniu konceptu, mającego za zadanie rozśmieścić odbiorcę, ważną rolę odgrywa innowacja słowotwórcza.

Kluczem do zrozumienia treści całego przekazu wyrażonego w niemiejskim obrazku, jest wiedza o rzeczywistości. Dla odbiorców, nieznających przywołanej w memie sytuacji, podany jest kontekst, który wyjaśnia związek pierwszego członu nowo utworzonego compositum kamerundyner z osobą młodego polityka, Ryszarda Petru, przedstawionego w górnej części obrazka. Skojarzenie ikoniczno-językowe staje się czytelne po wyjaśnieniu związku pierwszej części tej innowacji, tj. segmentu kamerun – z tym politykiem. Chodzi o wypowiedzь Petru, w której zaprezentował (dwukrotnie) niewłaściwy sposób wymawiania nazwiska premiera Wielkiej Brytanii, Davida Camerona. Polityk partii „Nowoczesna” nazwisko Cameron wymawia niepoprawnie: jako Kamerun, zamiast Cameron. Nie jest to w żadnym razie lapsus linguæ, ponieważ w dalszej części wypowiedzi Petru powtarza ten sposób artykulacji, dając tym powód do radości internautom. Por. kontekst:


Należy dopowiedzieć, że nie jest to pierwsza zauważona i obśmiana przez internautów wpadka posła Petru – przewodniczącego opozycyjnej partii „Nowoczesna” – bardzo eksponującego się i eksponowanego w mediach. Nietrudno zauważyć, że od momentu spektakularnego uaktywnienia się na scenie politycznej (jesienią 2015 r.), jest on „wdzięcznym obiektem” różnego typu żartów internetowych, w tym memów. Jak wiadomo, wyraz Kamerun jest utrwalony w polszczyźnie nazwą państwa środkowoafrykańskiego; odpowiada jej angielska forma Cameroon.

5. Innowacja kamerundyner jako przykład amalgamatu formalnego

Przy wykreowaniu okazjonalnej innowacji słowotwórczej kamerundyner, będącej integralną częścią całego konceptu, przedstawionego multimodalnie,
Został wykorzystany podobny formalny mechanizm językowy, jak przy przywołanych wcześniej asystemowych compositach typu Chunnel. W nawiązaniu do sposobu graficznego przedstawiania integracji pojęciowej wyeksponnawane w omawianym memie twórcze połączenie dwóch form wyrazowych o postaci kamerundyner można też zobrazować w postaci następującego schematu – por. Rycina 3


Rycina 3. Amalgamat formalny – schemat ukazuje relacje strukturalne między innowacją kamerundyner i jej podstawami słowo­twórczymi Kamerun i kamerdyner. 

Dziękuję Pani Agnieszce Kostrowieckiej za gra­ficzne opracowanie moich (wzorowanych na schematach Fauconniera i Turner 2002) idei i pomysłów ilustracji.


Przestrzeń generyczna (G) obejmuje wspólny obu wyrazom segment kamer (w obu wyrazach ucięty w sposób nierespektujący granic morfemowych).

W amalgamacie kamerundyner (A) można widzieć stopienie się dwu identycznych segmentów -er-: obecnego w nazwie własnej Kam-er-un z seg-
mentem w wyrazu *kam-er-dyner*. Właściwemu, tj. zgodnemu z intencjami nadawcy, rozpoznaniu elementów składowych tej niesystemowej struktury służy **kontekst**: a) **językowy**, informujący, o jaki Kamerun chodzi, oraz b) **wizualny**, przedstawiający kamerdynera.

Słowa *kamerdyner* na memie nie ma, ale bezsprzecznie jest obecne – świadczy o tym wspólny obu wyrazom segment *kamer-* oraz człon * -dyner w *kamerdyner*.

Ta formalna zbieżność, z jednej strony pewnie sprzyjała nadawcy przy łączeniu obu rzeczowników w compositum, z drugiej zaś: może ułatwić odbiorcy deszyfrcję tej pozasystemowej innowacji słowotwórczej.

Formalny związek neologizmu *kamerundyner* z wyrazem *kamerdyner*, do którego odnosi się cząstka * -dyner* (powstała w wyniku nieregularnej, asystemowej dezintegracji), ma ujednoznaczyć przekaz ikoniczny: fotografia młodego mężczyzny. Ten może być uznany za kamerdynera tylko z tej racji, że w sposób właściwy służącemu przy stole, na otwartej, uniesionej dłoni, w białej rękawiczce, trzyma tacę. Kamerdyner ten nie jest ukazany „w pełni jego cech prototypowych”. Jego strój (poza białą rękawiczką): elegancki, dobrze skrojony garnitur, lśniąco biała koszula i czerwony krawat przywodzi na myśl skojarzenia zgoła „niekamerdyner- skie”. Mówiąc wprost: ubiór obu panów (w podobnym wieku) jest zbliżony, a różnicę widać w zasadzie tylko w kolorze krawatów. Obaj wydają się pochodzić z tej samej grupy społecznej, a niewykluczone, że i politycznej, choć nie jest to wyraziste; czerwony krawat może przywoływać skojarzenia z rezydentem lub specjestykiem; mówi to o ich wizerunku w opinii publicznej. Dla odbiorcy o obu panach: „pozostawili w służbie, wykonywali swoje obowiązki w domach ludzi bogatych, których było stać na utrzymanie służby; por. „Sa-nym biesiadnikom podawali półmiski kamerdynerzy, podług zwyczaju przyjętego u króla” (SJPD). Zob. też definicja w ISJP: „kamerdyner to dawniej w bogatych domach starszy lokaj nadzorujący porządek w domu i podawanie do stołu”. TEN wizerunek był też pełen wobecego u podawania do stołu". Ten zapożyczony z języka niemieckiego (Kammerdiener) historyzm był też używany w odniesieniu do osobistego lokaja pana domu.

### 6. **Innowacja kamerundyner jako przykład amalgaMut pojęciowego**

Operację konceptualnej integracji (tj. scalenia, stopienia pojęć), w wyniku której na poziomie kognitywnym dochodzi do wyłonienia się z dwu pojęć nowej struktury ‘kamerundyner’, nieredukowalnej do jej komponentów, ukazuje w sposób schematyczny Rycina 4.

Pierwszy krok to połączenie dwóch przestrzeni mentalnych. Jedna (W1) dotyczy: polityka Petru, a) jego zachowań, ocenianych jako przejaw nadaktywności (m.in. nader częstego występowania w mediach, zwłaszcza w telewizji), kojarzenia tego polityka ze "światem finansjery", z którą łączą go liczne związki; b) przypisywanej mu cechy 'bycia ignorantem', na podstawie jego wypowiedzi publicznych, m.in. sposobu, w jaki zwykł był artykułować nazwisko premiera Wielkiej Brytanii, D. Cameron (gdy zwrócono mu uwagę, upierał się przy formie Kamerun jako właściwej)\textsuperscript{14}. Druga przestrzeń mentalna (W2) aktywizuje wybrane cechy z domeny 'kamerdyner', m.in.: 'to, że jest to ktoś będący w czyjejś służbie, reprezentujący czyjeś interesy'.

Krok drugi to: utworzenie abstrakcyjnej przestrzeni, określonej mianem generycznego (G), opartej na wspólnych relacjach, tj. cechach, które łączą obie te przestrzenie wyjściowe (W1 i W2): 'ktoś o jakichś cechach'.

Trzeci, a zarazem ostatni krok to integracja (stopienie, scalenie) pojęć obu przestrzeni (W1 i W2) ze względu na utożsamione wcześniej cechy – jej rezultatem jest nowa struktura konceptualna 'kamerundyner',

\textsuperscript{14} Inne przykłady to: podchwycona przez internautów niedolna wypowiedź Petru o „sześciu królach” zamiast „trzech królach” w związku ze Świętym Trzech Króli, artykulacja „Rubikoń” (zamiast Rubikon) połączona z przekonaniem, że nie chodzi o historyczną rzekę, ale o wierzchowcu.
czyli amalgamat (A), nieredukowalna do jej komponentów. Wyraża ona całościowy sens tego żartu, ośmieszającego Petru, za pomocą przekazu językowego opartego na metonimii (typu część za całość: sposób wymowy Kamerun za polityka tak mówiącego), dopełnia, a zarazem ujednoznacznia, przekaz ikoniczny: fotografia Petru – biernego przedmiotu w czyichś rękach.

W zaprezentowanym omówieniu żartobliwego sensu mema w myśl postulatów twórców teorii integracji konceptualnej starałam się wskazać dwa typy procesów: 1) te, które są wiązane z dwiema podstawowymi właściwościami umysłu ludzkiego: zdolnością do porównywania oraz zdolnością do łączenia struktur; 2) oparte na tych pierwszych złożone procesy mentalne, m.in. takie jak kompozycja (composition), uzupełnianie (completion) i rozwój (elaboration) – por. Fauconnier i Turner (2002: 42–44).

Schematycznie rzecz ujmując: utworzenie całkiem nowej struktury pojęciowej nastąpiło w rezultacie połączenia obu wyjściowych przestrzeni pojęciowych, przedtem ich skojarzenie, a następnie wzajemne skorelowanie w określonych relacjach. Zastosowane w omawianym memie środki przekazu wizualno-ikonicznego nastawione zostały na jeden ogólny cel: ośmieszenie nielubianego przez internautów polityka poprzez jego dezawuację.

7. Podsumowanie

Opisywany mem jest pod wieloma względami typowym amalgamatem. Wymagają dopowiedzeń językowych, uruchomienia przez odbiorcę (tak wyrażonego komunikatu) wiedzy o świecie, pozwalającej trafnie, czyli zgodnie z intencjami kreatora konceptu, odczytać przekazywane intencje. Analizowany mem jest w moim przekonaniu średnio dowcipny. Powiązanie językowe łączy obiekty z silniejszym niż wizualnym: związek polityka Petru z kamerdynerem jest słabo „umocowany”: fotografia ukazuje tego ostatniego w cechach prototypowych – przypomina on bardziej kelnera (nb. słowo kelner zdecydowanie mniej pasuje formalnie). Sens całego konceptu mógłby okazać się bardziej wyrazisty, gdyby tak jak w przypadku polityka Petru fotografia kamerdynera odnosiła się do konkretnej osoby, znanej ze świata polityki albo do samego Petru. Taka zmiana z pewnością wzmocniłaby negatywną ocenę Petru, czyniąc żart celniejzym.

Źródła


15 Ryszard Petru, lansowany na przyßzlego prezydenta lub premiera, dał się poznać (nie tylko internautom) ze swoich wpadek; m.in. wykazał się słabą znajomością historii, skoro według niego upadek Cesarstwa Rzymskiego (przyp. w V wieku) nastąpił w 1935 r.}_{\text{15}}

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ANEKS 1.

Rycina 5. Mem, w którym Petru jest obśmiany za wymowę Kamerun za pomocą innowacyjnej formy fleksyjnej kamery (zamiast kamerę), nawiązującej fonetycznie do nazwiska Petru (Źródło: almoc.pl).
The present paper discusses derivational innovations found in on-line journalistic texts and their comments, and focuses on two perspectives while approaching them: (i) innovations seen as the result of a speaker’s creativity in the act of communication (cf. Langacker’s notion of the usage event, 2003), and (ii) innovations understood as a mental concept which occurs in the mind of a hearer in a context-dependent speaker-hearer interaction. According to the author, both these aspects contribute to better decoding of the message conveyed in derivational innovations. It is the speaker who is aware of the derivational complexity and context in which he utters a newly coined form. The hearer, in turn, is able to read out a real message hidden in a semantically complex derivational innovation owing to cognitive processes that are activated in the course of making inferences from the text itself, or while recalling linguistic knowledge as well as contextual and intercontextual data.

Other aspects which should be taken into account while analyzing derivational innovations include: (i) the knowledge of the world activated in the mind of both the speaker and the hearer, (ii) axiological values as comprised in motivated and motivating words, and (iii) the role of verbal and non-verbal context, indispensable for the interpretation of derivational units. All these aspects are complementary and play an important role in the process of decoding the message conveyed in the derivative, or, more precisely, in the meaning of the elements that structure it.

The main objective of the paper is to account for a complex mechanism of context-dependent meaning creation and meaning interpretation on the example of two Polish derivational innovations, i.e. ekoterroryści (Eng. ecoterrorists) and kamerundyner, found in memes, a popular multi-modal technique of communication and cultural transmission. As observed by the author, the analysed derivational innovations should not be treated as purely morphological phenomena. Rather, they ought to be cognitively approached, as an element which, together with the accompanying visual component, creates a multimodal message of the speaker, usually the author of a meme. The case of ekoterroryści discussed herein is a good example of such a ‘collage’ (source: the cover of the Polish weekly Uważam Rze 5, 2015). Here, both the visual and verbal input are important in the process of decoding the meaning. The verbal input of the concept ekoterroryści is two-fold. Firstly, we witness a conceptual fusion of two distinct notions: while activating the knowledge and associations connected with the prefix eko- (Eng. eco-), and while doing so with a semantically distinct expression terroryści (Eng. terrorists). Secondly, the expression ekoterroryści is enhanced by a linguistic context expressed in the form of a sentence Zieloni specjaliści od kradzieży i wymuszeń (Eng. ‘green specialists on theft and extortion’). The verbal input is additionally supported with the visual input, being here a multi-element iconic message, where green hues, plants, a tight fist, money, motorways, a crane and buildings under construction are portrayed. As in the case of the verbal input, the visual input also requires the activation of semantic associations and further inferences. All these elements combined create the
following multimodal message that stands behind ekoterrorzyści: ‘ecologists are strong and ruthless terrorists who are beyond the law; they specialise in financial extortion and financial demands using uncompromising measures’. It has to be observed here that much as the prefix eko- is fully transparent and recognizable, and, many a time, it brings about positive associations, it does not contribute to an appropriate interpretation of the meme, nor does it indicate a true intention of the speaker. To fully account for a negative assessment that appears in the analysed meme, it is necessary for the recipient of the message to recall the context, visual and/or verbal. Without these components, a successful interpretation of the meme ekoterrorzyści will not be possible at all.

An important element in the discussion upon derivational innovations found in various sources and in various forms is the role of analogy, understood both as a formal and conceptual mechanism (cf. Kubriakova 2010). As observed by Kubriakova, “analogy consists in deriving one form the other, allowing for both the type and resemblance to the latter, which indicates the conceptual character of the whole process” (2010: 15).

The author of the paper goes a step further in her considerations upon derivational innovations and recalls further extensions of analogy. In particular, she stresses the role of conceptual integration in interpreting derivational innovations. Basic assumptions of the dynamic and context-dependent subconscious operation which comes along human beings in everyday thought and language have been thoroughly described by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). As emphasized by the author, the interpretation of linguistic expressions from a cognitive perspective is inextricably bound up with recalling mental representations (frames, scenarios, models, or schemas) as elements indispensable for meaning construction. Within the dynamic and context-dependent meaning construction, words play the role of “imperfect clues as to what discourse configurations to set up” (Fauconnier 1997: 5).

The Fauconnier and Turner four-space integration network model has been used in the analysis of another interesting derivational innovation kamerundyner. Here, as in the previous case analyzed, kamerundyner is a component which contributes to a message expressed in the meme (source: http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/281326-petru-wie-lepiej-lider-nowoczesnej-poucza-jak wymawiac-nazwisko-premiera-wielkiej-brytanii-internet-kpi-z-kameruna; ED: 11 Feb. 2016). The innovation itself is also vital in that it aims at making the recipient of the message laugh.

The key for unlocking the message comprised in the analysed meme is the situational knowledge which pertains to the young Polish politician, the leader of the liberal political party Nowoczesna (Eng. modern), Ryszard Petru, and the circumstances in which he wrongly pronounced the surname of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron. The basis of humour inheres in the wrong pronunciation of the English name which, when pronounced by Petru, sounds identical to the pronunciation of Cameroon, the name of a country in Central Africa.

The analyzed innovation kamerundyner may be approached from two perspectives: (i) as a formal blend and (ii) as a conceptual blend. Allowing for the formal aspect, kamerundyner is an instance of a lexical blend in the sense of Kemmer (2003), where two distinct concepts, Kamerun (Eng. Cameroon) and kamerdyner (Eng. butler) are fused together, to create “a new integrated concept” (Kemmer 2003: 69). No less important is the phonological aspect of a formal blend where we find “relevant connections between the phonological elements of the source lexemes” (Kemmer 2003: 81). Adopting the Fauconnier and Turner basic integration network model, one can easily observe two input spaces, i.e. Kamerun (IS 1) and kamerdyner (IS 2), the generic space represented by a shared morphological segment kamer, and the blended space, in which we find the innovation kamerundyner. It has to be noted that formal convergences that accompany the emergence of the blend here facilitate the communication between the speaker and the hearer: on the one hand, they help the speaker integrate both words used into a composite whole; on the other hand, they enable the hearer to properly decode the meaning hidden in the innovation.

The issue is more complex when we approach kamerundyner as a conceptual blend. In such an instance, phonological and/or morphological convergences prove insufficient to fully account for its
meaning. Instead, we have to activate a broader context in which kamerundyner occurs. To do so, let us adopt, once again, the Fauconnier and Turner model of conceptual integration.

The first step of conceptual integration consists in matching counterparts between two distinct input spaces. In Input Space 1, we activate the knowledge referring to the politician Ryszard Petru, as well as recall the elements related with his political career, in particular his ignorant attitude (manifesting in incorrect pronunciation of David Cameron’s surname) and behaviour (e.g. mass media exposure, connections with the world of finance and economics). Input Space 2 comprises elements typical for the concept kamerdyner (Eng. butler), and indicates the activities that are usually associated with this occupation, e.g. being on wealthy people’s service, or taking care of their business.

The second stage of conceptual integration is the creation of the generic space which contains common characteristics of the two input spaces. In the analysed case, the expression ‘someone having certain features of character’ seems to be such an element.

The third and most important stage, integration (or blending), is the moment during which a novel concept emerges. Kamerundyner arises as the result of a conceptual fusion that occurs between selected elements taken from two input spaces, and involves three basic processes: (i) composition, (ii) completion and (iii) elaboration (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 42–44). Thus, coupled with the visual input presented in the meme, kamerundyner stands for Ryszard Petru, an ignorant politician who humiliates himself on the international political arena and who, most probably, remains a passive tool in more influential people’s hands.

The memes analyzed in the present paper are, in many respects, conceptual blends. Therefore, the application of the Fauconnier and Turner four-space network model to their analysis enabled the author to develop new insights into a dynamic process of conceptual integration, simultaneously stressing a tremendous role of communication, a multidimensional cognitive, social and cultural activity that occurs between the speaker and the hearer. This, according to the author, facilitates the understanding of the way people conceptualize linguistic phenomena, and reflects the dynamics of various word formation processes.

The cognitive-communicative approach to word formation processes thoroughly discussed on the example of kamerundyner analysed herein fills the gap in the literature on Polish word formation, so far strongly based on the structural approach to language. The present paper shows how to apply the tools offered by Western cognitive linguistics and successfully combine them with the analysis of Polish derivational innovations being a part of a multimodal message conveyed in the meme.

Abridgement prepared by Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos

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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The book under review is another highly successful publication in a series of volumes containing transcribed lectures in cognitive linguistics, authored by Ronald Langacker. The series was initiated in 1995 and has been edited by Professor Henryk Kardela and his colleagues at the Department of English Studies of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University of Lublin.

This time, a series of four lectures edited by Adam Głaz, Hubert Kowalewski, and Przemysław Łozowski focuses on the introduction of sophisticated analytical tools which help to elaborate more fully than before on a unified account of nominal structure, particularly in the English language. In more detail, the volume addresses semantic functions of nominals and their functional organization and use. The volume is structured into four basic parts. Lecture 1, Structure, Function, System, and Strata, introduces details of the analytical apparatus, focusing on the theory’s foundational concepts of language, meaning, structure, system, opposition and categorization, and linguistic organization. Lecture 2, Noun Classes and Nominal Structure, persuasively manifests the adequacy of defining grammatical categories in conceptual and semantic terms, i.e., a theory of grammatical categories based on meaning. Lecture 3, Nominal Grounding, presents a comprehensive
elaboration on the whole system of referential function and the mechanisms of nominal contextualization. Eventually, the last lecture on Quantification makes precise further issues with respect to reference to real world and virtual world objects and phenomena in English quantifiers.

It is not possible to do justice to all linguistic processes and mechanisms discussed in the lectures, so rather than commenting on every language phenomenon raised, I choose to address only some of the main issues of relevance to larger linguistic circles.

2. Language, Form, and Meaning

All the lectures elaborate on the issues related to the concept of language, meaning (function), and structure.

On p. 16 Langacker proposes:

Now in the case of language, the first factor (substance vs. activity) is actually irrelevant. Linguistic structure doesn’t consist of any kind of substance. It consists in activity, patterns of activity. Whether you look at the neural, cognitive, perceptual, motor, or interactive level, it’s just patterns of activity — there’s no substance there. But in the case of language we still talk about structure and function. Structure is often identified with grammar, and function with meaning. Or structure with lexicon, morphology, syntax, and phonology, and function with things like semantics, pragmatics, and discourse functions. This is really a kind of disguised metaphor. It’s a manifestation of the substance/activity distinction which I think is ultimately wrong. The things that are considered to be structure involve sounds, phonology. Lexicon incorporates sounds, and grammatical expressions incorporate sounds. And sounds, because they are observable, are metaphorically viewed as substantive, compared to meaning, which is felt to be intangible, transient, and mysterious. But as I say, that’s really just a metaphor. Really all aspects of language structure consist in activity, ultimately.

I suppose the word ultimately in this description is a clue to the interpretation of the above statement. Motion, which is an intrinsic property of activity, is indeed a primary, primitive, and universal attribute of matter in ontology, as philosophers would have it. The definition is also quite broad — everything and anything performed in the organic and inorganic world can be reduced to activity (motion) on different levels, starting from the mental, social to, ultimately, the physical-chemical level. Langacker says that we consider sounds as substantive (matter) because they are observable. On the other hand, the familiar picture of a linguistic sign, having its source in de Saussure’s Cours (1916), which dominates the traditional linguistic schooling, makes a distinction between form (formal structure) and meaning (substantive content of the form). In fact then, the term substance is used in two dif-
ferent senses in linguistic tradition: first, precisely as a synonym of content or meaning, then as an equivalent of something observable in our familiar world, such as sounds, word order, etc., i.e. linguistic structure — although this latter sense is frequently put in the form “physical” (as opposed to the “mental”) manifestation of linguistic signs.

Putting aside the terminological argument, the picture of the linguistic sign as presented by Langacker approaches that of the Saussurean one in this respect. There is an illusory distinction between form (structure) and meaning (activity). The linguistic sign duality is rather close to the familiar picture of metaphorical two sides of the same coin (as evoked also by Evans & Green 2006), although, unlike a real coin, it is obviously not static but can be dynamically combined in terms of form (structure)-meaning (function) symbolic assemblies as constructions, combinable in different ways with different perspectives. As in Jean Aitchison’s (1995) metaphorical picture of meanings subjected to linguistic scrutiny, meanings are like dead butterflies vis-à-vis the real, living ones, i.e., meanings in use. Langacker observes that connection always produces a new entity, with emergent properties. Such properties represent a higher-level of organization and can set up a grouping, i.e., a set of elements functioning as a whole for some higher-level purpose. This function is instantiated as proposed in my paper:

Linguistic units are symbolic entities, which are characterized, as other semiotic signs, by a (phonological) form and semantic content. There is an observable dialectics between meaning of a lexical unit and semantic interpretation of discourse, emerging dynamically in interaction. On the one hand, a word is a unit abstracted from a verbal act and it is static in this role. On the other, it exerts influence on context and shapes it. The context in turn, moulds the meanings, which are modulated and emerge online. (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010: 107)

In Langacker’s original vision, the connections define implicit structures that have a potential to build up assemblies, i.e., structures that emerge at a higher level with their roles (functions). Using language involves activation of old and creation of new elements Langacker calls linguistic structures, with the role of entrenchment, degrees of cognitive salience, or likelihood of activation.

The attribute of function, meaning, is primary in Langacker’s theory, a property characteristic of all cognitive, semantically-based approaches (Langacker 1987, 1991), in opposition to all uniquely structure-oriented theories of language.

3. Categorization and system

System in Langacker’s model is categorization from the standpoint of functional, extrinsic factors. Members (exponents) of the same category consti-
tute a system. In traditional terms, they are linked by paradigmatic relations and form pairs of oppositions. “But also”, Langacker develops the thought, “they are similar to one another, typically, because if elements serve the same function, they must have a lot in common to be able to do so” (p. 28). This is certainly present in any opposition pair, in negation, etc. (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996), in which a negative form activates a positive counterpart, while positive ones imply the existence of a number of opposing dormant members, though linked by sharing a common (albeit varying) pool of functional values.

Langacker goes further and proposes that “the exponents of a system are mutually inhibitory, I suppose because they compete for the same resources. If you activate one, it tends to suppress the others. That’s the basis for the notion of opposition [and possibly any contrast, BL-T] — they’re opposed to one another, which is actually an aspect of their value” (p. 28). Reference to the competition for the same resources may be true of any system (cf. e.g., MacWhinney 1987 on language acquisition), although in actual reality on the part of language production the search for a particular member activates the whole (regions of a) system. It might be of some advantage to resort to — existing and possible — psychological evidence in such matters, though Ronald Langacker is rather skeptical about possibilities to obtain evidence from language psychologists with regard to (at least some) linguistic claims (p. 99). This is signaled in this volume in a discussion concerning a different case (the status of the phrase this rock as an instance of grouping), raised by one of the discussants (p. 99) — but it is interesting to note that similar skepticism (perhaps going even further) concerning a cooperation between linguists and psychologists is noted in psychological publications. As early as in 1978, Jim Miller wrote:

For instance, noun phrases are so obvious as constituents and turn up in so many grammatical theories that it would be peculiar if the psychologist failed to find any evidence at all that the linguist’s noun phrase corresponded to a syntactic unit employed by the native speaker of a language. On the other hand, linguists would not abandon noun phrases if psychologists found no evidence for them and would doubtless ignore experimental evidence that apparently demonstrated that native speakers of, say, English, do not employ a syntactic unit corresponding to the noun phrase.

(Miller 1978: 260)

On the other hand, clear convergence can be observed with respect to cognitive psychological and linguistic research in numerous contemporary publications.

A system is not only of a traditionally paradigmatic nature. It embraces two types, either a task of an alternative (i.e., the above-mentioned paradigmatic) and a component (i.e., systemic, syntagmatic in structuralist terms)
nature. Contrary to structuralism, it is the latter that is considered more fundamental in all cognitive linguistic approaches.

4. Linguistic organization

This account of the basic concepts in Langacker’s theory is followed by a thorough discussion of the notions of baseline and elaboration (B/E) as fundamental concepts of his approach to linguistic organization. They pertain to asymmetries in language structure or its (conceptual and phonological) basis. The baseline serves as a starting point of reference, already there, possibly stored in memory, while its elaboration (by various processes) produces another structure at another level of organization, both levels being linked either temporally or logically. Langacker gives a number of convincing instances in support of such organization: current prototypes versus their diachronic change over consecutive steps of growing schematization (as in instances of polysemy), asymmetries between concrete/abstract (as in metaphorization), physical/mental, and real/imagined; or on higher language levels: series of elements in successive clauses in a discourse, or a possessive chain or composite structures of different types.

B/E organization represents an arrangement, layering, in terms of core and periphery, referred to as strata. It is interesting to note that Langacker argues for the basicness of core elements over peripheral ones, making reference to their order of acquisition, behaviour in language change, and cross-linguistic universality, strikingly similar to the unmarkedness (versus degrees of markedness) criteria, familiar from long linguistic tradition. On the other hand, an important point in Langacker’s discussion is his explicit withdrawal from the concept of positing a “zero” (Ø) unit, i.e., a zero member, which he had previously identified with an unmarked option. This can be understood in traditional linguistic approaches not necessarily as a (fictitious) constructed element (as in Chomsky’s (T)G approaches) but rather as having an equivalent in actual linguistic reality in the form of the basic (phonological, lexical, morphological or syntactic) element, acquired first, most frequent cross-linguistically, and older in terms of diachronic change. One can agree though that asymmetries between zero-marked members and others might be more successfully regarded as cases of B/E organization.

5. Semantic definitions of grammatical categories

Consonant with Langacker’s thesis of conceptual/semantic primacy of the system over structural one and contrary to standard (i.e., structuralist) linguistic doctrine, Cognitive Grammar claims that basic grammatical categories, in particular noun and verb, have primarily, or even exclusively, concep-
tual-semantic grounds for their identification. Their validity for all members of the categories, on the other hand, could not be maintained as an exceptionless requirement. This thesis, opposing all types of structuralist tradition, had in fact supporters in traditional approaches to grammars, such as e.g., Otto Jespersen's (1924, 1933) or those of others. It is only later, when structuralist approaches took over, that a rigid view of grammatical categories required unique reference to structure.

Langacker is particularly innovative in this area, when he makes reference to notions like objects, events, properties of objects and properties of events as conceptual archetypes, i.e., basic concepts reflecting fundamental aspects of human experience and their schematic (general) roles as, possibly universal, category prototypes, expressing basic human cognitive abilities. Only these fundamental cognitive abilities figure in the CG definition of basic categories: a noun profiles a thing, a verb profiles a process (a relationship followed through time), while adjectives and prepositions profile non-processual relationships.

6. Nominals

Langacker identifies a thing as defined abstractly by its unitary nature. The author calls it oneness and accounts for this property as resulting from grouping activity at some level. In the case of nouns expressing objects, the grouping is almost automatic and intuitive, therefore object nouns can be considered prototypical instances of the category. Collective nouns clearly require a two-level conceptual organization, while countability can be equated with multiple cases of oneness and depends on bounding. Oneness can also be characteristic of mass nouns in the sense of functioning as a single entity for some purpose. Examples of a varying range of the lexical unit blue and run and their derivatives in a series of component relationships are instances discussed by Langacker in rich detail.

7. Grounding and referential function

This part of Langacker’s discussion enters more fully the domain of discourse. It concerns referential functions as linked to nominals and clauses, basic units of discourse in their interactive function, enriching intersubjective awareness of the interlocutors by their association with the ground, which is understood by Langacker to refer to the interlocutors, their interaction, and their immediate circumstances. While the primary concern for nominals is shown to be identification, the role of clauses is existence, their epistemic status. One could argue that it is only the present that is “real”, while any other temporal location (past, future) or e.g. hypothetical occurrences are in
fact imagined. Alternatively, as proposed by Jaszczolt (2009), all temporality, including the present, is in fact modal, so imagined and (exclusively) mental. Specification of epistemic status is a key task: dimension of elaboration. The semantic function of nouns, on the other hand, is to identify things and provide their schematic account, their schematic definition, accessible to discourse participants as their (momentary) focus of attention, which involves different strategies.

Langacker discusses nominals with unique versus non-unique reference, pointing to conceptual capacities of commonality and difference identification, as well as those of abstracting types of things and phenomena. An extensive discussion of all types of nominal grounding, including articles, demonstratives and quantifiers, predominantly in English, identifies nominal classes of different degrees of concreteness (Joe > blue > seven > justice), symbolic complexity (Joe vs. Barack Obama; seven vs. thirty seven), and specificity (meat > pork > ham). The function of demonstratives and their baseline grounding strategy, i.e., pointing (real or abstract), together with its multiple instantiations in quantifiers, possessives, numbers etc., is expressed in other alternatives for grounding strategies discussed in detail for English with some reference to more or less elaborate grounding observed also in other languages (e.g., classifiers in Mandarin). All fine points of grounding grammar in English are scrupulously accounted for.

The question of nominal reference is treated by Langacker in broad terms, not limited to real-world entities, as every nominal refers to a particular thing in our mental universe. Langacker points to the inadequacy of the narrow definition for linguistic purposes, although he is not a radical in this respect and assumes the existence of the “real world” (without specifying it any further), a range of uniquely mental constructions (e.g., metaphors, blends, and suchlike), as well as the imagined worlds of stories, myths, etc. A further distinction is made there between the unreal (not yet realized) and alternative worlds (Santa Claus), although further discussion suspends the actual/virtual distinction as relative, virtuality being associated with simulating other minds. There is a certain unclarity concerning this point, taken over in a discussion which follows, when Langacker proposes that “a virtual entity is imagined (“conjured up”) for a particular local purpose, hence limited to the mental space established for that purpose” (p. 129). In fact, both reality/unreality and actuality/virtuality are not strict dichotomies but degrees and dimensions of departure from the baseline and are therefore manifold and varied. To sum up, Langacker points to the fact that all grounding in use is local and heavily depends on the Current Discourse Space, emphasizing the discursive nature of all grounding. In this way, a referent’s epistemic status is specified through an inventory of varying linguistic markers, starting from pronouns and articles, to a meticulously analyzed system and subsystems
of quantifiers (Lecture 4), which provide alternate forms of epistemic control. In his interpretation of quantification, Langacker resorts to a large pool of linguistic phenomena, e.g., the use (in English) of either singular or plural verbs in cases such as a flock of geese was/were is explained as undergoing a metonymic shift by virtue of alternate profiles being imposed on the same conceptual content (p. 164). In other cases, reference to diachronic change and grammaticalization patterns is called forth.

To mention one more issue, through his response to a question about connectionism (p. 57), we learn that Langacker’s model of language is not a realia model in the sense of Wittgenstein’s picture of a boiling pot, which — to be a “true” representation — would need to have a real pot and real boiling water in it (Wittgenstein 1953: § 297). Langacker talks about connections as basic, although in his model they are used in a representational sense: he sees them as matching the processing mental model. A discussion of the competing connection/disconnection properties that follows (p. 99) is revealing and points out once more to basic properties of categorization: recognition of similarities and differences, i.e., grouping together by identification of differences.

8. Concluding remarks

The framework proposed for the present analysis of nominal structure is scrupulously and thoroughly researched for inferences and further implications. It covers significant developments in the explanatory approach to nominal structure and synthesizes Ron Langacker’s advances in cognitive linguistic theory of nominal structure, grounding, and reference.

While the analysis presented may not be definitive (recall that the book is a record of a series of lectures, not a finished, carefully edited monograph), I believe it to be more perspicuous and explanatory than previous attempts in this domain. If nothing else, it reflects a number of theoretical notions which, though not new in grammar, are now being made explicit in cognitive linguistic terms and explored in greater depth. These notions include systems of opposing elements, the fundamental role of semantic functions, grammar as the implementation of those functions, and structures being organized in strata.

I want to praise the editorial work put in the publication of the volume as supervised by Adam Glaz, Hubert Kowalewski, and Przemysław Łozowski with very few things to improve. We are provided with a bibliography to the lectures — it is not very extensive but this is only to be expected. A well-thought over system of synopses with condensed information on each of the points certainly serves its purpose. Very well structured question-answer parts following each lecture and a comprehensive index of terms provide
a useful help in looking for relevant information. The reader has to appreciate
the work of the editors, the whole editorial team and, last but not least, the
transcribers, whose names I take the liberty to mention: Ziemowit Janiak,
Ewelina Prażmo, Marietta Rusinek, Katarzyna Stadnik, Przemysław Terejko,
Anna Wyrwa, Angelina Żyśko, and Konrad Żyśko.

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The monograph contains nineteen chapters on motion and emotion as aspects of physical and cultural embodiment in language. Seventeen papers by Polish scholars and two by contributors from Spain and Italy cover the space of 281 pages, which makes the volume a comprehensive representation of the subject matter.

The introduction by the editors provides brief descriptions of the individual papers and the analytic approaches employed by their authors. Unfortunately, the volume has not been divided into sections, for example second language teaching/acquisition, translation strategies, specialist languages, visual communication, etc. Their presence would make it even more accessible to the potential reader.

The adopted view of embodiment is broad. The analyses go far beyond the cognitive linguistic accounts of image schematic structures (Johnson 1987), theories of conflation and emergence of primary metaphors (Johnson 1997; Grady 1997), and the neural theory of metaphor (Narayanan 1997). At the same time, most papers deal with emotions as manifestations of embodied experience.

Some remarks on individual papers seem to be apposite. Thus, the first two texts — by Bożena Rozwadowska / Ewa Willim and Marcin Kuczok —
discuss linguistic expressions of emotions from the contrastive but complementary standpoints of grammar and the lexicon. Whereas the former adopts a partly formal perspective, the latter is set within the framework of cognitive linguistic analysis of emotions developed in numerous studies by Kövecses (1986, 2000, 2005). Marcin Kuczok’s paper certainly contributes to the overall study of emotions in cognitive linguistics, but it pays too little attention to the metonymic motivation for some emotion-related concepts.

The next five chapters deal with the impact of emotions on the process of foreign language learning. The first two of them again represent contrastive views because they deal with anxiety and self-confidence — the two poles on the scale of emotions that strongly affect the process of learning and its effects. The chapter by Elżbieta Krawczyk-Neifar analyses the whole spectrum of positive and negative emotions in the context of English-Chinese translation classes. The adopted method of questionnaire, as well as presentation of the results in the form of tables, make the argument lucid. The chapter by Anna Klimas, in turn, is less directly related to the topic of the volume because it focuses on motivational strategies. Although they do involve some emotion-related factors, such strategies are first and foremost a part of teacher’s competence.

The next six chapters discuss various issues related to translation and persuasion. Mariusz Kamiński’s contribution focuses on the relations between the use of reference tools such as dictionaries and language corpora, the quality of legal translation, and self-confidence of the translator. Though the outcomes of the analysis are largely foreseeable, the paper provides a convincing empirical confirmation of them. The chapter by Katarzyna Filipowska investigates ways of rendering emotions in Stanisław Barańczak’s translations of Philip Larkin’s poetry. The cognitive linguistic perspective rooted in Langacker’s (1987) framework allows the author to pair alternate image construals with various translation strategies, for example omission. The discussion thus reflects one of the major contributions of Cognitive Poetics to the analyses of literary texts (Stockwell 2003). The chapter by Olga Łabendowicz correctly describes the status of audio-visual translation/AVT methods in Poland, but — again — is only indirectly related to the leading theme of the volume. The question whether source or target culture should be represented in translation goes beyond the scope of emotion analysis. Also the paper by Magda Żelazowska and Magdalena Zabielska on translation in Polish-Russian patient-doctor communication does not seem to fit the volume well. Although it mentions empathy as a vital element of such communication, the study focuses mostly on translation problems. The papers by Anna Kuzio and Jessica Mariani remain out of the scope of the volume still more obviously — both apply elements of discourse analysis to the description of politics-related texts.
The remaining five chapters investigate the role of emotions in the understanding of proverbs, popular science headlines, patients’ and doctors’ narratives, internet communication, and comics. The paper by Michał Szawerna contains some discussion of multi-modal metaphors, which “rounds off” the cognitive linguistic perspective present in several other contributions to the volume.

The placement of most papers makes the overall organization of the volume clear and increases the force of their argument. The contrast between grammatical and lexical approaches to emotion in the chapters by Rozwadowska/Willim and Kuczok is, again, a good example of the above-mentioned effect. The same is true about the chapters by Katarzyna Rokoszewska and Małgorzata Serafin, which deal with opposite emotions in similar contexts. The paper by Anna Kuzio is an exception. Even though it is sometimes difficult to draw clear boundaries between the areas of research, it certainly should not have been placed among the translation-related contributions.

The book has been carefully edited. Some minor spelling errors present in the text, for example in the word wit instead of with on page 78 and elsewhere, do not lower its overall quality.

Finally, most papers in the volume go beyond strictly theoretical approaches and employ various empirical methods in their analyses, for example questionnaires or language corpora. This “linguistics in action” attitude, together with a broad range of issues covered, makes the volume a comprehensive, readable, and useful source of information on the topic. In spite of the above-mentioned shortcomings, it can certainly be of use in research.

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Monografia autorstwa Piotra Blumczyńskiego opublikowana nakładem wydawnictwa Routledge (Taylor & Francis) w 2016 r. jest tekstem nietypowym. Oryginalność książki wynika nie tyle z przyjętej interdyscyplinarnej optyki zjawiska „wszechobecności” tłumaczenia, ile z treści trzech tez, które stawia Autor jako centralne dla przeprowadzonego wywodu. Pierwsza teza dotyczy percepcji tłumaczenia jako zjawiska o charakterze zarówno substantywnym, jak i proceduralnym. Substantywność wiąże się z pytaniem, czym jest tłumaczenie, natomiast proceduralność — jak tłumaczenie się realizuje. Pytanie jak jest dla Blumczyńskiego kluczowe, ponieważ ogniskuje uwagę na Whiteheadowskim procesualistycznym wymiarze tłumaczenia i stanowi niejako pojęcie-hiperonim zawierające w sobie inne ważne aspekty w kontynuum relacji tłumacz – tekst A i B – odbiorca. Blumczyński stawia w tym momencie drugą tezę, a mianowicie, że położenie nacisku na jak raczej niż na co gwarantuje realność dialogu między różnymi obszarami humanistyki. Dialog, według Blumczyńskiego, staje się realny, ponieważ odbywa się na ziemi niczyjej, swoistym pasie transgranicznym, gdzie żaden z uczestników dialogu nie czuje się ani gospodarzem, ani gościem. Odrzucony zostaje w gruncie rzeczy podział na „swoich” oraz „obcych” jako przejaw niepożądanego fundamentalizmu, ponieważ od tej chwili „swojskość” oraz „obcość” są


**Recenzent**
Marek Kuźniak
(Uniwersytet Wrocławski)
kategoriami płynnymi, zarówno zewnętrznymi, jak i wewnętrzonymi w stosunku do konceptualizatora. Fundacjonizm zastępuje się płynną mediacją, swoistą negocjacją w zakresie pytań o istotę wiedzy, prawdy, a zatem kluczowych zagadnień właściwych dla epistemologii oraz ontologii jako dwóch zasadniczych, poza aksjologią, gałęzi filozofii. Teza trzecia stanowi konsekwencję przyjęcia wyżej wymienionych dwóch tez i dotyczy rozumienia „wszechobecnoc” tłumaczenia jako pewnej klamry spinającej poznawcze rozproszone i niezwiązane z sobą pojęcia funkcjonujące w różnych gałęziach humanistyki, których wzajemna przetłumacjalność jest możliwa ze względu na daleko idącą konwergencję „JAKościową”.

Tłumaczenie dla Blumczyńskiego to coś więcej niż narzędzie czy proces tworzenia tekstu B pod wpływem tekstu A. To swoisty światopogląd, sposób na życie, sposób na zrozumienie siebie oraz innych w nieustannie pulsującym i zmiennym kontekście — wszechgarniającej semiozie doświadczeń. Wspomniane wyżej trzy tezy sprowadzają się w istocie do jednej, którą można syntetycznie przedstawić w formie swoistego manifestu: „szukajmy nieustannie sposobu na to, aby odnajdywać to, co nas łączy, a nie to, co nas dzieli”.

Autor wybiera cztery obszary humanistyki, które mają potwierdzić tezy o „nomadyczności”, a zarazem „przetłumacjalności” pojęć według drogowskazu nakreślonego przez Autora. Obszarami tymi są kluczowa hermeneutyka niemiecka (Hans Georg Gadamer), teologia procesu (Tomaš Halík), językoznawstwo kognitywne (Ronald Langacker, George Lakoff) oraz antropologia symboliczna (Clifford Geertz). Autor konsekwentnie zatem w rozdziale pierwszym omawia teoretyczne założenia procesualistycznej oraz proceduralistycznej wizji tłumaczenia. W kolejnych zajmuje się odkrywaniem dialogiczności, przetłumacjalności konkretnych pojęć pomiędzy przytoczonymi wyżej obszarami humanistyki. Autor porusza się w wyznaczonym przez siebie mikrokosmosie nader sprawnie, analizując ze swadą oraz erudycją kolejne etapy „wszech-wędrówki” na spotkanie z Obcym.

Praca stanowi niewątpliwie interesującą syntezę rozważań metaorytycznych nad zjawiskiem przekładu w ujęciu filozofii hermeneutyckiej znozącej w warstwie deklaratywnej zasadność wszelkich podziałów oraz granic w rozważaniach naukowych. Stąd przyjęta przez Autora, jak się wydaje, „bezpieczna” optyka transdyscyplinarna, gwarantująca de facto immunitet na kontrargumentację płynącą z tradycjonalistycznych źródeł wywodzących koncepcję nauki opartej na rygorze metody oraz kryterium falsyfikacyjnym w rozumieniu Poppera. Oczywiście w przypadku monografii Blumczyńskiego o wypełnieniu obu kryteriów nie ma mowy, ponieważ Autor założył poetykę argumentacji opartą na zupełnie innych podstawach.

Podstawy te są zasadniczo chwiejne, nieoparte w istocie na żadnych przesłankach o charakterze weryfikacyjnym. Blumczyński się waża,
ale nie jest to nowość — już przecież zwątpienie znajdujemy u Karneadesa z Cyreny, gdzie żadna wiedza, żadna działalność o charakterze intelektualnym, poznawczym nie jest pewna. Wahali się zatem greccy sceptycy, wałał się Kartezjusz, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz i wielu innych. Zwątpienie jest czymś naturalnym w filozofii. Na przestrzeni dziejów rodiło jednak wielkie problemy, ponieważ przestrzegano zasady jak podporządkowanej co oraz dlacego. U Kartezjusza zwątpienie zaowocowało dualizmem psychofizycznym, u Pascala — dualizmem porządku rozumu i serca, u Spinozy — paralelizmem ducha i materii oraz panteistycznym racjonalizmem, wreszcie u Leibniza — rachunkiem różniczkowym oraz relatywizacją czasoprzestrzeni. W przypadku książki Blumczyńskiego wahanie staje się niejako wartością autoteliczną, swoistym ucieleśnieniem procesu epistemologicznego. Takie są konsekwencje wyboru aksjologicznego Autora, w rezultacie którego proceduralne jak, przy pomocy uniwersalistycznego translatio, dokonuje transgresji granic wytyczonych wielowiekową refleksją filozofii greckiej i zawłaszcza teren niepodzieleni nalezażący dotąd przez substancjalne co. Nie odbieram, rzecz jasna, prawa Blumczyńskiemu do takich projekcji, ale warto zauważyć, że konsekwencje są daleko idące, czego namacalną egzemplifikacją jest programowa wręcz marginalizacja konkluzji jako ważnego produktu pracy naukowej. Tkwi w tym zapewne jakiś zamiśń Autora, ponieważ istotne dla Niego jest przede wszystkim procesualistyczne (nieproduktywne) wielopłaszczyznowe przeżywanie świata z dramatyczną scenografią nieodwracalności dokonywanych wyborów w tle, podszytą determinizmem tzw. „strzałki” upływu czasu.

Książka Ubiquitous Translation to szczególne zaproszenie do lektury. Zaproszenie wymagające, bo oczekujące od odbiorcy swoistej komunii ze światem Autora, jego wartościami, a co za tym idzie, wysoce problematyczną koncepcją przekładu jako jawnika wszechgarniającego i przenikającego jestesto tłumacza. Tłumacz jawi się tutaj jako indywiduum zaangażowane etycznie, emocjonalnie, poznawczo w przekład rozumiany jako czynna kontemplacja podobieństw na scenie konceptualizowanej, projektowanej rzeczywistości, ale również jako proces solipsystyczny. Wszechobecność, która jest cechą wyróżniającą przekładu sensu largo jest propozycją kontwersyjną, ponieważ raczej zamyka dyskusję na autentyczny dialog, niż go otwiera — jak chce tego Autor. Dialog u Blumczyńskiego odbywa się pozornie, niejako w rodzinie, gdzie wspólnym mianownikiem wiążącym refleksję jest szeroko pojęty interpretatywizm osadzony na gruncie tzw. eksperiencjalisme-emergentyzmu oraz osiągnięcie lat 70. XX wieku w psychologii poznawczej.

Blumczyński, być może w zgodzie z własnym domniemanym założeniem, nie ilustruje kluczowych też żadną graficzną czy opisową ilustracją. Zakładam, że Autor chciał w ten sposób uniknąć fosylizacji — swoistego „ułamecznienia” rozważań, co byłoby niezgodne z zakładaną tezą o prze-
kładzie nieustanie pulsującym, procesualnie zorientowanym, stawającym się, podatnym na reakcjonistyczne podglebie złożoności kontekstu interpretacyjnego itp.

Jeśli praca miała spełnić zatem warunki pożądanego przez Autora „autentycznego dialogu”, to na spotkanie w kierunku odkrywania siebie oraz innych w relacji do czasoprzestrzennego wymiaru naszej rzeczywistości powinni się raczej nadać „zmienny” Heraklit z „niezmiennym” Parmenidesem, „niedyskretny” Protagoras z „dyskretnym” Demokrytem, „pulsujący” Heidegger z „ejdetycznym” Husserlem, „płaski” Euklides z „wielowymiarowym” Riemannem, „absolutyzujący” Newton z „relatywizującym” Leibnizem, „wczesny” Wittgenstein z „późnym” Wittgensteinem, „interpretatywny” Geertz z „funkcjonalnym” Malinowskim itd. A tak pozostaje nam poniekąd skazany na sukces „dialog” Heideggera z Gadamerem, Geertza z Turnerem, czy, z leka ironizując, Lakoffa z Johnsonem.

Podsumowując, tłumaczenie staje się u Blumczyńskiego „wszechobecne” w obrębie „koncesjonowanych” gałęzi humanistyki, natomiast nieprzetłumaczałość dalej wydaje się „rządzie” w obszarach realnie opozycyjnych, jak np. pomiędzy postawą badawczą „dogmatycznie” fundamentalistyczną oraz „dogmatycznie” relatywistyczną. Zdaje się, że sam Autor podziela taki pogląd, szukając dialogu wśród „przyjaciół”, a odrzucając możliwość zadziałania *translatio effect* wśród „nie-przyjaciół”. „Ubiquitous Translation is NOT ubiquitous” — chciałoby się powiedzieć. Nie mam innego wyjścia — jak Blumczyńskiego wyprodukował kwalifikator *ubiquitous*, który absolutyzuje rolę i „JAKość” przekładu — czytelnik jest zatem zmuszony albo przyjąć *en bloc* tak skonstruowaną tezę, ALBO nie, ponieważ *ubiquitous* jest niestopniowalny, „bezwzględny”. *Tertium non datur*. Mimo wszystko, książka prowokuje, zmusza do krytycznego myślenia, stawia przed czytelnikiem intelektualne wymagania. Dla tych, którzy ulegną pokusie podążania ścieżką wytyczoną przez Autora, publikacja niewątpliwie będzie uczta intelektualno-duchową. Dla tych jednak, którzy pozostaną z boku, książka wytworzy nieodparte uczucie wręcz klaustrofobicznego zawężenia oraz zawłaszczenia przestrzeni do rzeczywistego dialogu.

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1 Zauważalne jest to również w wymiarze formalnym związanym z niekonsekwencją zapisu graficznego nazwiska Autora omawianej publikacji, pisanego raz przez „n”, innym razem przez „ń”).