

# **DEBATE: WHAT CAN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS CONTRIBUTE TO OTHER COGNITIVE SCIENCES, AND WHAT CAN IT GAIN FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES?**

The following debate took place on September 27, 2019, at the Faculty of Philology, University of Białystok, during the annual conference of the Polish Cognitive Linguistics Association (PCLA). The debate was led by Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (State University of Applied Sciences, Konin, Poland). It included conference keynote speakers Alan Cienki (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam), Dagmar Divjak (University of Birmingham, UK), Jeannette Littlemore (University of Birmingham, UK), and Jordan Zlatev (Lund University, Lund, Sweden). Other PCLA conference participants were Bogusław Bierwiaczonek (Jan Długosz University, Częstochowa, Poland), Elżbieta Górka (Warsaw University, Poland), and Małgorzata Fabiszak (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland).

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** I suggest that we proceed by asking our panelists to say a few words as we turn to the position statement regarding the topic. After that, we will ask the participants to contribute to the discussion, and later there will be a free exchange of thoughts, questions, and comments. If I may, I will ask Professor Jordan Zlatev to start the discussion.

**J. Zlatev:** Thank you very much. Alan just reminded us that four years ago, a special issue of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* appeared, and many of us had a chance to write short articles about this topic for that issue.<sup>1</sup> I may be repeating some of the things I wrote there as I address the question “What can cognitive linguistics (CL) gain from other fields?” There are three fields, and they are the three cognitive sciences as defined by a broad sense of the word *cognitive*. I won’t go into the polysemy of the term *cognitive*, but I hope that we can agree that it does not refer only to something “in the head.” Cognition is also about social interaction and distributed cognition, about knowledge as a social phenomenon. Therefore, the first cognitive science that we can learn from is philosophy. It includes analytical philosophy, that is, the philosophy of the mind; the philosophy of language (represented here at our debate by Piotr Konderak); and all discussions of conceptual analysis. There is also phenomenology, which is clearly relevant if CL is to be based on experience; as you may remember, the founding fathers of the field were promoting “experientialism” some years ago. In the area of experience, the natural place to go is phenomenology, which is the tradition in philosophy dedicated to explicating the nature of experience. One may consider here the notion of intuition, which is important for linguistic methodology. Intuition is not just having a hunch; intuition is not the same as introspection. Intuition is, per its definition, shared, or at least shareable and, hence, a valid method of investigation.

The second area that may offer gains for cognition (you won’t be surprised about this if you heard my talk yesterday) is semiotics. This broad field and its literature offer many insights, but there is little awareness of them in CL. Roman Jakobson is a good example of a great linguist who was also a semiotician. Notions that I was talking about yesterday, such as “sign,” “sign system,” and “iconicity,” all come from semiotics; rather than reinventing the wheel or using these notions in other senses than in the way they were used in semiotics, why not read about them and complement our ideas about how language interacts with other semiotic systems? Another advantage would be to not treat them as language or some kind of subsidiary to language but rather as semiotic systems on their own.

The third field is actually other kinds of linguistics. It’s interesting to remember how, 30 years ago, CL defined itself in opposition to generative linguistics. It more or less had to be everything that generative linguistics was not: learned rather than innate, cognitive rather than modular, and so on. In some ways, however, a generic “generativist” may have been a straw man, an enemy artificially created to provide coherence in the movement of

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1 All contributions are available with free access at: <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/cogl/27/4/cogl.27.issue-4.xml>

CL. For many of us, it is not an enemy in either an ideological or institutional sense because it is not as influential as it once was, and in some countries, never was. The connection between CL and, let's say, typological linguistics or structuralist linguistics is a very natural one. I myself have been learning, for example, from Eugenio Coseriu, who is virtually unknown in the English-speaking world because he wrote mostly in Spanish or German, but is considered by many one of the most important linguists of the 20th century. I think his ontology of language is much richer than the one we are operating with today. Adopting an ontology of language in which there is a place not just for usage events but also for the language system and language universals is a very productive linguistic ontology and related epistemology. That brings us back to philosophy. For these reasons, my answer to the question is this: philosophy, semiotics, and other kinds of linguistics.

**J. Littlemore:** What I would like to talk about is what CL can bring to other disciplines. Here I'm talking about disciplines that are a bit further afield from our closest neighbors. I have worked with people in marketing, law, education, and nursing, so I'd like to talk about those four areas in particular. I'll start with marketing. One of the things that CL has to offer to the field of marketing is a more subtle way of looking at the role played by metaphor and metonymy in advertising, the functions they can perform, and the effect that they can have on the consumers. Some of our work has shown, for example, that people respond well to complex combinations of metaphor and metonymy rather than to very simple manifestations of them. In turn, what marketing can bring back to CL is an awareness that what people are interested in is not the straightforward advertisements that researchers have been analyzing for years; they are interested in much more subtle ideas of branding, conveying a message through a kind of polysemiosis, and the idea that you're creating an identity for a brand also in some subtle and indirect ways. I for one had not thought about this until I worked with people in marketing. So, that's marketing.

The second discipline is law. I've been working with people in law on the Death Before Birth project, and one of the things that has been quite useful to discuss are radial categories of meaning, of word senses. Often in law the meaning of a word is very rigorous, and there is no shading from one thing to another. I think this is out of necessity, because in a lot of cases, the law has to be very black and white. However, when you look at how people interpret the law, how the law is understood when it lands on the ground, and how people read the law, its meanings become understood very differently based on people's own experiences and their background knowledge, their encyclopedic knowledge. The study of how law is interpreted therefore benefits from a radial category approach to meaning.

The final two disciplines are education and nursing. I think what CL can bring to those two fields is a more in-depth understanding of why communication can break down. There are subtle ways in which people can misunderstand very technical terms. This occurs in doctor–patient and nurse–patient dialogues and in educational situations. In these fields, there are specific discourse communities, and specific metonyms that have particular meaning for those communities but are completely misunderstood by newcomers to the communities. People may not think that these words are problematic, because they are very, very simple words, but they are used in different ways that can be problematic. So I think I'd say marketing, law, education, and nursing are the four that come to mind for me.

**A. Cienki:** The first issue that comes to my mind is the assumption that CL is a cognitive science, which is something I think a lot of people would question. The question is whether CL is going to be swallowed up by cognitive science or whether it is going to identify itself as offering something new and different and independent. I think that's a bigger question in terms of what constitutes cognitive science. It started as a six-field discipline in which philosophy and anthropology were among the foundational fields. There was a debate, or series of pieces, in the journal *Cognitive Science* a few years ago around the question "Do we still need anthropology?" I felt that that was shocking. It was a sad statement at the time that arose from the fact that not many papers were being contributed to the journal from anthropologists. Anthropologists were often seen as being in their own corner, as not relating to what mainstream cognitive scientists, who were mostly cognitive psychologists, were doing. I think this situation brings up the question of to what degree, for example, can anthropology, cultural anthropology, and cognitive anthropology relate to what's being done in CL, reminding us of the cultural background and context in which we're working. I think those are important points that we often forget about, especially if research is moved more and more into laboratory settings, where everything is controlled as much as possible. Such a move isolates the research from so many different cultural factors. I think that's a point to think about.

In terms of what CL can contribute, we can look at those psychological studies and the contexts in which they were conducted: The richness of language use gets forgotten or pushed aside because it has to in order to have the control of different variables needed in the study. I think that's something else that we can bring as cognitive linguists; we can remind researchers in cognitive science about the richness of language use and all that goes with it. In connection with that, if we look at language use, then there's also the difference between speaking and writing. I think that's something that often gets overlooked, and it is in some ways a carryover from earlier

traditions. The assumption is that there is language and it gets expressed. It can get expressed in writing and it can get expressed in speaking, but maybe it doesn't matter. I think if we really take the usage-based approach, we need to consider speaking and writing more on their own terms and pay attention to what they involve. We have this idea of thinking-for-speaking, but it's very different from thinking-for-writing and what's involved in that. People who work in the field of academic writing are quite aware of the special training needed to produce good academic texts. This is one point out of several points that we can come back to. To finish up the discussion on the relationship of CL to cognitive psychology, I offer the following thoughts: I come from the field of gesture studies, and I have found that when you go to a gesture studies conference, there is more and more a predominance of people working in the field of cognitive psychology. It brings up the question of the degree to which we can talk about the validity of research and how it relates to everyday practices when it's about a very particular phenomenon in a very controlled setting. One final little story: I was at a gesture studies conference with someone who had brought a partner who was an evolutionary biologist. The partner wasn't there for the gesture studies conference; he was just sort of tagging along. He started going to the talks, however, because he started to find them more and more interesting. Talking to him during the coffee breaks was one of the most useful parts of attending that conference for me because every time I became more and more curious. I asked, "What did you hear in this talk and earlier talks that we'd just heard?" He was very struck by how some of the analyses presented results in a graph with a nice neat line and everything seemed to line up. He said, "Maybe they're looking at gesture use as if it's like playing chess on one chessboard. What if there are, in fact, many chessboards that are vertically stacked up and any move that's made is actually influenced by moves on the other boards, not just the board that we see?" This way of thinking was something I thought about for a few weeks afterward. If we're dealing with a complex, dynamic system, we can't just look at one level such as language use and think that it answers everything about language use. Language use is also connected with other semiotic systems, other behaviors, and different contexts. So, I think, it's really important for us, if we're going to have a usage-based approach, to connect with other disciplines that are looking at communicative usage events and then see how what language is doing relates to these other behaviors and communicative practices.

**D. Divjak:** I kind of made my points earlier [during the plenary lecture]. I'd like to go back to something that Jordan said about the special 2016 journal issue "The Cognitive Commitment 25 Years On," which I co-edited: We started that project because we were not convinced that we were necessarily

on the right track, and what came out of it was the finding that collectively, we *are* on the right track. We had some papers by people who were individually arguing for the cognitive dimension, for the social dimensions, and so on. Everybody had their own agenda, but together the articles painted a very accurate picture of the complexity of language. We asked our contributors to make some practical suggestions as to how the complex image they had painted would influence the daily practice of cognitive linguists, and everybody took a step back. I think that's the real challenge: I don't think we disagree, as a community, about the many dimensions of language. I think the challenge is methodological. It's hard enough to do one thing well, and it's very difficult to do two things well. So my question to you is how can we organize ourselves in a way that allows us to study language in all its complexity?

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** In one of the sessions preceding the plenary we had a discussion about one of the most essential concepts in CL, namely, conceptualization. What is it? Professor Waszakowa introduced the topic, and we were all asking ourselves what we should look for to have a good understanding of the definition and grasp of the meaning of conceptualization. We can't simply limit our methods and our study to the form of languages. Of course, we have to dig down deeper.

**M. Fabiszak:** I want to address what Professor Littlemore has proposed, meaning the connection between linguistics and law, because your suggestion was that lawyers can learn from us that words don't have just one sense. I'd like to ask you to explore this a little bit more, maybe with examples from your experience in cooperating with lawyers. I came across the Romeo and Juliet law, which is exercised in the United States, in which aspects of Shakespeare's work are applied to [statutory rape] cases. The idea is that you are supposed to be true to the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law. The idea [of the Romeo and Juliet law] is that a minor's consent doesn't matter and is actually invalid because a minor can't do that [on their own], and therefore, any sexual encounter with a minor is an offense, a crime. Yet, if the age difference between the two people is rather small, you don't persecute the other person because the two people are in a relationship. The intent of the law is to stop abuse and not to stop people from developing relationships at a younger age, so there is this dynamic distinction between the spirit and the letter of the law. Would you like to comment on that?

**J. Littlemore:** I was really talking in personal terms about the conversations I've had with the person I'm working with on the Death Before Birth project. We have considerations such as the fact that the law in the United Kingdom

is very strict about the 24-week cut-off; if a baby is lost before 24 weeks of pregnancy, it's a miscarriage, and if it is lost at midnight after 24 weeks, it becomes a stillbirth. Understandably, this has to be the case. One of the things we've been looking at in the project is how women talk about the baby that was lost, and we found that, for them, there is obviously no cut-off before, at, or after 24 weeks. There is not even any kind of correlation between the gestational period and the specific language used. Some people talk about a baby, others about a fetus, and others about a pregnancy. It's not as if we are telling lawyers that these words have different meanings, but it is a matter of looking at these words and their particular meanings for the people who are using them. It's important to use the words that the people who experienced the loss are using themselves rather than imposing a particular kind of language on them. One of the terms that's been particularly problematic is the official legal term for the way in which people deal with the baby's body: *disposal of the pregnancy remains*. This is true for other terms, as well. In regard to the term *pregnancy loss*, for example, people say, "It's not a loss. I haven't lost anything. I may lose my keys, I might lose my car, but I haven't lost my pregnancy". So people are going back to something like the basic sense of *loss* in their understanding. I think what CL can bring to the table is the notion that people very often have a basic sense at the back of their minds. Even if it's not the sense that it is intended in the context, it still resonates and it still makes a big difference in the way people understand and communicate.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** There's this emerging new type of linguistics, cultural linguistics. I was surprised because nobody here has mentioned the concept of culture. Cultural linguistics is discussed in terms of its relationship with CL, its overlaps, identities, and so on. To my mind, linguistics has always been dealing with cultures, although not that explicitly. I wonder what your ideas would be about that. Of course, we mentioned anthropology, which is part of culture, but that is not all.

**B. Bierwiaczonek:** We should keep in mind the gap between cognition and language. Of course, we do have it in mind. We basically explore how cognition becomes language and, possibly, how language affects cognition. One term that popped up in my mind when I was thinking about modern cognitivism and the modern world was something similar to literary criticism. I thought we perhaps need a "linguistic criticism." We have the tools and wonderful theories to do that. One big book that, again, crossed my mind is *Moral Politics* by George Lakoff. I think the world is in a terribly turbulent stage, the whole world, particularly countries and their governments. We as scholars have to deal with these issues, but in fact each citizen may contribute something. We should contribute as cognitive linguists. Of course

we describe cultures and linguistic aspects of culture, but we can also do some work in terms of explaining things. What I mean by that is not only telling members of the public about these aspects but also doing research in this area to show what kind of models we live by. In the moral world, in particular, I myself am worried about the ideologies, both new and old, that have come back. I think that people are unaware of them. Behind the political programs and speeches, there are ideologies that can be described as cognitive models. These are models of the world, of a person in society, of the relations between countries, and so on. We may ask about these models and try to find answers regarding the different ideologies on which they are based. What sort of presuppositions do we have? What sort of concepts of a person do we have? What sort of model of society do we have? I remember when Trump was elected in the United States, there was an interview with George Lakoff on CNN, and he said that Trump would be doing politics in a business-like way because he is a businessman. He would treat his political partners as business partners, customers. In a way, he would be using this cultural model, this cognitive model, of interpersonal relations in his political decisions and strategies. We could help the public understand the cognitive models underlying those decisions and strategies. There's a lot to be done because the reality is so dynamic now that we have to update this description of reality and ideologies as models almost on a daily basis. There are new models and there's a lot of axiology there. We should think about it because a lot of people buy those axiologies in the models and are unaware of what those axiologies really are. I think younger scholars, especially, should study and talk about these issues. As scientists, we have quite a lot to contribute to our society. We can explain social and political issues in cognitive terms and show the implications of the cognitive models politicians are offering us. In this sense, we may contribute to the quality of the present political debate, especially in countries such as Poland. In the longer run, on the academic level, this may lead to fruitful cooperation between cognitive linguists on the one hand and sociologists and political scientists on the other.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** There is a strong focus on CL and political discourse and metaphors, for example, by Andreas Musolff and his team and a number of others. In Poland, I suppose it's mostly people with a background in Polish philology who are dealing with that. Those who are in other languages would rather focus on the language sphere that is in their area of interest, which is the language and culture they specialize in, often vis-à-vis English. The English language and British and American themes seem to be dominating in political discourse analyses and it is obviously English that has been the main focus of attention for all those linguists who are dealing with language and culture topics in the UK.

**A. Cienki:** I was going to mention the connection with critical discourse analysis. This is doing some of what you've been pointing out. It is using different methods and theories from CL and trying to take a critical approach to get at how language use is relating to or reflecting different power structures, how it's being manipulated, and how certain kinds of framing can persuade people to think about a question in one way versus another way. I think there are some useful connections being made within critical discourse analysis in connection to CL.

**J. Littlemore:** The framing and also the connotation and some subtle nuanced framing with certain constructions and what they resonate with. In the UK, we obviously have to deal with these issues. For instance, we use the word *remains* with its negative connotations such as *the human remains* or *the remains are left in the fridge* [laugh] and *the Remain people* versus *the Brexiteers*, which connotes the Buccaneers and the Three Musketeers. That kind of stuff should be discussed more in the public domain, the way language is being kind of "hijacked" by the Leave campaign and how people have been sometimes subtly or not so subtly influenced by this use of language. Much more discussion could take place in the public sphere on what exactly is going on and on the cynical manipulation through linguistic means.

**J. Zlatev:** I would like to address Barbara's question about the place of cultural linguistics but also Dagmar's point about how we should go on from here. On the one hand, pluralism sounds very good, with more subfields and different methods to go with it. A metaphor for this could be Dagmar's image of a kind handshake with 10 hands merging.<sup>2</sup> Is it not easier said than done, though? There will always be friction, and maybe even fights, about deciding whose hand will be "on top." Another factor is seeing how much there is in a name. By establishing a journal called *Cultural Linguistics* and an association by that name, as well, according to the basic principle of structuralism, there has to be some opposition to CL (i.e., *cultural* rather than *cognitive*, and *cognitive* rather than *cultural*) because the two words stand in the same structural paradigm. Some of us established the field of cognitive semiotics some years ago to try to mend such gaps, but instead, we often get the reaction, "So you're not cognitive scientists or linguists, since you are cognitive semioticians." I think it's a dilemma. On the one hand, we don't want to have imperialist motives that would lead to statements such as "these are the methods" or "this is the only way to understand cognition." On the other hand, what we lack today but what seemed to exist some 20 to 30 years ago is a set of theories and concepts that are shared. People could then address "conceptual meta-

2 Professor Divjak's plenary lecture finished with a photo of 10 hands put together.

phors,” “image schemas,” “blends,” and “frames” from various perspectives. Now we don’t have that. We have ten different theories about metaphor; this is, I guess, the way it’s supposed to be, but there is little to unite us. This is my general feeling. We have a very “radical category” kind of concept about what CL is about, which is probably okay, but because we do not agree on the “nodes,” we have all the frustrations that several of you have mentioned.

**D. Divjak:** Well, this internal proliferation of interpretations is actually being held against us. People often tell me that we [cognitive linguists] know what we *are not* but that we don’t know what we *are*. I think we realize that language is a very complex phenomenon and we want to do justice to all its dimensions. Maybe we should articulate this better toward the outside world and openly ask, “How does all of this fit together?”

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** Our conclusions are far reaching. We say, “Oh, that’s a pattern in the data,” but we make a jump, a leap to the mental, which is nothing to be observed directly. One is usually hesitant about such a leap, and that’s the problem. This is the “cognitive,” and that’s what we are supposedly exploring, so I think there’s nothing more than the data, obviously. However, the arguments and our way of thinking go much further than the data. That’s the problem because we go ahead of what’s seen exclusively in one type of data, especially linguistic data only.

**J. Littlemore:** Yeah, I think if we stick to corpus data then we get frequency. If we bring in the human, we get salience and cultural models that are not always countable or visible. I think that’s what we bring to linguistics, as well, not just counting.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** Even the corpus data, you interpret them, right? If you interpret the corpus data, you put your thoughts in it; this may coincide with what *your subjects* were doing and thinking, but that usually remains to be seen and should be subject to further methodology refinement.

**J. Zlatev:** There used to be this notion of the “convergence of evidence,” but, again, the evidence does not always converge. If you remember the debate on polysemy networks from the 1990s, that made it very clear that the type of evidence that argues for 20 to 30 different senses of the preposition *over* is going to be a different kind of evidence than when you do psychological experiments, and it will be a different kind of evidence when you do first or second language acquisition. If you do neuroscience, you have new evidence that will be even harder to converge. Therefore, it’s wishful thinking to hope that the evidence is going to converge when you do interdisciplinary

research. What I've been trying to distinguish is, I wouldn't call it ontological levels any more, but at least different levels of analysis of language. We have at least three such levels: the conscious, the unconscious, and the subpersonal/neurological. Maybe we can distinguish even higher levels in which we are describing, explicating, and even, to some degree, explaining our shared intuitions: the social level of language. Then, when we go to a field such as discourse analysis, we won't be doing experiments; we will be explicating those cultural cognitive models. The reason I've been reacting negatively every time I hear "Oh, we have either observation or introspection" is because it makes it sound like it's only observational, actual data that is real and introspection is nonscientific. It's not just introspection, however; we have judgments by ourselves and by our participants. So yes, "language data," but this is not always something to be seen and counted; it's also data produced by intuition.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** The worry that some of us have been having is also about if we borrow things from other realms and sciences, who is supposed to do all these experiments that are based on collecting and interpreting? Shall we turn into more or less competent psychologists, sociologists, or anthropologists? This is what happens when we see and suddenly start using methods that are not strictly linguistic. That's a very important question. I mean, who is doing what and is there a division of labor any more or not?

**E. Górska:** I think the problem is that we believe we still can explain things rather than understand them. For me, the main shift from formal linguistics to CL is about the research question of whether we want to explain things or understand them. Because we are studying minds, we are in a "mind-studying-mind situation," and, therefore, we need to accept that we cannot explain things but can only try to understand them.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** We'd like to ask the panelists to conclude with some final comments.

**J. Zlatev:** The statement by Professor Górska was about the priority of *verstehen* contra *erklären* in hermeneutics. I am a defender of hermeneutics, along with Esa Itkonen and others who battle the constant attempt to make linguistics into a positive science, but I do believe in the levels that I mentioned earlier. There is a level for causal explanation, as well, as long as we do not say that everything depends on such a causal explanation. There is a level for neural explanation, as long as we do not say that everything hinges on it. Linguists don't have to be psycholinguists and neurolinguists. They can

do their explications, their *verstehen* analysis, in a consistent and clear way, and collaborate with others who are going to do other analyses.

**J. Littlemore:** The convergence of different methods is not going to involve converging on the same answer but rather on different elements of the answer that may complement each other. Heading for a convergence is a kind of narrow sense and not where we should be. We should be heading for some kind of complementarity because that's what we need.

**A. Cienki:** Collaboration is great. [laughter and applause]

**D. Divjak:** We need to have shared ways of doing things. You cannot collaborate if you fundamentally misunderstand each other, or if you fundamentally disrespect each other.

**B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk:** Broad perspectives, sharing and collaboration. So we kind of went back to the starting point!

Transcribed and edited by Daniel Karczewski and Justyna Wawrzyniuk

## STRESZCZENIE

### CO MOŻE WNIĘŚ JĘZYKOZNAWSTWO KOGNITYWNE DO INNYCH NAUK KOGNITYWNYCH I CO MOŻE OD INNYCH DZIEDZIN OTRZYMAĆ?

Debata odbyła się 27 września 2019 roku na Wydziale Filologicznym Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku podczas dorocznej konferencji Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawstwa Kognitywnego. Wzięli w niej udział mówcy plenarni zaproszeni na konferencję: Alan Cienki (Wolny Uniwersytet w Amsterdamie), Dagmar Divjak (Uniwersytet w Birmingham), Jeannette Littlemore (Uniwersytet w Birmingham), Jordan Zlatev (Uniwersytet w Lund), a także inni uczestnicy konferencji: Bogusław Bierwiaczonek (Uniwersytet Jana Długosza w Częstochowie), Elżbieta Górską (Uniwersytet Warszawski) i Małgorzata Fabiszak (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu). Debatę moderowała Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Koninie).

Jako pierwszy zabrał głos Jordan Zlatev, wskazując, że językoznawcy kognitywni powinni przede wszystkim korzystać z dorobku filozofii, zwłaszcza filozofii analitycznej, filozofii języka i fenomenologii. Po drugie, sięgać

mogą do semiotyki, z której pochodzą tak istotne pojęcia, jak system znaków czy ikoniczność. Po trzecie, wiele się mogą nauczyć z innych koncepcji językoznawczych, z którymi łączą je naturalne związki. Jako przykład mało znanej, ale niezwykle wartościowej teorii językoznawczej Zlatev podał ontologię języka, którą zaproponował Eugenio Coseriu.

Następnie zabrała głos Jeannette Littlemore, podkreślając, że językoznawstwo kognitywne może wnieść istotny wkład w rozwój innych dziedzin, takich jak marketing, prawo, edukacja i pielęgniarstwo. Na przykład w dziedzinie marketingu może zaproponować wnikliwsze spojrzenie na rolę metafory i metonimii w reklamie. W edukacji i komunikacji medycznej podejście kognitywne pomogłoby wyjaśnić mechanizmy nieporozumień związanych ze specyficznym użyciem metonimii. W obszarze nauk prawnych narzędzia językoznawstwa kognitywnego pozwalają zrozumieć, jak ludzie interpretują prawo, odnosząc je do osobistych doświadczeń i stosując kategorie radialne. Problem relacji językoznawstwa kognitywnego z prawem podjęła także Małgorzata Fabiszak.

Alan Cienki zwrócił uwagę na związki językoznawstwa kognitywnego z antropologią, zastanawiając się, do jakiego stopnia można powiązać badania językoznawcze z antropologią kulturową i kognitywną. Podkreślił rolę kulturowego podłoża i kontekstu, które bywają lekceważone, zwłaszcza w badaniach językoznawczych przeprowadzanych w kontrolowanym środowisku, jakim jest laboratorium. Jego zdaniem, językoznawcy kognitywni mogliby przypomnieć innym badaczom kognitywnym o całej złożoności i bogactwie języka w użyciu. Wyraził pogląd, że zbyt mało przykłada się wagi do rozróżnienia mówienia i pisania, związanych z myśleniem dla mówienia i myśleniem dla pisania.

Bogusław Bierwiaczonek zaproponował stworzenie na wzór „krytyki literackiej” – „krytyki językoznawczej”, która objaśniałaby społeczeństwu modele kognitywne oraz aksjologię ukrywające się za programami politycznymi. Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk zwróciła uwagę, że podobne badania są już podejmowane przez różnych badaczy, np. Andreas Musolff i jego grupa używają narzędzi językoznawstwa kognitywnego do analiz dyskursu politycznego i metafor.

Jordan Zlatev i Dagmar Divjak podkreślili wielość perspektyw oglądu podstawowych pojęć językoznawstwa kognitywnego, takich jak metafora pojęciowa, schemat wyobraźniowy, amalgamat, rama, oraz trudności z tego wynikające. Z kolei Elżbieta Górka wyraziła pogląd, że sytuacja językoznawcy kognitywnego, umysłu studiującego umysł, oznacza, że należy zrezygnować z wyjaśniania na rzecz rozumienia. Opozycję między wyjaśnianiem a rozumieniem Zlatev odniósł do wyrażonego w hermeneutyce poglądu o primacie *verstehen* względem *erklären*, zaznaczając jednak, że – jego zda-

niem – w nauce można znaleźć różne poziomy, np. obok poziomu wyjaśnień przyczynowych istnieje poziom wyjaśnień neuronowych. Językoznawcy mogą przeprowadzać analizy, które zmierzają do *verstehen*, jednocześnie współpracując z badaczami, których analizy sytuują się na innym poziomie.

Streszczenie przygotowała Agnieszka Libura