Worldview is defined in this study as the knowledge at the disposal of an individual or community and the point of view projected on the world with reference to that knowledge. An inquiry into worldviews, manifested in and transmitted through the use of language, is proposed. In accordance with a basic tenet of cognitive linguistics, language use is underlain by and describable with recourse to cognitive processes. However, because of the focus on the cultural, as well as cognitive underpinning of language, worldview is understood here as cultural cognition, the latter being characterised by its distributed nature and by the cultural content that feeds cognitions. The latter of these properties is exemplified in the paper through an analysis of two diverse reactions to the 2016 Nice terrorist attack: it is shown what meanings emerge when such parameters of construal as degree of specificity (granularity of viewing), mental scanning, focus selection, viewpoint, and attention to similarity vs. difference operate not on “raw” perceptual substrates, but on cultural concepts, such as political states, religions, or cultural areas.
1. Worldview and linguistic worldview

Before one engages in the analysis of specific data, it is usually imperative to introduce a few terminological distinctions and this study is no different in this regard. A full-length monograph on the problems that beset the approach to language represented here remains yet to be written, for now let me only sketch the background to the analytical part by briefly considering the notions of worldview and linguistic worldview, in this section, and that of cultural cognition in the next.

Worldview, a calque of the German Weltanschauung (dating back to Kant and Hegel), can in the most general terms be understood as what individuals or communities recognise as relevant for their functioning in the world they live in, as well as the way that content is organised, through a network of relationships, into a coherent representation. The coherence of the representation is necessarily subjective, although not necessarily in the negative sense of it being “biased” — but rather, in the technical sense of “subject-oriented.” In other words, a given worldview needs not to make sense to everyone; its role is to aid the individual or community that entertains it in the process of making sense of the world. Worldview is thus the cognitive orientation of an individual or a community, an understanding of the relationship between that individual or community and the world, which involves two aspects:

(i) the knowledge at the disposal of the cognising subject (again, an individual or a group), i.e., an awareness of the world and the way the world is or may be organised, plus

(ii) the point of view that the individual or the community projects on the world with reference to that knowledge.

This includes the awareness of what exists, what is important for the conceptualising subject, how that which exists is structured, and — most crucially — how the subject relates to it with regard to their interests and values.

As linguists, however, we are specifically interested in linguistic worldview, the view of the world as it is entrenched in language, with Humboldt’s Weltansicht as the obvious classic reference. This pseudo-definition is as general as it is vague, for what does it mean to be “entrenched in language”? Is the entrenchment harbouried in the language system, language use, the language as it is cognitively processed in the mind of the speaker (each individual speaker or the community), or all of the above in various configurations? Can one reconstruct that worldview from language samples alone (the lexicon, grammatical patterns, discourse) or does one need to inquire through psycholinguistic experiments, interviews, and questionnaires into the way these samples are produced, understood, and interpreted (by native speak-
ers or all speakers of a language)? What is the role of evidence other than the strictly linguistic? The question concerns, for example, ethnographic information (cf. Palmer 1996, 2006, 2015) or what in Polish cognitive ethnolinguistics is called “co-linguistic data,” i.e. ritualised behaviours that accompany language use but do not themselves involve language (cf. Bartmiński 2012 /2009/: 34–35; Bielak 2013; Prorok & Glaz 2013).

These are only some of the questions relevant to this field, merely pointing to the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, different authors, even if in agreement about the major direction of their respective research programmes, would likely provide somewhat different answers. Bartmiński’s (2012 /2009/) cognitive ethnolinguistic approach accentuates the notion of the mental object (the idea or image in the speaker’s mind) and the tripartite System-Questionnaire-Text procedure of data elicitation. Underhill’s (2011) five-layer model focuses on metaphor in discourse and distinguishes between the communal, individual, and cross-linguistic aspects of worldview. Wierzbicka’s NSM approach (Wierzbicka 1997; Wierzbicka & Goddard 2014; Levisen 2012) is directed towards culturally salient concepts, expressed through “cultural keywords.”

3 Palmer (1996, 2006, 2015) seeks motivation for grammatical patterns in the socio-cultural contexts, cultural scenarios, and beliefs of a given speech community. Finally (although this is hardly an exhaustive enumeration), Sharifian’s (2011, 2014, 2017) Cultural Linguistics enterprise is an attempt to coherently account for the use of language and the notions dear to its users through such constructs as cultural schemas, categories, and models. All of these approaches, in fact, require that linguistic worldview be understood as linguistic-cultural worldview. Indeed, another avenue for systematic exploration is the indisputable compatibility between the linguistic worldview conception and the notions of Friedrich’s (1989) linguaculture or its later modification, Agar’s (1994) languaculture.

However, a credible inquiry into the linguistic (or linguistic-cultural) worldview must also venture into another area characterised by inherent linkage, that of the culture-cognition interface. Linkage may not be the right word here, though: what in fact one may be dealing with is an inseparable culture-plus-cognition whole, divided only artificially for the sake of an easier identification of specific “local” foci.

2. Cultural cognition

It may thus be more appropriate to investigate, not the culture-cognition nexus, but cultural cognition. This is a key notion in Sharifian’s Cultural Linguistics, deriving from Hutchins’s (1995) integrated view, whereby culture is an inalienable aspect of cognition and cognition is a cultural process par excellence. Within his own framework, Sharifian defines cultural cognition as:

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2 An additional question is that of the appropriate worldview-related terminology. Struggles and debates within this realm have become somewhat legendary; for a systematic discussion of the problem in the Polish context cf. Tabakowska (2013).

3 Cf. also Schröter and Veniard’s (2016) study of cultural keywords inspired by, although not strictly following, Wierzbicka’s NSM approach.
...a property of cultural groups, and not just individuals. [It is] an emergent system [...] resulting from the interactions between the members of a cultural group across time and space. [...] Cultural cognition [...] is heterogeneously distributed across the minds in a cultural group. [...] Emergent properties of cognition at the group level supersede what is represented in the mind of each individual and arise from the interactions between the group members. Members of a cultural group may share some but not every aspect of their cultural cognition with other members, and the patterns are not exactly the same for all individuals across the cultural group. (Sharifian 2011: 21)

The author illustrates this with reference to the Australian Aboriginal English *This land is me* vs. Anglo-Australian English *This land is mine* (Sharifian 2011: 94). Australian Aboriginal people do not view land as anyone's property, as something that cannot be owned and sold, but rather as something that has embraced the spirits of their ancestors. If, then, the living commune with their ancestors, as is believed by the people (Sharifian 2011: 59), land also embraces the living: they are one with the land, with reciprocal responsibilities of the two sides towards each other. The belief is consistent with the overall worldview of the community and even if some of its members do not share it, the notion is perpetuated through language and maintained at the level of distributed, cultural cognition.

However, cultural cognition's distributed nature is only one of its aspects. Another aspect, or one that in fact marks its essence, is the *de facto* oneness of the cultural and the cognitive. Having done about four months of fieldwork onboard a navy ship studying its navigation procedure, Edwin Hutchins readily concludes that:

>culture is a human cognitive process that takes place both inside and outside the minds of people. It is the process in which our everyday cultural practices are enacted. I am proposing an integrated view of human cognition in which a major component of culture is a cognitive process [...] and cognition is a cultural process. (Hutchins 1995: 354)

By stating this in his groundbreaking proposal, Hutchins goes one step further than his colleague Roy D’Andrade (1981), for whom to study cultural linguistics means to divide the inquiry into cognitive processes and cultural content. In other words, cognitive processes do not (only) operate on “raw” perceptual substrates but on culturally construed, inherited, and maintained notions. It is precisely this kind of division, says Hutchins, that is misleading, for in reality none exists. His claim, hardly to be dismissed as ungrounded fancy, is corroborated with months of methodical fieldwork. Indeed, Hutchins’s integral view of culture-as-cognition and cognition-as-culture appears not only to open a promising avenue of inquiry but, I believe, may
well turn out to be the way to proceed in cultural (or cognitive-cultural) linguistics. The proposal below may therefore be castigated as a retrograde step back to D’Andrade’s scenario of integrating what is integral in its nature: cognitive processes and cultural content. Yet, I will be taking this step for two reasons. Firstly, with this kind of distinction, even if artificial, it is easier to see the mechanisms being investigated: cognition and culture may be one but because we have become accustomed to seeing them as distinct, the “integrating” (vs. integral) view caters for the implicit expectations that many of us might cherish and may in fact prove more effective in the argument it forwards. Secondly, the present study is an exercise in text analysis concerned with relatively small language samples and to do justice to Hutchins’s integral (vs. integrating) view one would probably have to proceed his way, i.e. through fieldwork. With those reservations in mind, I nevertheless hope to contribute to our understanding of how cultural cognition translates onto a linguistically expressed worldview, leaving a systematic follow-up on Hutchins for another occasion.

Finally, the last proviso that needs to be introduced before we launch the analytical rocket, is that language-encoded worldviews will in the present study be limited to individual perspectives of specific speakers-conceptualisers. They will thus perhaps approximate what Underhill (2011: 7) identifies as a given speaker’s relatively stable personal world, or possibly their more changeable perspective (cf. the doubts and commentary in note 12 below). Additionally, because the first of the analyzed samples (Sample 1) is a translation from Polish, another of Underhill’s parameters of worldview may be said to surface, that of a cultural mindset: a “worldview specific to a political [system] or religion” that can “migrate between language systems (as the spread of Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and communism clearly demonstrates)” (pp. 6–7). However, although Sample 1 is not robust enough for us to claim that we are actually dealing here with a cultural mindset thus understood, I would still consider it an instance of personal world and/or perspective, even if it is one that “migrates” from one language to another through the act of translation.

We have been witnessing attempts to construct a coherent cognitive-plus-cultural analytical toolbox that could be applied in analyses of specific data since at least the 1996 publication of Gary Palmer’s Toward a Theory of Cultural Linguistics. In that book, Palmer marked a pathway for the development of a cultural linguistics that would be grounded in, and would make use of the constructs proposed by Cognitive Grammar. In subsequent publications, he proceeded to add details to this general framework. For example, in Palmer (2006), he proposes that image schemas that derive from bodily experience and apparently have a universal status, are incorporated into cultural schemas, such that the latter are cognitive by definition, but also derive from mythology, social structure, everyday activities, or socially salient
rituals. Other authors have joined Palmer in his progress along this pathway, especially Sharifian (2011, 2014, 2017), in whose consistently developed framework the focus is shifted from allegedly universal cognitive processes to those involving cultural conceptualisations: cultural categories, schemas, metaphors, and models. In a similar vein, I hope to show below what kinds of meaning emerge from discourse when the cognitive processes that underlie it operate on cultural content, rather than on purely sensory input.

3. CULTURAL COGNITION AND WORLDVIEW THROUGH LANGUAGE SAMPLES

The analysis will concern two reactions to the terrorist attack in Nice, France, on July 14, 2016. According to Wikipedia, on the evening of that day

... a 19 tonne cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais [...], resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injuring 434. The driver was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of France. The attack ended following an exchange of gunfire, during which Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was shot and killed by police.


Unsurprisingly, the attack was extensively covered in the media, as well as being the subject of many heated debates and public speeches. One such speech that I had a chance to listen to is the source of Sample 1: it was delivered about six weeks after the event at the parish church in Janowiec, eastern Poland (regrettably, the identity of the speaker was not recorded and cannot be verified). It is rendered here in as faithful an English translation as possible. The other sample, Sample 2 (a–c), consists of three excerpts from an article in the New Statesman, published a day after the attack (Norris 2016). Both samples come from premeditated, nonspontaneous discourse and although they are of unequal length, I believe that the focus of the analysis and the kinds of conclusions drawn remain valid despite this asymmetry.

3.1. Sample 1

In the late summer of 2016, in a public performance related to the tragic Nice events, Speaker X said the following:

(1) On the same day that the Nice attack took place, a mosque funded by Saudi Arabia was opened in the city.

[Polish org., quoted from memory: „W tym samym dniu, kiedy miał miejsce zamach w Nicei, otwarto w tym mieście meczet ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską.”]
What is the message in this short statement? We will look at two local points within it and assume that speakers select the content for their utterances with a certain intention and for a particular purpose. Naturally, there is no guarantee that the inferences on the listeners’ side will necessarily coincide with those intentions.

First, the expression *the same day* appears to be responsible for at least three effects:

(i) it suggests an evident link between the attack, Saudi Arabia, and Islam (indirectly, through reference to its institutionalised symbol, the mosque);

(ii) it effects what Ungerer and Schmid (2006: 262) call spatial compression: Nice and Saudi Arabia are distant geographically (a relative judgment, obviously) so an alleged link between one and the other calls for a conceptual compression of the distance;\(^5\)

(iii) it effects what I would call “conceptual compression”: driving a truck into a crowd apparently has something to do with Islam (cf. mosque), although the precise nature of the connection remains unknown.

Second, the statement that *the mosque [was] funded by Saudi Arabia* seems to imply that Islam, represented by its institutionalised place of worship, is alien to Europe and comes “from outside,” but not just from anywhere: it comes from affluent anti-democratic regimes.

Thus, if one reads between the lines, as is required if inferences are to be made, the speaker seems to imply that the responsibility for the attack (directly or indirectly) lies with Muslims because it is they who fund mosques and open them on the day that they (the same or other Muslims?) launch attacks. This very peculiar Weltanschauung is economical with the truth in several respects. First and most straightforward, the mosque was opened on 2 July, some 12 days before the attack.\(^6\) Second, no apparent connection between the perpetrator and Saudi Arabia has yet been established. Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel was Tunisian with a French residency permit and married to a French-Tunisian cousin. If there had been any attack-related dealings on his part with someone from an Islamic country other than Tunisia, it is much more likely to have been with an Algerian member of a Nice-based group affiliated to Daesh (ISIS).

The spatial and conceptual compression becomes even more radical now: Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are worlds apart, not only geographically, but also politically. Although both are predominantly Sunni Muslim countries, they differ tremendously in their political systems and practicalities of life. Most Tunisian Sunni Muslims belong to the Maliki School, some to the Hanafi School; there is also a sizeable number of non-denominational Muslims. In contrast, most of the populace of Saudi Arabia are Sunni Salafists. Politically, Tunisia is a representative democracy, whereas Saudi Arabia is an
absolute monarchy. As a result, attitudes to religions and religious denominations are very different. In Tunisia, although the country’s official and promoted religion is Islam, other denominations are granted a measure of tolerance: about 1% of the populace are non-Muslims, religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution, and conversion from Islam to other faiths is legal (although in practice subject to social pressure or even ostracism). In Saudi Arabia, religions other than Islam cannot be practised openly and even the practising of Shia Islam (about 15% of the populace) is suppressed as a heresy. Conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. With these facts in mind, it appears that Speaker X’s reference to Saudi Arabia and the omission of the Tunisian connection of the attacker was far from random. Alternatively, it could also be based on an ignorance of the intricacies of Islam, as this is often part of the “us” vs. “them” dichotomisation, with “them” being reduced to a homogenous threat and with nuances downplayed.

Third, the attacker was never excessively religious and whatever religious activities he had engaged in prior to the attack had been perfunctory. Instead, he had had a family history of psychiatric treatment, had had a history of drug and alcohol use, had been charged with minor offences and violence (including domestic violence), and had led a rather erratic sex life. It is most likely that he had become self-radicalised, there being no solid evidence that organised religion had played any serious motivating role in the planning and perpetration of the attack: it was merely an artificial and non-spiritual garnish.

Given these contexts, the implicit suggestion from Speaker X that the Nice terrorist act had been steered, perhaps funded, and possibly performed by an “outside” Muslim unit is somewhat wide of the mark. The suggestion is inferable at discourse level, but it is rendered through an array of cognitive processes, of which I will mention four. No claims are made as to the completeness of the list or the exhaustiveness of the processes involved, at issue is rather the mechanism through which cognition and cultural content are channelled into a coherent complex.

1. **Degree of specificity or granularity of viewing** (cf. Langacker 2008: 55–57). In this case it is very low; only sufficient to project very crude and mostly underspecified distinctions, such as the following “make-shift” oppositions:
   - Europe vs. “others.” The identity of the others is indeterminate: is it the Middle East, (North) Africa, or the postcolonial Orient?
   - Christianity vs. Islam. Although there is no mention of Christianity, the reference to a mosque suggests this as an evident opposition. What renders this opposition dubious is that the July 14 celebrations in France are anything but religious; in fact, Bastille Day marks the

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8 I thank Sam Bennett for pointing this out to me.

9 Although ISIS praised the perpetrator as “a soldier of the Islamic State” (cf. Birnbaum & McAuley 2016), they may have done so for publicity reasons.

10 The Orient is obviously a rich notion but especially in France it may embrace not only the Middle East and/or the Far East but also North Africa.
dawn of a secular state (officially established in 1905), a notion to which the French are very attached. Therefore, the crucial opposition appears to be:

- Europe vs. Islam. It is idiosyncratic, very low in viewing granularity, and as a result indiscriminate as to its geographical, religious, and cultural contexts.

2. **Viewpoint**, an exceptionally complex notion. With regard to what Simpson (1993; following Uspensky 1973 [1970]) calls *ideological viewpoint*, Sample 1 seems to encode the European stance. With regard to viewpoint as a cognitive operation correlated with the mental distance of the conceptualiser from the conceptualised, the position of the former is detached from the above-described scene in a bird’s-eye view manner. This can be inferred from three kinds of compression, already mentioned above:

- temporal compression: *the same day* renders the time gap between July 2 and July 14 null and void;
- spatial compression: southern France (Nice), Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia appear as “close” only on a small-scale map, a projection effected from a certain distance;
- conceptual compression: people of certain religions (Islam), cultural areas (Europe, Saudi Arabia, North Africa as cultural areas), and territories (the same but as territories) merge into an undifferentiated “other” or “them.”

These kinds of compression are only attainable with a fair degree of mental detachment and a disengaged view that pans across the whole scene.

3. A combination of **mental scanning** and **focus selection** (cf. Langacker 2008: 57–60, 82–85). An analogy is implicitly drawn between two events that apparently coincide in time, opening a mosque and perpetrating a terrorist attack, such that:

- both involve a period of preparation, culminating at a certain point;
- in both the focus is on that point of culmination;
- they have comparable consequences: death of people in the case of the attack, and purported “cultural death” or “death of European values” in the case of mosque opening (Figure 1; on the next page).

4. Finally, there are various degrees of **attention to similarity and difference**, basic cognitive operations responsible for the process of category construction (cf. MacLaury 1997). Attention to similarity (S) contracts the cognitive distance between the items being viewed; attention to difference (D) protracts that distance. Through various configurations of these reciprocally balanced strengths in various stages of the process, conceptualisers can effect categories of various shapes. In Sample 1, we are dealing with strong initial, category-internal attention to S,

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11 I am using this term here at the very general theory-external level; in specific models its understanding may differ, as in fact may the actual terminology: *perspective* and *vantage point* (as a subparameter of perspective) in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 2008), *perspective* and *viewpoint* (also distinct notions) in cognitive ethnolinguistics (Bartmiński 2012/2009), *viewpoint space* in Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1994/1985) and Conceptual Blending (Fauconnier & Turner 2002), or *viewpoint* vs. *categorial vantage as point of view* in Vantage Theory (MacLaury 1997).

12 For a discussion of the status of these notions against a broader background of categorisation, cf. Glaz (2013).
prior to strong, inter-categorial attention to \( D \). As a result, within the categories being constructed, the differences between their individual members are flattened out into homogenised wholes. An “us” category is thus formed through strong attention to similarity and weak attention to difference (\( S-d \)): it includes Europeans, non-Muslims, perhaps Christians. An analogous category of “them” originates from the same configuration of \( S-d \) strengths: it includes Muslims, outsiders, non-Europeans from whatever territories and cultural areas (Saudi Arabia is mentioned, albeit factually unconnected; Tunisia may be taken as being implied through factual knowledge although unmentioned). Next, strong attention to \( D \) between the categories polarises them into a stark division (Figure 2).

Crucially, these are ideological (cultural) projections: the cognitive processes here do not operate on raw, sensory perceptions but on cultural entities, such as religions (Islam), religious institutions/places of worship (mosque), cities and states (Nice, Saudi Arabia). It is these kinds of culturally-grounded cognitive operations that allow the speaker to construct and project a worldview.

3.2. Sample 2

Sample 2 (a–c), three short fragments excerpted from Norris (2016), is comparable to Sample 1 with regard to the underlying cognitive operations involved and yet is very different in the worldview it projects. In the article,
the author actually deconstructs the kind of worldview we have just identified for Sample 1, by exposing several flaws in its all-too-frequently accepted reasoning, and specifically by relating to:

- the lack of a terrorist record of the perpetrator;
- the simplicity of divisions into “us” and “them,” Muslims and non-Muslims, without any notice being taken of the so-called “grey zones of coexistence”;\footnote{In Norris’s article, this statement is attributed to “the journalist Murtaza Hussain,” whose article in The Intercept is referenced. This begs the question of whether Norris presents her own views or whether she represents a broader worldview. One solution is to say that the question need not be answered in a black-and-white fashion: Norris’s argumentation is framed as a coherent set of ideas that can be attributed to her, and/or the authors she quotes, and/or the general attitude of the magazine she writes for. In other words, “worldview as cultural cognition” needs not to be represented by a precisely specified individual or group, as long as the “architecture” of that worldview can be reconstructed. However, I will adopt another solution and assume that Norris draws on Hussain (and possibly other sources) to add credibility to views that we can safely assume are her own — and in this sense illustrate what Underhill (2011) calls personal world or perspective (cf. above).}
- the fact that Daesh (a.k.a. IS or ISIS), in terms of numbers, kills more Muslims than non-Muslims;
- the corrosive tactic of sowing polarity and division, typical of every extremist group;
- the purposeful reinforcement of “the Otherness” of Muslims, at the expense of the “common humanity” view (terrorist attacks are crimes against humanity, questioning the value of life as such).

Amidst these explicitly expressed views, the author says:

(2) (a) For example, fewer than ten days ago, IS attacked Baghdad, with a suicide bomber killing 250 people. On 5 July, IS attacked three sites in Saudi Arabia, including the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. In May, IS killed 40 people in Yemen as they stood in line to enlist for national military service. IS kills countless people every day in Syria.

Let us consider, with regard to this excerpt, three out of the same four processes that were identified for Sample 1. Scanning and focus selection will not be considered. In Sample 1, they involve an implied analogy and because no comparable analogy has been identified for Sample 2, a comparison of the samples with regard to these parameters would lack a credible basis.

1. **Degree of specificity/ granularity of viewing** is emphatically greater here than in Sample 1. Details as to the time, place, and the number of victims are provided for each attack, in the original article all of them being hyperlinked to factual reports. There is no superficial fusion of terrorist activities (IS terrorism), religion (Islam), and institutional representation of that religion (the Prophet’s Mosque).

2. **Viewpoint.** On the one hand, the viewpoint here also seems to be detached from the scene(s) being conceptualised (as it is in Sample 1); on the other hand, because it is differently correlated with the third parameter, attention to similarity and difference, I discuss them jointly in the next point.

3. **Attention to similarity and difference** plus **viewpoint.** Instead of two broad S-dominated categories polarised by strong attention to D, in Sample 2(a) there is a stronger differentiation of small, “local” foci. Only then are they brought together into a loosely coherent category
of “attacks on Muslims by IS.” This is effected through initial stronger attention to $D$, followed by a somewhat weaker $s$ operating “across the board.” Thus, first the individual cases are distinguished from one another, and then the overarching “attacks on Muslims by IS” category is constructed. In Vantage Theory, this phenomenon is called the “spotlight effect” (MacLaury 2013: 90–92), as when one moves a spotlight away from the stage, which allows for panning the light across the stage and focusing on specific areas of it (Figure 3).

In other words, we are dealing here with a detached viewpoint, strong attention to $D$ (which produces multiple foci) followed by a relatively weaker attention to $s$ (which brings them together as examples of the same loose category — events on the same stage).\textsuperscript{15}

At this point, however, we run into a problem that the cultural-cognitive linguistics I am advocating must be able to address. A continuation of this passage brings us back to the familiar polarity effect that we saw in Sample 1:

(2) (b) These attacks have been met with mostly silence in the West. Social media tributes and hashtags have been scarce. The fact that ISIS kills more Muslims than non-Muslims is rarely explored.

Here we also have two broad $S$-dominant categories of West vs. non-West, polarised through strong intercategorial $D$ (Figure 4; on the next page).

If cognitions are parallel, do we have to conclude that these two configurations (in Samples 1 and 2(b)) are essentially the same kinds of portrayals? Definitely not, for they are parallel only with regard to what happens on the cognitive, “mechanical” level. However, purely mechanical operations, deprived of cultural content, are in fact a fiction. Let us consider: in the context of the non-West category, there is reference to previous discourse, i.e. to the facts (the multitude of terrorist attacks) reported there in the spotlight-effect manner. Also, within the overall message of the article as a whole, the excerpt in 2(b) functions as an example of the worldview that is not accepted by its author; cf. 2(c):

\textsuperscript{15} One can also probe deeper and claim that increased attention to $D$ results not only in the identification of these specific incidents but in the degree of detail supplied about each (place, time, number of casualties, context of situation).
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(2) (c) This is an example of a divisive boundary at work, where lives have different values depending on their geographical location.

With that statement, the author clearly distances herself from the $D$-$s$ induced categorial polarity. A more adequate representation would thus be that in Figure 5, where the stark contrast between West and non-West recedes to the background.

We thus conclude that the cultural aspect is indispensable in cognitions, since the cognitive processes “in between the ears” alone are not sufficient to account for the differences in worldviews but must operate on cultural entities. This is the second of the two parameters of cultural cognition identified in Section 2, but it also connects with the first one, namely with its distributed nature: the notions of religion, political state, or the value of human life are not shared in exactly the same manner among all members of a cultural group, but are salient for the group as a whole and function as content material in conceptualisation effected for the purpose of linguistic portrayal. Thus, similarity-vs.-difference attentional strengths, viewpoint construction, or focus selection and mental scanning are (and here we are back with Hutchins) manifestations of cognition as a cultural process.
4. **A FINAL WORD**

Up to this juncture, I have inquired into a view of cognition whereby cognitive construals of a scene operate on cultural content. I will now try to mark out several paths for further inquiry.

1. Given that only a few of the broad array of cognitive processes have been considered here, one would probably wish to compile a relatively comprehensive and coherent list of such processes, so that diverse language data could be approached in a comparable manner.

2. It remains to be investigated what dictates the adoption of a cognitive-cultural viewpoint: even if, as Hutchins proposes, we perform cognitions as culture and we engage in culture as cognition, should we still recognise cognitive processes at the fundamental level of perception and schema formation as prerequisites for cultural schemas to emerge? This is indeed what is suggested in Palmer (2006).\[16] This would mean that worldviews result from cognitions that are additionally equipped with cultural content, in that order, rather than an ideological stance entering the stage prior to (and independently of) cognitive operations. But this would probably be an unwelcome development: it would set the tone for further inquiry that would take us away from Hutchins’s integrated cognition model.

3. How can Hutchins’s view that joint, cultural activities are inherently cognitive and actually qualitatively different in this respect from the cognitive actions of individuals be corroborated with linguistic data? More precisely, what linguistic evidence is there for cultural cognition to be actually distributed? It is instructive to begin with Sharifian’s (2011) *This land is mine – This land is me* example (cf. Section 2 above) but at the same time vital to systematically collect more robust data and explain them away through recourse to cultural categories, schemata, and models.

One has reasons to believe that with a principled approach of this kind it will be possible to correlate more precisely the notions of cultural cognition and worldview. In the present study, an attempt was made to zoom in on relatively small portions of worldviews of individual speakers, but eventually what we want to be able to characterise are worldviews of communities and the idea that they are maintained and transmitted as cultural cognition seems to be a legitimate assumption.

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Streszczenie

Obraz świata jako poznanie kulturowe

Obraz świata to jego podmiotowy ogląd, gdzie podmiotem jest pojedynczy użytkownik języka lub społeczność, obejmujący dwa aspekty:
(i) wiedzę na temat świata w dyspozycji tegoż użytkownika lub społeczności oraz
(ii) punkt widzenia na świat z uwzględnieniem tej wiedzy.


Wiarygodny opis tego obrazu musi także wziąć pod uwagę całość poznawczo-kulturową, rozdzielaną wyłącznie w celu rozpoznania szczegółowych, „punktowych” zjawisk. Sharifian mówi tu o poznaniu kulturowym, takim, że „emergentne własności poznania na poziomie grupy wykraczają poza reprezentacje obecne w umysłach jej poszczególnych członków” (Sharifian 2011: 21). Pojęcie to wywodzi się z koncepcji poznania jako procesu par excellance kulturowego (Hutchins 1995).

Drugim parametrem poznania kulturowego, stojącym w centrum uwagi w niniejszym studium, jest kulturowa treść procesów poznawczych leżących u podstaw użycia językowego. W tym sensie poznanie kulturowe przekłada się w wyrażany językowo obraz świata (tu ograniczony do indywidualnych obrazów konkretnych użytkowników języka).

Analizie poddano dwie reakcje na zamach terrorystyczny, do którego doszło 14 lipca 2016 r. w Nicei. Pierwsza z nich (próbka 1), pochodzi z publicznego wystąpienia; natomiast trzy fragmenty składające się na próbkę 2 zaczerpnięto z artykułu w piśmie New Statesman (Norris 2016), lewicowym, polityczno-literackim tygodniku brytyjskim.

Próbka 1

(1) On the same day that the Nice attack took place, a mosque funded by Saudi Arabia was opened in the city.

[Tego samego dnia, kiedy miał miejsce zamach w Nicei, otworzono w mieście meczet ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską.]}

Wyrażenie the same day ‘tego samego dnia’ ma potrójny efekt:
(i) sugeruje istnienie związku między atakiem terrorystycznym, Arabią Saudyjską i islamem (po-proszę wzmiątkę o meczecie);
(ii) świadczy o kompresji przestrzennej między dość odległymi od siebie Niceią i Arabią Saudyjską;
(iii) świadczy o „kompressji pojęciowej” – sugeruje się istnieniu bliżej nieokreślonego związku między celowym wjehanieniem w tłum ciężarówką a islamem.

Powyżej, stwierdzenie, że the mosque [was] funded by Saudi Arabia ‘meczet został ufundowany przez Arabię Saudyjską’ sugeruje, iż islam narzucany jest Europie przez bogate autokracje.
Tego typu szczególny obraz świata mija się z prawdą w kilku punktach: meczet otwarto 2 lipca, czyli dwanaście dni przed zamachem; nie stwierdzono żadnych znaczących powiązań zamachowca z Arabią Saudyjską; zamachowiec nigdy nie był osobą religijną, a bezpośrednio przed atakiem jego wzmócona religijność była powierzchowna.

Obraz świata, który wyłania się z próbk i, powstaje w wyniku współdziałania kilku procesów poznawczych. Są to:

1. **Stopień uszczegółowienia / ziarnistość oglądu.** Ma ona tu bardzo niską wartość, co pozwala jedynie na dokonywanie, w postaci kontrastowych par, podstawowych i wątpliwych rozróżnień:
   - Europa – „inni”;
   - chrześcijaństwo – islam;
   - Europa – islam (pomieszanie kontekstów geograficznego, religijnego i kulturowego).

2. **Punkt widzenia.** Ideologiczny punkt widzenia (zob. Simpson 1993) jest tu umieszczony w Europie, natomiast jako parametr poznawczy punkt widzenia jest oddalony od postrzeganej sceny, co właśnie pozwala na kompresję czasową, przestrzenną i pojęciową.

3. **Skanowanie mentalne i wybór ogólnika uwagi.** Przeprowadzona jest (w sposób domyślny) analogia między otwarciem meczetu a zamachem terrorystycznym — w obu wypadkach mamy do czynienia z okresem przygotowawczym, z koncentracją uwagi na końcowym punkcie tego okresu, z sugerowanymi podobnymi konsekwencjami (śmiercią ludzi i rzekomą „kulturową śmiercią” Europy).


**Próbka 2**

Pierwszy z trzech fragmentów tworzących próbkę z brzeg następująco:

(2) (a) For example, fewer than ten days ago, IS attacked Baghdad, with a suicide bomber killing 250 people. On 5 July, IS attacked three sites in Saudi Arabia, including the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. In May, IS killed 40 people in Yemen as they stood in line to enlist for national military service. IS kills countless people every day in Syria.

(Na przykład niecałe dziesięć dni temu ISIS przeprowadziło w Bagdadzie zamach samobójczy, zabijając 250 osób. 5 lipca atakowali trzy miejsca w Arabii Saudyjskiej, w tym Meczet Proroka w Medynie. W maju ISIS zabiło w Jemenie 40 osób czekających w kolejce na przyjęcie do armii. Codziennie zabija niezliczoną liczbę osób w Syrii.)

Analiza tego przykładu pod kątem trzech z czterech wymienionych wcześniej procesów poznawczych wygląda następująco.

1. **Stopień uszczegółowienia / ziarnistość oglądu** jest większy(-a) (por. szczegóły dotyczące każdego z zamachów).

2. **Punkt widzenia** (patrz pkt 3 poniżej).

3. Podkreślanie podobieństwa i różnicy oraz punkt widzenia. Mamy tu wyróżnienie większej liczby wydarzeń, zgrupowanych następnie w luźno powiązaną kategorię „ataki terrorystyczne ISIS na Muzułmanów” (początkowe silne uwypuklanie różnicy, następnie silniejsze, ale nadal stosunkowo słabe podkreślanie podobieństwa).

Następny przykład w ramach próbki 2 wywołuje podobny efekt polaryzacyjny, jak próbka 1 (dwie szerokie kategorie oparte na podobieństwie, wyraźna różnica między nimi):
These attacks have been met with mostly silence in the West. Social media tributes and hashtags have been scarce. The fact that ISIS kills more Muslims than non-Muslims is rarely explored. [Ataki te pozostały na Zachodzie najczęściej niezauważone. Reakcje na portalach społecznościowych i Twitterze były nieliczne. Fakt, że z ręki ISIS ginie więcej Muzułmanów niż nie-Muzułmanów nie jest przedmiotem zbyt częstych analiz.]

Jednak obrazy w tych dwóch próbkach są inne ze względu na ich różną kulturową zawartość treściową oraz ogółny wydźwięk próbki 2 (gdzie wspomina się polaryzację na Zachód i nie-Zachód, lecz jej nie akceptuje):

This is an example of a divisive boundary at work, where lives have different values depending on their geographical location. [To przykład podziałów, które powodują, że ludzkie życie ma różną wartość w zależności od miejsca na mapie.]

Wnioskujemy stąd, że procesy poznawcze przekładają się na obraz świata, jeśli „działają” na treściach kulturowych.

Na końcu proponuje się kilka kierunków przyszłych badań:
1. Zaproponowanie w miarę wyczerpującej listy procesów poznawczych biorących udział w tworzeniu obrazów świata;
2. Próba określenia, czy o przyjęciu takiego, a nie innego obrazu świata decydują określone procesy poznawcze, czy treści, których dotyczą, nawet jeśli model poznania zintegrowanego (Hutchins 1995) uznamy za właściwy kierunek myślenia;

Ostatecznym celem jest opisanie obrazów świata jako poznania kulturowego nie tylko dla pojedynczych użytkowników języka, lecz także całych społeczności językowo-kulturowych.

**Bibliografia**


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