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# **ONSTAGE OR OFF, OR SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN?**

## *Intersubjectivity markers in Dawkins and Lennox's debate "Has science buried God?"<sup>1</sup>*

**ABSTRACT** The "mutual apprehension of other minds," which is a "central if not a defining feature of intersubjectivity" (Langacker 2007: 182) is not directly observable. However, it can be analysed through language use, particularly the pronouns I, you, we (Langacker 2008: 78). These pronouns put the Speaker/Hearer "onstage" through explicit mention. Hence, an analysis of how debaters use personal pronouns may shed light on how the (inter)subjectivity inherent in public debates is expressed through language.

This paper looks at the use of you and its derivatives in the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox "Has science buried God?" held at the Oxford Museum. While this debate has already been analysed in terms of cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska forthcoming, 2016), it is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of different perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways those perspectives may be construed. Specifically, it considers how the choice to (not) use personal pronouns affects both the argument and the speaker's relationship with their interlocutor. This debate in particular is an ideal source for such a study as, in exit interviews, members of the audience recognized this debate to be one in which the opponents not only listened to each other, but also seemed to exhibit mutual respect. Thus, it seems safe to assume that each speaker was making a conscious effort to invite his opponent and the audience to see the universe and the meaning of life from his own vantage point. This presupposes awareness of the other minds involved in the debate; hence, fertile ground for an analysis of intersubjectivity.

The analysis shows that Dawkins and Lennox use second person pronouns for different purposes. This raises questions for future research; for example, are these differences related to Dawkins' and Lennox's individual debate styles or are they characteristic of scholars who share their distinct worldviews?

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of intersubjectivity, or the “mutual apprehension of other minds” (Langacker 2007: 182), is of interest both for theoretical cognitive linguistics and discourse analysis. While all texts assume some level of intersubjectivity, the debate, by nature, requires a heightened awareness of the other person’s mind or thinking process. Moreover, the format allows the participants to use various means of including his/her interlocutor in the debate or even putting him/her “onstage” through the use of personal pronouns.

This study looks at the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox “Has science buried God?” held at the Oxford Museum. While this debate has already been analysed in terms of cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska forthcoming, 2016), it is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways these perspectives may be construed. As such, this paper is part of a larger project that will attempt to analyse the linguistic markers of intersubjectivity in debate.

The participants of a debate fit the canonical viewing arrangement in that they are usually in a 1-1 Speaker/Hearer (S/H) relationship, located in the same place and at the same time (cf. Langacker 2007). However, there are certain unique elements that affect the nature of this type of 1-1 dialogue. The most obvious, perhaps, is that this conversation has an audience and, very often, a moderator who controls and directs the discussion with questions. At the same time, the debaters represent philosophically different viewpoints. Their goal is to convince the audience, and perhaps even their interlocutor, to view the issue, in this case, if science has made belief in God superfluous, from their own philosophical vantage point.

This article begins with a brief review of the notions of *subjectivity*, *objectivity* and *intersubjectivity* from the perspective of cognitive linguistics with a focus on Langacker’s definitions and applications of the terms. Then the research aims, debate context and methodology applied are presented. These sections are followed by the results, which include statistical information regarding the use of second person pronouns by Dawkins and Lennox as well as a qualitative analysis of excerpts from the debate. The paper concludes with a discussion followed by ideas for future research.

## 2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The terms *subjective* and *objective* are commonly used in everyday English to mark the difference between opinionated (subjective) and unbiased/factual (objective) information. However, these words take on different meanings

### Keywords

subjectivity/objectivity, intersubjectivity, cognitive grammar, God and science

<sup>1</sup> This project was first presented in Olsztyn at the annual conference of the Polish Cognitive Linguistics Association (Cognitive Linguistics in the Year 2016) and benefited from the comments I received there. I would also like to thank Aleksandra Górska for her time and insight as we discussed this debate and the marking system and Łukasz Stolarski for his assistance with statistical calculations. I am also indebted to two anonymous reviewers. Any remaining errors are my own.

in different academic disciplines. Thus, it is crucial that we establish the linguistic definitions that will be used in this project so that these non-linguistic salient meanings do not interrupt analysis (cf. Giora 1999).

The issue of subjectivity and objectivity is complex and raises controversy even within linguistic theories. For instance, Langacker (2007), Verhagen (2003) and Closs-Traugott (2010) all draw attention to new perspectives on speech acts and the calculation of implicatures provided by looking at these “pragmatic” puzzles from the perspective of intersubjectivity. However, they do so from different theoretical approaches to the relationship between language, cognition and social interaction. Langacker highlights the importance of understanding the construal of “I” (canonical speaker) and “you” (canonical listener) as dependent on an intersubjective relationship that can be analysed as a blend. Verhagen focuses on the argumentative — or persuasive — nature of communication and states “the *process* of verbal communication involves *partially* shared and partially divergent experiential-conceptual content, that communicating subjects attempt to coordinate on by means of (the speaker) attempting to influence the other’s inferences and (the addressee) assessing such attempts” (Verhagen 2008: 307). Although Closs-Traugott (2010) accepts the importance of the speaker’s consideration of the hearer, she sees meanings as encoded in language and transferred, as opposed to negotiated. As a result, she suggests analysing linguistic markers that index subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This differs distinctly from work by cognitive linguists, who view intersubjectivity as something that is primarily conceptual and only secondarily reveals itself in language. Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned authors, despite their different philosophical approaches to language, would agree that “the very fact of communicating with another person entails general intersubjectivity” (Traugott 2010: 30).<sup>2</sup>

According to Verhagen (2005: 4–5), despite the variety of publications and linguistic theories mentioned above, three distinct uses of subjectivity/objectivity can be found in the literature:

1. as a way of distinguishing between the viewer (subject) and object under investigation,
2. as a way of distinguishing between information that is personal (subjective) and publicly available (objective),
3. as elements of construal (per Langacker’s description of Cognitive Grammar).

Verhagen claims that Langacker’s approach provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with the other two definitions “simultaneously and in an integrated way.” He cites Langacker’s (1987: 487–488) definition of the construal relationship, which is worth repeating here: “The relationship between a speaker (or hearer) and a situation that he conceptualizes and portrays, involving focal adjustments and imagery.” This corresponds to Langacker’s viewing

<sup>2</sup> A review of these different perspectives can be found in Nicolle (2007).

arrangement in which the S/H use language to focus the other's attention on the same object of conceptualization. For this reason, and because Langacker is specifically interested in the use of personal pronouns as markers of objectivity and (inter)subjectivity, it is his definition of the terms as part of Cognitive Grammar that I describe below and apply in analysing the transcript.

## 2.1. SUBJECTIVITY/OBJECTIVITY

Within the framework of Cognitive Grammar, subjectivity/objectivity refers to the degree to which S/H, or other elements of the ground, are put “on-stage,” or made objective, through implicit or explicit mention. Langacker (2008: 78) explains:

In their tacit role as subjects of conception, the speaker and hearer are always part of the conceptual substrate supporting an expression's meaning. If that is their only role, they are always implicit and construed with maximal subjectivity. To varying degrees, however, they can themselves function as objects of conception, in which case they are more salient by virtue of being construed more objectively. The extreme is to put them onstage as the focus of attention: with the first- and second-person pronouns (*I, you, we*, and their variants), the speaker and hearer are profiled, explicitly mentioned, and objectively construed.


Hence, the terms “subjective” and “objective,” in Langacker's understanding, do not describe definite categories, but extreme points on a continuum. Moreover, subjectivity is not construed as the speaker's opinion, but the extent to which the speaker is present in the utterance. This is a crucial difference from the understanding of subjectivity/objectivity in other discourses and disciplines, where it is viewed as a difference between fact and opinion or public and personal knowledge, as has been mentioned in the previous section, and deserves emphasis.

For me [Langacker], however, it is a matter of *perspective*. Moreover, only a particular entity (not an expression overall) is said to be subjectively or objectively construed. Whether *boor* means “farmer” or “crude person”, for example, its profiled referent is the onstage focus of attention, hence objectively construed, whereas the speaker remains an implicit locus of judgement and is thus construed subjectively. This is not to deny that the speaker's attitude becomes more evident in the later meaning, the primary content being evaluative, but the speaker carries out this evaluation without becoming the focused target of conception. (Langacker 2008: 78)

Langacker gives the example of *boor*, which, although it may have a negative connotation, is fully objective as a discrete unit. It only becomes subjective when the speaker includes the ground (S/H and their context) in the conversation. This can be achieved through several grounding devices


including tense and deixis markers. Figure 1 places possible utterances on Langacker's continuum. Only nouns are truly objective. The middle sentence is subjective to the speaker and hearer: it is grounded in the given discourse context through the use of *the*, which requires that both S/H know what cat is being talked about, and the location *behind*, which places S/H on the other side of the fridge. Present tense also places the utterance and the situation/picture in the same moment. The far-right utterance further objectifies the hearer by placing him/her onstage, within the S/H conceptualization of the event.

Figure 1. Objectivity-Subjectivity continuum<sup>3</sup>



Langacker (2007: 181) suggests that another way of understanding this continuum is through analysing what elements are onstage and off stage in different imperatives. He gives three examples with the verb *leave*, which I have graphed in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Varying levels of subjectivity/objectivity in imperative forms (after Langacker 2007: 181)



In the first utterance, only the act of leaving is placed onstage; the speaker and hearer are fully subjective. In the second utterance, both the hearer and the act of leaving are objectified. In the third example, both S/H, as well as the actions of ordering and leaving, are onstage and fully objective. This is an important distinction from the uses of subjective and objective in other fields of study.

## 2.2. INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Intersubjectivity is unique to the human species (Tomasello 2000) and realized in language through the use of, e.g., personal pronouns (Langacker 2007), negatives (Verhagen 2005), epistemic complementation constructions (Almeida & Ferrari 2012; Verhagen 2005), determiners (Langacker 2007), and imperatives (Langacker 2007).

Personal pronouns play a pivotal role in “the mutual apprehension of other minds,” which Langacker argues is a “central if not a defining feature of intersubjectivity” (2007: 182). He argues (Langacker 2007: 185) that the intersubjectivity inherent in face-to-face dialogue is the result of a multi-space blend (after Fauconnier & Turner 2002). One input space contains a blend of S and H, in which the roles are constantly reversing during the course of the conversation, a second input space is the situation

<sup>3</sup> Example sentences come from the author

in which  $S(H')$  is the object of conceptualization and a third has  $H(S')$  as the object of conceptualization. In the blend, both  $S$  and  $H$  are objects of conceptualization in the onstage region and subjects of conceptualization in the ground. This interaction can be schematically illustrated according to Figure 3.




Figure 3. *You* (Figure 8 in Langacker 2007: 184)

While the blending of  $S/H$  as the subject/object of conceptualization is implicit in all communication, which is intersubjective by nature, it is made explicit through the use of *I* and *you*. Thus, in the examples with *leave* in Figure 2, it is important to note that while  $S/H$  are fully objective in the third utterance — *I order you to leave* — they are also fully subjective.

### 3. RESEARCH AIMS

The aim of this paper is to analyse the use of *you*, and its derivatives, in the 2008 debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox “Has science buried God?” Previous analysis of this debate has included cognitive metaphor (Drogosz & Górska forthcoming) and rhetorical strategy (Górska 2015, 2016). This particular debate has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, both participants are experienced debaters and have encountered each other before. Secondly, in exit interviews, members of the audience recognized this debate as the one in which the opponents both listened to each other and seemed to exhibit mutual respect. Thirdly, given the context and setting, it can be assumed that each speaker was making a conscious effort to invite his opponent and the audience to see the universe and the meaning of life from his own vantage point. Finally, this desire to invite others to accept one’s viewpoint presupposes the awareness of the other minds involved in the debate; hence, fertile ground for an analysis of intersubjectivity.

This research project focuses on the following questions:

1. How frequently do the speakers use second person pronouns?
2. What discursive effect do these pronouns have?
3. What differences in second person pronoun usage, if any, can be seen in Dawkins's and Lennox's debate styles?
4. How does this choice affect
  - a. the argument?
  - b. the speaker's relationship with their interlocutor and audience?

It is believed that looking at the debate in terms of (inter)subjectivity will improve understanding of perspectives on the relationship between science and religion as well as the ways those perspectives may be construed.

#### 4. CONTEXT

Before discussing the lexicalization of (inter)subjectivity in the debate, it is necessary to establish the ground, that is, the context in which the debate occurs and the debaters, moderators, and (possibly) audiences shared knowledge. Both Dawkins and Lennox can be considered as experienced debaters and apologetics for their personal worldviews.

Richard Dawkins is an evolutionary biologist, ethologist, and author. He earned his MA and DPhil in zoology at Oxford University. From 1995 to 2008 he was the Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University. He has written many books on evolution and what he believes to be the theory's incompatibility with belief in God including *The Blind Watchmaker* (1996 /1986/), *The Magic of Reality* (2011) and the autobiographical *A Brief Candle in the Dark* (2015). He is a fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal Society of Literature (<https://richarddawkins.net/richarddawkins/> ED September 2016).

John Lennox is a mathematician, philosopher, and author. He earned his MA, MMath and PhD from Cambridge University, DSc from the University of Wales in Cardiff, MA and DPhil from Oxford University, and MA in Bioethics from the University of Surrey. He is currently a professor of Mathematics at the University of Oxford and Emeritus Fellow in Mathematics and the Philosophy of Science at Green Templeton College, Oxford (among other places). His books focus on the necessity of God's handiwork in the process of evolution and include *God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?* (2009 /2007/) and *Gunning for God: Why the New Atheists Are Missing the Target* (2011) (<http://www.johnlennox.org/about/>). The debate, organized by Fixed Point, borrows the title from Lennox (2009 /2007/).

Due to the complexity and frequent false dichotomies in debates concerning faith and evolution (cf. Barczewska 2017), I would like to emphasize the similarities between Dawkins and Lennox. Both are professors in their given

field: Dawkins in zoology and Lennox in mathematics and philosophy. Both are Oxford professors. Both are recognized debaters for their positions. Both accept evolution. In other words, this is neither “creationism vs. evolution,” nor “theologian vs. scientist.” Questions raised in the debate include the following:

- Can evolution be explained by purely natural/random processes?
- Is it more probable that we will find a natural or supernatural cause for the fine-tuning of the universe?
- If we are the product of purely natural/random processes, how can we trust our own reasoning?
- Is it reasonable to believe in God?

In presenting their arguments and questioning their opponents, the participants exploit greater and lesser degrees of objectivity, thereby inviting their interlocutor and audience to interact on different levels of (inter)subjectivity. It is these similarities and differences that are analysed in this paper.

### 5. METHODOLOGY

The transcript of the debate was taken from the automatic captioning on YouTube,<sup>4</sup> which proved to be error-ridden. Hence, it was edited/completed by Aleksandra Górska and Shala Barczewska (unpublished).<sup>5</sup> I annotated the transcript according to speaker and used WordSmith Tools 6 (Scott 2017) to search for the pronouns *you, your, yourself, yours* for each speaker.<sup>6</sup> Each instance of a pronoun was marked according to its place on the objective/subjective/inter-subjective continuum. The markings used for this stage of analysis are provided in Table 1.

Tag	Explanation
P2_OS	2 <sup>nd</sup> person onstage
P2_CL	2 <sup>nd</sup> person clarification/questions
P2_DM	2 <sup>nd</sup> person discourse marker
P2_EP	2 <sup>nd</sup> person epistemic (mental activities)
P2_EP_NEG	2 <sup>nd</sup> person epistemic negative
P2_EXP	2 <sup>nd</sup> person experience
P2_H	2 <sup>nd</sup> person, hypothetical
P2_RS	2 <sup>nd</sup> person reported speech
P3	impersonal
R	repeated/deleted

Table 1. Tags for second person pronouns

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoUIb-doeLxw>

<sup>5</sup> This edited version also contains Górska’s markings included for the conversational analysis.

<sup>6</sup> The research project also includes *we, our, ours, ourselves*; however, it was decided to keep this paper focused on the use of *you*.

To provide a better understanding of these tags, a sample of how the transcript<sup>7</sup> was marked is provided in Table 2. Some markings require further explanation. OS designates situations where the speaker places himself or his interlocutor onstage as a part of his argument in the debate. RS (reported speech) differs from EP (epistemic) in that EP identifies instances where the speaker attributes a perspective belief or feeling to his interlocutor which is not necessarily grounded in what has been said. Repeated phrases, which could indicate a stutter or mis-

Table 2. Samples of tag markings in the transcript

Tag	Explanation	Examples
DM	Discourse marker	D: <P1_DM> I mean, that is, that is deeply against the spirit of science. L: but we know of no other conceivable way of it being generated <P2_DM>you see [...]
CL	Clarification	D: <P2_Q>you really think that the, the creator of this magnificent edifice of the universe, these- the expanding universe the galaxies L: don't let me put words in <P2_C>your mouth, of course that would be unfair (1.0) but
OS	Onstage	D: <P2_OS>you- we- we- both of us are faced with the problems of saying how did things start L: I find <P2_OS>your writings so fascinating because of the metaphors and images <P2_OS>you use
EP	Epistemic (mental) verb	D: I mean <P2_EP>you think <P2_H>you're going to survive <P2_H>your own death I gather L: <P2_EP>you believe, (,) that this universe is just freak accident
EP_NEG	Epistemic verb negative	D: --- L: [...] now the only thing we know of capable of producing language is mind and yet <P2_EP_NEG>you reject that.
EXP	Experience	D: well <P2_EXP>you must talk to different historians than the one I talked to L: in <P2_EXP>your world (3.0) where is justice (4.0) to be found?
ID	Identifying	D: <P2_ID>you as a scientist will explain that by gravity L: By definition as an atheist <P2_ID>you must reject that, there's no but- mind behind this language
RS	Reported speech	D: Well John, <P2_RS>you said that <P1_EP>I believe that the universe is L: When <P2_RS>you say it's anti-scientific, I don't think it's anti-scientific at all.
P2_H	Hypothetical	D: <R>you could, <P2_H>you could possibly persuade <P1_EP_H>me that there was some kind of creative force in the universe L: I get the impression that, <P2_EP_NEG>you're not taking history really seriously. Otherwise, <P2_H>you'd interact with
P3	Impersonal	D: So, so <P3>you don't jump over the cliff because <P3>you understand the meaning of jumping over a cliff is that <P3>you're going to die. L: That's exactly true. <P3>You wouldn't recognize if dead people were popping up all over the place, <P3>you wouldn't think it was very special but
R	Repeated/deleted	D: Well <R>you've the...<P2_RS>you're asserting there's no way. L: <R>you use words like- <R>you lose- <P2_RS>you use words like blind and automatic this watch is blind and automatic but it's been designed

<sup>7</sup> These excerpts come from various points in the debate; in other words, D:/L: marks the speaker, but does not mean that the excerpt necessarily came from the beginning of that speaker's turn.

start are not tagged as an additional occurrence of, e.g., a discourse marker; instead they are marked *R* and not included in further analysis.

## 6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

### 6.1. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF PRONOUN USAGE

DAWKINS (4681 words)			LENNOX (5336 words)			P-values of the difference
Word	Occurrences	Per 1,000	Word	Occurrences	Per 1,000	
YOU	96	20.51	YOU	102	19.12	0.6688
YOUR	9	1.92	YOUR	18	3.37	0.2286
YOURSELF	0	0	YOURSELF	2	0.37	0.53791
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>22.43</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>22.86</b>	<b>0.938</b>

Table 3 lists the number of occurrences for each word according to speaker. Raw numbers as well as a standardized ratio (per 1000 words) is provided. A quick glance at the table shows that *you* is used slightly more often by Dawkins (per 1,000 words) and *your* — more often by Lennox; however, these differences are not statistically significant. Despite this apparent similarity between the debaters, the way these pronouns are used differs substantially.

Table 3. Occurrences of first and second person pronouns according to speaker

The first thing we observe (Figure 4 and Figure 5) is that the intensity with which these pronouns are used varies according to speaker as the debate progresses. Dawkins begins with a relatively limited use of second person pronouns, intensifies his use mid-debate and continues using them through to the closing. Conversely, although Lennox is consistent in using second person pronouns throughout the debate, his use is most concentrated in the very beginning, in his opening statement, which we will analyse in the following section. It almost appears as if the two plots are mirror representations of each other, as Dawkins increases his use of the second person pronoun, Lennox, particularly in his closing, decreases his. One possible explanation is that the debaters, consciously or subconsciously, were attempting to adjust to the other person's debate style.




Figure 4. Dispersion plot of Dawkins's use of *you*





Figure 5. Dispersion plot of Lennox's use of *you*


Differences also occur in the way these pronouns are used. The pie charts in Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrate these differences graphically. The results are discussed after each.

Figure 6. Dawkins's use of second person pronouns



Dawkins's debate style favours using *you*\* to refer to a generic, unspecified individual or to ask his interlocutor to consider some hypothetical situation. He rarely uses *you*\* to refer to his opponent's thoughts or beliefs; however, he does use *you*\* in discourse markers and to report what Lennox has said earlier in the debate.

Figure 7. Lennox's use of second person pronouns



Lennox's use of *you*\* differs. He frequently employs second person pronouns to comment on Dawkins's thoughts/beliefs and to report or clarify what Dawkins has said.

Two of these differences are statistically significant: Lennox's use of *you*\* to place his interlocutor onstage ( $p = 0.01093$ ) and Dawkins's use of *you*\* as a third person pronoun ( $p = 0.03457$ ).<sup>8</sup> The excerpts in the following section will demonstrate how these uses affect the debater's style in terms of (inter)subjectivity.

## 6.2. ANALYSIS OF THE DISCURSIVE ROLE OF THESE PRONOUNS

In this section, we will look at two excerpts from the debate and observe how each debater uses these personal pronouns to put themselves and/or their interlocutor on/off stage. The first excerpt comes from Dawkins's introductory comments.

D: **John Lennox** is a scientist who believes that Jesus turned water into wine (.) a scientist who believes that Jesus somehow influenced all those molecules of H<sub>2</sub>O, and introduced proteins and carbohydrates and tannins and alcohol (.) and turned it into (.) wine. **he** believes that Jesus (.) walked on water. [...] I had been accustomed to debating with sophisticated theologians (.) and I come across **John Lennox** who's a scientist who believes in all those things in particular (.hh) **he** believes that [...]<sup>9</sup>

The first thing we notice is that Dawkins chooses to use the third person, rather than *you*, to refer to Lennox. This has the discursive effect of creating distance between the debaters. Apart from Dawkins's reference to his own experience, he keeps himself off-stage. At the same time, despite recognizing that Lennox is a scientist, it is Lennox's beliefs, not his experience, that Dawkins chooses to put onstage (cf. Górska 2016).

Conversely, Lennox addresses Dawkins directly in his response, placing his interlocutor and his beliefs onstage.

L: (2.0) Well Richard, erm, thank <P2\_DM>**you** for explaining so clearly at least in part what I believe, erm (.) I'm glad to hear <P2\_RS>**you** saying that (.hh) <P2\_RB>**you** feel a good case could be made out that there is rationality behind the universe <P2\_RS>**you** said it's not something <P2\_RS>**you** personally accept.  
So, <P2\_RB>**you** believe, (.) that this universe is just freak accident, there's no mind behind it, and yet here <compliment>**you** are with one of the best minds in the world.  
So <P2\_RB>**you** believe a number of things that I as a scientist find very difficult to believe.

Lennox engages Dawkins at the intersubjective level with discourse markers that address his interlocutor, while at the same time using reported speech and reported beliefs to place Dawkins's opinions onstage. His strategy seems to be to attempt to directly engage Dawkins, at times even complementing him — *with one of the best minds in the world* — before criticizing him — *you*

<sup>8</sup> P values were calculated using the occurrences of second person pronouns as the base, if the total word count for each debater is used, the p-values suggest even greater significance ( $p = 0.009719$  and  $0.01228$ , respectively).

<sup>9</sup> For an in-depth analysis of the discursive role of *scientist* in this debate, see Barczewska (2017) and Górska (2016).

*believe a number of things that I as a scientist find very difficult to believe.* This final statement accomplishes a number of things at the level of intersubjectivity. First, it places Dawkins, his intelligence, and his opinions onstage for examination. Secondly, it does so without belittling them. Thirdly, when Lennox places himself onstage with Dawkins to criticize Dawkins's position, he does so from the perspective of a scientist, thereby reversing the belief-science relationship presupposed by Dawkins in the first exchange (cf. Górska 2016).

The second fragment that we will look at is Dawkins's explanation of what truth is. Just as the previous fragment provided a representative illustration of how Lennox uses second person pronouns, this excerpt illustrates Dawkins's usage. Notice that his use of *you* does not refer to Lennox or the audience, but to any or all individuals. Thus, it is hard to view this as evidence of intersubjectivity.

D: Truth is what happens, an animal that er that was attempting to survive, and it didn't recognize truth or falsehood in some sense, at whatever level is appropriate for the kind of surviving that it has, it wouldn't survive. I mean truth just means that **you're** living in the real world, and **<P3>you** behave in the real world in such a way as things make sense. In the real world when **<P3>you** see a rock in **your** way **you** don't go charging into it. **You'd** die if **you** did that. **You** jump over a cliff **you** die. That's truth. It's perfectly obvious that natural selection would favour, in any animal, a brain that behaves in a, in a way that recognizes truth, and acts upon it.

The final excerpt that we will look at involves Lennox putting both himself and Dawkins onstage as objects of conceptualization. This constitutes part of his argument for the personal/relational aspect of the God of the Bible, whom Lennox worships.

L: yes, but (therefore) the question to be decided then, (.) is (.) is there a God, and has he revealed himself? And that's where again I think this pettiness needs to be pushed aside. Because (.) I can't get to know **you** as a person. **You're** not just a scientific object. I can look at **you** through a- a- a- telescope or a magnifying glass I could even dissect **you** and so and so forth, but because **you** are a person I cannot get to know **you** unless **you're** prepared to reveal **yourself** to me. So, (.) the fact (.) that (.) the claim of Christ to be the truth to be the God incarnate, that makes perfect sense to me [...] so one of the very important questions to ask is, is that really true or is this simply myth and fantasy?

The dialogue continues with a short rebuttal from Dawkins; however, what is interesting here is that Dawkins responds to Lennox's attempt at personalizing the debate.

D: (1.0) well, myth and fantasy for **me** (3.0)

Then Lennox, while keeping the intersubjective nature of the debate in the foreground, adds historical evidence to his personal arguments and

asks Dawkins to link the two. In other words, he keeps Dawkins onstage, but moves the debate from the hypothetical to the historical.

36:54 L: Yes well (1.0) d'**you** know, that disturbs me for the following reason, reading **your** book. The God Delusion. **you** say that (.) it's under scholarly dispute among historians that Jesus actually existed. Now, I've checked with the ancient historians. that is not so. (.) and it disturbed me. History is not natural science. But- what I don't understand is this, why **you** would write something like that

[...]

37:37 D: Um, well, there are one or two, but I don't really care actually because it, precisely because it's petty. I mean I cannot repeat, **you** could, **you** could possibly persuade me that there was some kind of creative force in the universe, there was some kind of uh physical mathematical genius who, who created everything the expanding universe devised quantum theory, relativity and all that. **You** could possibly persuade me of that, but that is radically and fundamentally incompatible with the sort of god who cares about sins, the sort of god who cares about what, what **you** do with **your** genitals the sort of god who, who, who is interested in, who has the slightest interest in **your** private thoughts, wickednesses and things like that. Surely **you** can see a god who is grand enough to make the universe is not going to give a truepenny cuss about what it what, what **you**'re thinking about him and **your** sins and things like that

The exchange in this excerpt is one of the few in which Dawkins readily uses first and second person pronouns to place himself onstage or to directly interact with Lennox. At the same time, it is still possible to observe a shift in meaning from the personal to the impersonal.

## 7. DISCUSSION

In summary, statistically speaking, there is no significant difference between the number of times each debater uses second person pronouns. Both Dawkins and Lennox use hypothetical situations and the impersonal *you* to put the issues onstage and provide some distance between themselves and their argument; however, Dawkins uses this strategy more often and that difference is statistically significant. Dawkins's use of *you*<sup>\*</sup> is frequently impersonal or somewhere on a continuum between referring to his co-debater or the audience and an impersonal, unknown, hypothetical individual. Lennox uses *you*<sup>\*</sup> more often to engage Dawkins directly and put him and his views onstage. When given the opportunity to respond in these contexts, Dawkins often chooses to switch to the third person and talk about the opinions of an unspecified populace (cf. Górska 2016). Despite this tendency, the plot diagram in section 6.1 suggests an increase in Dawkins's use of second person pronouns during the course of the debate and a decrease in Lennox's use. However, there is insufficient data to

suggest whether the change is internal to the speaker's individual debate styles or represents a subconscious or conscious attempt to adapt to the other's strategy.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study raises several questions that could serve as spring boards for future research. Firstly, are these differences due to Lennox's and Dawkins's individual debate styles, or do they fit into a larger pattern? For instance, are they topic specific (God inspired/enabled science vs. naturalistic science) or viewpoint specific (Christian vs. atheist)? Secondly, do other debates exhibit tendencies of one interlocutor adopting the style of the other. If so, when does this occur? Finally, how do the different ways in which intersubjectivity is lexicalized affect the audiences' reception of the debaters' arguments? These are just a few of the directions that future research could take.

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# STRESZCZENIE

## *Na scenie, poza sceną czy gdzieś pomiędzy? Znaczniki intersubiektywności w debacie Dawkinsa i Lennoxa „Czy nauka pogrzebała Boga?”<sup>1</sup>*

„Wzajemne rozumienie innych umysłów”, które jest „centralną, lub wręcz definicyjną cechą intersubiektywności” (Langacker 2007: 182) nie podlega bezpośredniej obserwacji. Można je jednak analizować dzięki badaniu użycia języka, w szczególności zaimków *I, you, we* ('ja', 'ty', 'my') (Langacker 2008: 78). Zaimki te umieszczają mówiącego i słuchającego (M/S) na scenie poprzez eksplicytnie odniesienie. W związku z tym analiza użycia zaimków osobowych przez uczestników debaty może rzucić światło na zagadnienie językowego wyrażania (inter)subiektywności obecnej w publicznych debatach.

W tym artykule zajmiemy się użyciem *you* ('ty') i jego wariantów w debacie między Richardem Dawkinsem i Johnem Lennoxem, która odbyła się w 2008 roku w Muzeum w Oksfordzie jako druga z czterech debat pomiędzy tymi uczonymi (Taunton 2014). Debatą ta była przedmiotem analizy pod kątem metafor konceptualnych (Drogosz & Górska w druku) i strategii retorycznych (Górska 2015, 2016). Uważamy jednak, że uwzględnienie w analizie (inter)subiektywności pozwoli na pogłębienie rozumienia różnych perspektyw ujmowania relacji pomiędzy nauką i religią, jak również sposobów konstruowania tych perspektyw. W szczególności pozwoli na uwzględnienie wpływu (nie)użycia zaimka osobowego zarówno na argumentację, jak i relację między mówiącym i jego rozmówcą. Wspomniana debata dostarcza idealnego materiału do takich badań. Widzowie podkreślali, że uczestnicy debaty nie tylko słuchali się wzajemnie, ale także okazywali sobie wzajemny szacunek. Można więc założyć, że każdy mówiący starał się zaprosić swojego oponenta i widownię do spojrzenia na świat i sens życia z jego perspektywy, a to z kolei zakłada uwzględnienie innych umysłów uczestniczących w debacie i, w konsekwencji, znakomity materiał do analizy intersubiektywności.

W związku z częstymi pozornymi dychotomiami w dyskusjach na temat religii i nauki, a w szczególności ewolucji (por. Barczewska 2017), konieczne jest przedstawienie dodatkowych informacji na temat uczestników debaty i pytań, które w tej debacie stawiają. Zarówno Dawkins, jak i Lennox są doktorami nauk w swoich dyscyplinach — Dawkins w dziedzinie zoologii, a Lennox w dziedzinie matematyki i filozofii; obaj są autorami licznych publikacji na tematy związane z wiarą i nauką; obaj szeroko propagują swoje stanowisko; obaj uznają istnienie ewolucji. Innymi słowy, nie mamy do czynienia z opozycją „kreacjonizm/ewolucjonizm” czy „teolog/naukowiec”. Pytania podniesione w debacie obejmują następujące kwestie: 1) Czy można wyjaśnić ewolucję jedynie jako działanie naturalnych i nieukierunkowanych procesów; 2) Czy jest bardziej prawdopodobne, że znajdziemy naturalną czy nadprzyrodzoną siłę jako przyczynę działania wszechświata; 3. Jeżeli jesteśmy produktem działania naturalnych i nieukierunkowanych procesów, to jak możemy opierać się na naszym rozumie; 4. Czy wiara w Boga jest racjonalna?

<sup>1</sup> Analiza ta została wcześniej przedstawiona w Olsztynie, na dorocznej konferencji Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawstwa Kognitywnego (Językoznawstwo Kognitywne w roku 2016) i uwzględnia komentarze, które tam usłyszałam. Chciałabym również podziękować Aleksandrze Górskiej za jej czas i uwagi, którymi podzieliła się ze mną w trakcie naszych dyskusji, a także za zapoznanie mnie z systemem oznaczeń. Chciałabym też podziękować Łukaszowi Stolarskiemu za pomoc w obliczeniach statystycznych, jak również dwóm anonimowym recenzentom.

Transkrypcja debaty została oparta na automatycznych podpisach YouTube (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JOUlbdoeLxw>) w znacznym stopniu poprawionych przez Aleksandrę Górską i Shalę Barczewską<sup>2</sup>. Poszukiwanie konkordancji za pomocą WordSmith 6 Tools (Scott 2017) pozwoliło zidentyfikować wystąpienia zaimków drugiej osoby. Ustalono, że chociaż Dawkins używa *you* częściej niż Lennox (uwzględniając liczbę wystąpień na sto wyrazów), to różnica nie jest statystycznie istotna. Ponadto tylko Lennox używa zaimka zwrotnego *yourself*.

Wystąpienia *you*, *yours*, *yourself* zostały otagowane w odniesieniu do ich roli w dialogu (np. jako znacznik dyskursu, jako odniesienie do doświadczenia, do czynności umysłowej, jako generyczny znacznik 3. osoby i jako opis sytuacji hipotetycznej). Dzięki temu udało się ustalić, że Dawkins i Lennox używają zaimków 2. osoby (*you*, *yours*, *yourself*) do innych celów. Analiza pokazała, że ponad 25% użyć Dawkinsa ma charakter bezosobowy, tj. słowa te nie odnoszą się bezpośrednio do jego rozmówcy. W przypadku Lennox jest to 9%. Styl debaty Lennox obejmuje prośenie rozmówcy o ocenę jego stanowiska w kategoriach bezpośredniego doświadczenia, co często oznacza umieszczenie rozmówcy na scenie. W związku z tym Dawkins staje się częścią argumentacji, w której Lennox przedstawia swoje poglądy. Przykładem tego może być fragment, w którym Lennox opowiada się za koniecznością wcielenia w sensie religijnym, opisując, czym dla niego byłoby „poznać” Dawkinsa.

I can't get to know **you** as a person. **You're** not just a scientific object. I can look at **you** through a-a-a- telescope or a magnifying glass I could even dissect **you** and so and so forth, but because **you** are a person I cannot get to know **you** unless **you're** prepared to reveal **yourself** to me.

[Nie mogę poznać cię jako osoby. Nie jesteś tylko obiektem badań naukowych. Mogę patrzeć na ciebie przez teleskop lub szkło powiększające, mogę cię rozłożyć na czynniki pierwsze i tak dalej, ale ponieważ jesteś osobą, nie mogę poznać cię, dopóki nie będziesz gotowy otworzyć się przede mną.]

Jest to odpowiedź na powtarzane przez Dawkinsa stwierdzenie, że kwestia istnienia Jezusa jest mało istotna, a jego wcielenie irracjonalne. Konstruuąc swoje argumenty, Lennox umieszcza zarówno siebie, jak i swojego rozmówcę na scenie, zlewając podmiot i przedmiot konstruowania.

Z drugiej strony, Dawkins często używa 3. osoby w odniesieniu do Lennox. Często od tego zaczyna swoją wypowiedź, opisując poglądy Lennox i przedstawiając ich ocenę. Kiedy Dawkins decyduje się na *you*, najczęściej odnosi się ono do hipotetycznej lub nieokreślonej 3. osoby. Na przykład, kiedy wyjaśnia sens słowa *meaning*:

So, so **you** don't jump over the cliff because **you** understand the meaning of jumping over a cliff is that **you're** going to die.

[Tak więc nie skaczesz z klifu, ponieważ rozumiesz znaczenie skakania z klifu, wiesz, że zginiesz.]

Podobnie jak w przykładzie Lennox, *you* jest umieszczone na scenie, jednak w tym kontekście nie odnosi się ani do rozmówcy, ani do widzów, ale do ludzi w ogólności.

Nawet w kontekstach, kiedy Dawkins jest zmuszony użyć *you* w odniesieniu do swojego rozmówcy, jak w przypadku obrony wcielenia przez Lennox, stara się on zmienić znaczenie *you*. Jego pierwsze użycie zaimka odnosi się do Lennox, ale już drugie i trzecie użycie nie wskazuje bezpośrednio na Lennox, ale na bezosobowego, hipotetycznego „innego”:

Surely **you** can see a god who is grand enough to make the universe is not going to give a true penny cuss about what it what, what **you're** thinking about him and **your** sins and things like that.

[Zapewne zgodzisz się, że bóg na tyle wielki, aby stworzyć świat, nie będzie się interesował tym, co się o nim myśli, naszymi grzechami i tym podobnym.]

Chociaż Dawkins angażuje się bardziej bezpośrednio niż Lennox, zwłaszcza pod koniec debaty, jego ogólna strategia polega na umieszczaniu na scenie swojego poglądu na sens życia, na obronie

<sup>2</sup> Objęło to wprowadzenie znaczników prozodii i systemu otagowania wypowiedzi uczestników debaty.

tego poglądu, a następnie na zostawieniu słuchaczowi decyzji co do przyjęcia czy odrzucenia takiego konstruowania. Sprawa ma się inaczej z Lennoxem, który używa zaimków 2. osoby, aby objąć Dawkinsa i nakłonić go do spojrzenia na sens życia z jego perspektywy.

Powyższe obserwacje otwierają dalsze pytania badawcze, np. czy te różnice wynikają z indywidualnego stylu debaty Dawkinsa i Lennox, czy też są cechą charakterystyczną badaczy podziwiających ich poglądy.

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