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CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY: *Some new proposals*

ABSTRACT In recent years, I have made some new suggestions concerning conceptual metaphor theory (Kövecses 2010a, 2010b, 2015a, 2017). They are related especially to two areas of the functioning of the conceptual system: (1) the role of context in the production of metaphors and (2) the level conceptual organization that applies to conceptual metaphors. In the present paper I would like to demonstrate *how the context can produce viable metaphors and how the level of conceptual organization in metaphor can have an impact on a debated issue* in CMT: namely, the issue of *methodology*.

1. INTRODUCTION

In some recent publications, I have proposed two major ways in which conceptual metaphor theory needs to be supplemented (see especially, Kövecses 2015a, 2017). One concerns the role of context in the creation of metaphors in discourse. While the comprehension of metaphors has always been seen as being aided by taking context into account, the role of context in the production of metaphors in discourse has been largely ignored by researchers.

A contextualist version of conceptual metaphor theory requires the characterization of at least three large issues that center around the following three questions: (1) What is needed for (metaphorical) meaning making?; (2) What are the most common contextual factors that play a role in the use and creation of metaphors?; and (3) What is the cognitive mechanism by means of which the contextual factors actually produce metaphors in natural discourse? It is the third issue that I will be concerned with in this paper.

The second proposal I made in recent years was that the conceptual metaphors occupy a variety of distinct levels in our conceptual system. Conceptual metaphors should not be thought of as occurring at a single level of schematicity. Instead, they should be seen as parts of a “schematicity hierarchy” on at least four levels (Kövecses 2017).

A consequence of this view is that conceptual metaphors are not a unitary phenomenon, and this has implications for the way we study them. I suggest that different methodologies apply to the four levels of metaphoric schematicity and that it is probably a mistake to insist on a “single best” method in the study of metaphor.

2. METAPHOR: A CONTEXTUALIST VIEW

In the present section, I attempt to briefly discuss the main conceptual ingredients that appear to be prerequisite for the production of a particular metaphorical expression in a discourse situation. I propose that there are at least four cognitive processes involved in this: (1) Out of the many construal, or cognitive, operations the speaker must decide on metaphor as a meaning making device. (2) Given the various context types, the speaker is exposed to a wide array of information or experiential knowledge that “compete” for the speaker’s attention. (3) One of the contextual factors will emerge as the strongest and primes the speaker to use the matching metaphorical expression. (4) The expression will have the meaning that is appropriate for the communicative intention of the speaker. I label the required cognitive processes as follows:

1. cognitive/construal operations,
2. types of context,
3. contextual priming,
4. conceptual pathways.

Keywords

conceptual metaphor theory, context types, levels of metaphor, schematicity hierarchy, methods of studying metaphor

2.1. CONSTRUAL OPERATIONS

In any given context, the speaker chooses a particular construal operation out of the many that are available to him/her. Below is a list of these operations that cognitive linguists typically work with (based on Langacker 2008; see also Kövecses 2006):

Schematization/abstraction

Image-schemas

Attention/focusing

Figure-ground

Scope of attention

Scalar adjustment (granularity; fine-grained – course-grained conceptualization)

Dynamic and static attention (sequential and summary scanning, including fictive motion)

Prominence/salience

Profile – base

Trajector – landmark alignment

Perspective

Viewpoint

Subjectivity – objectivity

Metonymy

Metaphor

Mental spaces

Conceptual integration

Often, several of these constitute alternative choices for the construal of a situation. The alternative operations commonly include abstraction, schematization, attention, perspective (subjectivity – objectivity), metonymy, metaphor, and conceptual integration. In the case under consideration, the speaker decides on using metaphor. This choice is indicated by bold type in the list above.

2.2. CATEGORIES, TYPES, AND KINDS OF CONTEXT

The in-depth study of discourse shows that the use of metaphors in discourse is influenced by a large variety of contextual factors. The specific contextual factors can be grouped into four large categories: situational context, discourse context, conceptual-cognitive context, and bodily context. All four of these context types can be broken down into various kinds of specific contextual factors. In Kövecses (2015a), I arrived at the following inventory of types of context and the kinds of specific contextual factors that belong to them.

Situational context

Physical environment

- Social situation
- Cultural context
- Discourse context
 - Surrounding discourse
 - Previous discourses on the same topic
 - Dominant forms of discourse and intertextuality
- Conceptual-cognitive context
 - Metaphorical conceptual system
 - Knowledge about elements of the discourse
 - Ideology
 - Knowledge about past events
 - Interests and concerns
- Bodily context

I discuss and exemplify all of these types and kinds of context in my book *Where Metaphors Come From*. However, a brief comment is in place here on the last type of context, which I call “bodily context.” The body is not only responsible for the production of hundreds of conceptual metaphors through the many correlations between subjective and sensory-motor experience (cf. Grady 1997a, b; Lakoff & Johnson 1999), but it can also prime the use of particular metaphors in more immediate, local contexts (see, e.g. Gibbs 2006; Gibbs & Colston 2012; Boroditsky 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002). In other words, it can lead to the production of metaphors in discourse in the same way as the other contextual factors previously mentioned can. This explains why I regard it as a type of context.

My general claim is that it is differential experience (as defined by the contextual factors above) that is mainly responsible for the use of (especially novel) metaphors in discourse and that the cognitive operation that helps speakers achieve this is priming. The view I propose here may be thought of as a cognitively-oriented alternative to Sperber and Wilson’s treatment of metaphor use and comprehension as an “inferential process” (Sperber & Wilson 1995 /1986/, 2008).

2.3. CONTEXTUAL PRIMING

In some previous publications (see, e.g., Kövecses 2005; 2010a, b; 2015a), I showed that contextual factors can motivate, trigger, prompt, facilitate, shape, etc., the use of a particular metaphor in discourse. We can think of these various mental operations as instances of “priming.” Priming is a well-studied cognitive process used extensively in psychological and psycholinguistic experiments with a sizeable literature (see, e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002; Casasanto 2009; Gibbs & Colston 2012; and several other studies). Priming is based on the simulation of some experience in the situational, discourse, bodily, and conceptual-cognitive context.

Experiments that make use of priming as a method in their design can range from “in vitro” to “in vivo” experiments (see Kövecses 2005). In the latter, people simply go through their everyday routines constituting particular contextual factors, and the researcher asks the participants questions about the way they conceptualize a particular situation, given those experiences. Studies, such as those mentioned above, indicate that various bodily and discourse (semantic) experiences that function as contextual factors do shape the subjects’ metaphorical (and nonmetaphorical) conceptualizations of the situations related to those experiences. It is shared experience (the dynamically evolving “common ground” in a situation, as used by Clark 1996) that enables the production and comprehension of metaphors in discourse.

I suggest that contextual factors can all prime the use of particular metaphors in context — simply because the choice of the metaphors would be coherent with the contextual factors functioning as primes. I think of the use of context-induced metaphors as a result of real-world (i.e., in vivo) priming without the researcher being present.

Kahneman (2011), examining the issue from a non-cognitive-linguistic perspective, gives us a flavor of the strength of priming effects in metaphorical thought. This is what he writes concerning an experiment that involves metaphorical thought:

Other experiments have confirmed Freudian insights about the role of symbols and metaphors in unconscious associations. For example, consider the ambiguous word fragments W_ _H and S_ _P. People who were recently asked to think of an action of which they were ashamed are more likely to complete those fragments as WASH and SOAP and less likely to see WISH and SOUP. Furthermore, merely thinking about stabbing a coworker in the back leaves people more inclined to buy soap, disinfectant, or detergent than batteries, juice, or candy bars. (Kahneman 2011: 56)

This experiment involves the conceptual metaphor BAD/IMMORAL IS DIRTY and some of the actions (cleaning) that are associated with this metaphorical source domain. In general, my suggestion is that the various kinds of experiences in real life can prime people to choose particular metaphors (i.e., metaphorical source domains) in the course of conceptualizing target domains.

We typically talk about “the context of X.” The X here is a metaphor, or, more specifically, the use of a metaphor in discourse. It can be suggested that the context of a metaphorical discourse is some experiential content that controls or influences the use of metaphors in discourse. This experiential content consists of the four types of context identified above: linguistic-discourse context, situational context, the conceptual-cognitive context, and the bodily context.

In every situation we have a large amount of experiential content to deal with in the course of communication. Consequently, the question

arises: Which of these will prime the speaker to produce a metaphor (and the hearer to comprehend it)? Van Dijk (2009) proposes the idea that contextual content is represented by the conceptualizers as a “context model.” A context model is a(n idealized) cognitive model of the situation in which such communication takes place that comprises a number of components, including the following: Setting (time, location, circumstances, props) and Happening, which consists of Actors (individuals or groups) and Activity/Conduct (Van Dijk 2009: 39). The latter can be personal, social, and mental. We can think of such elements as the components of a context model that respond to the questions below (the questions are followed by the designations of various specific contextual factors as discussed above and in Kövecses 2010a, b; 2015a):

- What do I know about the speaker, the topic, and the hearer? *Knowledge about the main elements of the discourse*
- What was said in the present discourse so far? *Surrounding discourse*
- What was said about the topic on previous occasions? *Previous discourses on the same topic*
- What are the major discourse types that dominate public discourse? *Dominant forms of discourse and intertextuality*
- What are the systems of thought that govern public discourse? *Ideology underlying discourse*
- What are the properties of the physical situation where something is conceptualized? *Physical environment*
- What are the properties of the social situation in which something is conceptualized? *Social situation*
- What are the properties of the cultural situation in which something is conceptualized? *Cultural situation*
- What has happened preceding the discourse? *History*
- What are the people participating in the discourse interested in and concerned with? *Interests and concerns*
- What are the properties of the conceptualizers’ body? *The body as context*
- What is the content of the participant’s conceptual system? *The metaphorical conceptual system as context*

The conceptualizers are aware of, but probably also actively seek out, the information that responds to these questions, and, as a result, they can form a specific context model in every communicative situation where metaphorical conceptualization occurs. Given the model (of all of this experiential content), only a manageable set will become sufficiently active to prime the use of particular metaphors in the discourse. The set of potential contextual factors above is the result of empirically studying discourses that contain metaphors and the situations in which the discourses

were used. In this sense, the factors form a “natural” set. Thus, the results of this empirical research indicate common tendencies in metaphorical conceptualization.

Although considerably limited to the (empirically arrived-at) twelve general factors above, a decision still has to be made by the speaker concerning which particular piece of perceptual or mental information they utilize for metaphorical use. The only way to further constrain the available information for the purpose of metaphor creation in discourse seems to be to take into account the particular target domain meaning the speaker-conceptualizer wishes to express in the communicative situation. Given this target-domain meaning, the appropriate source-to-target mapping(s) may be activated from the experiential content of the contextual model.

Let us take an example for this from the work by Semino (2008). Semino studied the metaphors used by various participants at the 2005 G8 summit meeting in Scotland on the basis of an article about the summit. The summit was accompanied by a major rock concert called Live 8. Some participants assessed what the G8 summit had achieved positively, while some had doubts concerning its results. Semino looked at one such negative assessment she found in an article about the summit. She states:

In contrast, a representative of an anti-poverty group is quoted as negatively assessing the G8 summit in comparison with the Live 8 concert via a metaphor to do with sound:

1.4. Dr Kumi Naidoo, from the anti-poverty lobby group G-Cap, said after ‘the roar’ produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered ‘a whisper’.

The reference to ‘roar’ could be a nonmetaphorical description of the sound made by the crowd at the concert. However, the use of ‘whisper’ in relation to the summit is clearly a (negative) metaphorical description of the outcome of the discussions in terms of a sound characterized by lack of loudness. Hence, the contrast in loudness between the sounds indicated by ‘roar’ and ‘whisper’ is used metaphorically to establish a contrast between the strength of feeling and commitment expressed by the concert audiences and the lack of resolve and effectiveness shown by the G8 leaders. (Semino 2008: 3–4)

In my view, the metaphor *whisper* here emerges from the physical(-social) context in which it is produced. Dr. Kumi Naidoo creates the metaphor *whisper* against a background in which there is a very loud concert and a comparatively quiet summit meeting. We can think of the loudness and the relative quiet of the occasion as perceptual features of the two events. Thus, the original conceptualizer, Dr. Kumi Naidoo, chooses a perceptual property of the physical context from all the experiential content that is available to him.

2.4. CONCEPTUAL PATHWAYS

However, we are still left with another question: How can *whisper* be used in the sense of ‘the lack of resolve and effectiveness,’ as proposed by Semino? “Whisper” and “lack of resolve and effectiveness” appear to be fairly different and distant notions. Out of the many potential experiential experiences represented by the twelve questions above, this particular one can be selected, I suggest, because the specific (target-domain) meaning, “lack of resolve,” seems to be expressible by it; i.e., it can convey the desired meaning. It can convey it because a particular *conceptual pathway* (made of several conceptual metaphors and metonymies) can be built between the two meanings (between that of *whisper* and “lack of resolve”), as I show elsewhere (Kövecses 2010a, b; 2015a). This way, a particular piece and kind of information (or experiential content) and a particular context-induced metaphor (*whisper*) is chosen out of the huge number of available options in the situation.

The required conceptual pathway consists of the following conceptual metaphors and metonymies: INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT, EMOTIONAL RESPONSES FOR THE EMOTIONS, ANGRY BEHAVIOR FOR ANGER/ARGUMENT, and EMOTION FOR DETERMINATION TO ACT. We need each of these metaphors and metonymies to be able to account for the meaning of the word *whisper* in the example. The INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT metaphor is especially important, in that it provides us with the connection between the degree of the loudness of the verbal behavior and the intensity of the determination, or resolve, to act. This way a particular piece and kind of information (or experiential content) and a particular context-induced metaphor (*whisper*) is chosen out of the huge number of available options in the situation.

3. THE MULTI-LEVEL VIEW OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS

I mentioned in the introduction that conceptual metaphors occur on four levels of schematicity: more specifically, image schemas, domains, frames, and mental spaces. (I describe the four levels and justify their differentiation in Kövecses 2017.) In other words, we have a vertical hierarchy of levels, such as the following:

IMAGE SCHEMA
 DOMAIN
 FRAME
 MENTAL SPACE

The image schemas, domains, and frames are part of what we can conceive of collective semantic memory. Mental spaces, however, are our online individual representations of discourse. The diagram below indicates this:

IMAGE SCHEMA

DOMAIN collective semantic memory

FRAME

MENTAL SPACE online individual representation of discourse

↑

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

My suggestion is that the contextual factors mentioned above affect conceptual metaphors at the level of mental spaces. To stay with the example of *whisper*, we can say that the conceptualizer of the G8 summit metaphorically construes the situation in an EVALUATION mental space through the *whisper* metaphor, which is, in turn, based on the INTENSITY IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT metaphor at a higher level, and which is connected to a number of other conceptual metaphors and metonymies. The linguistic metaphor arises as a result of the influence of the perceptual situation in the course of the online representation of the events in question, that is, the level of mental spaces.

4. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS VIEW FOR THE METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING METAPHOR?

There are a number of different approaches to the study of metaphor within a general conceptual metaphor theory framework. These different methods sometimes compete with one another and claim superior status in the field. Lakoff and Johnson's (1980, 1999) work was later seen as an "intuitive" approach to metaphor. The label was used because Lakoff and Johnson and their followers were believed to rely on their own intuitions in identifying metaphors and grouping them into sets of examples for conceptual metaphors. Corpus linguists argue that to find all or most of the conceptual metaphors in a language, one needs to take advantage of large corpora, such as the BNC (British National Corpus) or COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English) (see, e.g., Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 2005; Stefanowitsch 2006). They emphatically point out that our linguistic intuitions are not adequate for studying metaphors. More recently, I proposed to revive the older intuitive method (Kövecses 2015b), and pointed out that the revised "lexical" approach has advantages that the corpus-linguistic method cannot ignore. Other metaphor scholars place emphasis on the social-pragmatic uses of particular metaphorical expressions. They typically work with smaller databases than corpus linguists, and study the communicative functions of metaphors in authentic discourses (e.g., Musolff 2006; Cameron 2003; Semino 2008). Some scholars pay attention to how frames and metaphors are related and study various metaphorical constructions

(see, e.g., Sullivan 2013). They often make use of the Framenet project that was developed by Charles Fillmore.

Psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists study metaphors as a conceptual phenomenon and the embodied nature of metaphorical conceptualization (see, e.g., Gibbs 1994, 2006; Gibbs & Colston 2012; Boroditsky 2001; Casasanto 2009). This work is largely experimental — in the form of either “in vitro” or “in vivo” experiments (see Kövecses 2005 on this distinction). Neuroscientists take advantage of the most recent brain imaging techniques and try to identify the neuronal activities that underlie the use of conceptual metaphors in the brain (Gallese & Lakoff 2005, and see Coulson 2008 for an overview). Finally, groups of scientists are working to build computational models of how humans use conceptual metaphors for a variety of purposes (see, e.g., Narayanan 1999; Feldman 2006).

Thus, we have at least the following approaches dedicated to the study of conceptual metaphors:

- Intuitive approach,
- Corpus linguistic approach,
- Lexical approach,
- Discourse analysis approach,
- Framenet type approach,
- Psycholinguistic experimentation,
- Neuroscientific experimentation,
- Computational modeling.

There are undoubtedly other approaches, but even this set shows very clearly the variety of methods for the study of conceptual metaphor.

How can we pair the different approaches with the different levels of metaphor described above in the paper? The following pairing of approaches with the levels is suggestive, rather than definitive. Most of the approaches can be used to study several different levels. I suggest that the different approaches primarily attach to the following levels of metaphor:

IMAGE SCHEMAS	– Psycholinguistics; Neuroscience ¹
DOMAINS FRAMES	– Intuitive approach; Corpus linguistics; Lexical approach; Framenet

MENTAL SPACES	– Discourse analysis; Computational modeling – Psycholinguistics; Neuroscience

¹ An anonymous reviewer remarked that the intuitive approach is commonly used in identifying image schemas. True, but this practice could probably be subjected to the same criticism as the intuitive approach to identifying linguistic and conceptual metaphors.

What lends significance to these pairings of levels and methods is threefold: First, there is no single approach that can be used to study all levels of metaphor. Second, several distinct approaches can be used to study the same

level(s), but they can contribute complementary insights to it/them. Third, certain approaches may be better-fitted to study a particular level than others.

In sum, there should not be rivalry between the various approaches, since they all have different insights to contribute to the field. The real challenge is to see how the different levels work together and to design programs to study the entirety of metaphor use with the help of the many distinct methodologies that are most appropriate for particular levels.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Conceptualizers derive their metaphors from four large types of experience: the situational, discourse, conceptual-cognitive, and bodily contexts. The four context types and the contextual factors belonging to them prime conceptualizers to choose their metaphors in discourse. The priming effect can take place only if the conceptualizers (both speaker and hearer) can build the appropriate conceptual pathway between the intended target-domain meaning and the particular experiential content that is primed.

This view extends the study of metaphor beyond those cases that are body-based in the usual sense in conceptual metaphor theory (i.e., correlations between sensorimotor experience and abstract ideas). The metaphors based on the situational, the discourse, the conceptual-cognitive context, together with the bodily one that involves unique features of individual bodies may represent the majority of cases of metaphor use in natural communicative situations.

Finally, I proposed a multi-level view of metaphor in which the levels range from the most schematic level of image schemas to the least schematic one of mental spaces. The context influences the most specific level of conceptualization, the level of mental spaces. Such a multi-level view has implications for methodology in studying metaphors. We can probably suggest that each level can be approached by a different method or set of methods and that there is not one single methodology that works “best” for all the levels. The study of metaphor is most successful if we approach all the levels by the methods that work best for each.

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STRESZCZENIE

Teoria metafory pojęciowej – nowe propozycje

1. WPROWADZENIE

W nowszych pracach z zakresu metafory pojęciowej Zoltan Kövecses (2010a, 2010b, 2015a, 2017) proponuje dwukierunkowe rozszerzenie tej teorii przez: (a) dowartościowanie roli kontekstu w tworzeniu i stosowaniu metafor w dyskursie oraz (b) uwzględnienie hierarchii co najmniej czterech poziomów systemu pojęciowego i powiązanie z nimi wyboru różnych metod badań nad metaforą.

2. METAFORA W UJĘCIU KONTEKSTOWYM

Warunkami wstępnymi utworzenia wyrażenia metaforycznego w dyskursie są co najmniej cztery rodzaje procesów kognitywnych:

1. Operacje poznawcze/konstruujące (interpretacyjne), spośród których nadawca wybiera metaforę jako narzędzie tworzenia sensu.
2. Różne rodzaje kontekstu, które dostarczają mówiącemu licznych informacji i wiedzy konkurujących o jego uwagę.
3. Torowanie kontekstowe, czyli wyprzedzające przygotowanie nadawcy do użycia takiego wyrażenia metaforycznego, które pasuje do najwyrazistszego czynnika kontekstowego.
4. Ścieżki konceptualne, dzięki którym wybrane wyrażenie metaforyczne ma znaczenie zgodne z zamierzoną intencją komunikacyjną mówiącego.

2.1. OPERACJE KONSTRUUJĄCE (INTERPRETACYJNE)

Mówiący ma w danym kontekście do swej dyspozycji różne operacje konstruowania sceny, m. in. schematyzację/abstrakcję (schematy wyobrazeniowe), ogniskowanie uwagi (figura – tło; zakres uwagi; dopasowanie skalarne – konceptualizację drobnoziarnistą lub gruboziarnistą; uwagę dynamiczną i statyczną – skanowanie sekwencyjne i sumaryczne, w tym ruch fikcyjny), wyznaczanie pozycji/istotności (profil – baza; trajektor – landmark), przyjmowanie perspektywy (punkt widzenia; subiektywność – obiektywność) oraz posługiwanie się metonimią lub metaforą, operowanie przestrzeniami mentalnymi i integrację pojęciową. Spośród tych możliwości wybiera metaforę.

2.2. KATEGORIE, TYPY I RODZAJE KONTEKSTU

Użycie metafory w dyskursie zależy od wielu czynników kontekstowych, które można podzielić na cztery główne kategorie (i ich typy). Należą do nich:

1. Kontekst sytuacyjny, który obejmuje otoczenie fizyczne, sytuację społeczną i kontekst kulturowy.
2. Kontekst dyskursu, który zawiera dyskurs otaczający, wcześniejsze dyskursy na dany temat oraz dominujące formy dyskursu i intertekstualność.
3. Kontekst pojęciowo-poznawczy, w którym mieszczą się: metaforyczny system pojęciowy, wiedza o składnikach dyskursu, ideologia, wiedza o minionych zdarzeniach oraz zainteresowania i obawy.
4. Kontekst cielesny uwzględniający sensoryczno-motoryczne doświadczenie.

2.3. TOROWANIE KONTEKSTOWE

Różne czynniki kontekstowe mogą motywować, uruchamiać, ułatwiać lub kształtować użycie danej metafory w dyskursie, czyli torować drogę dla tej metafory – jako spójnej z danym kontekstem. Van Dijk (2009) wprowadza pojęcie „modelu kontekstu”, czyli reprezentacji sytuacji komunikacyjnej w umyśle konceptualizatora. Składnikami tego (wyidealizowanego) modelu sytuacji, w której zachodzi komunikacja, są: Sceneria (czas, lokalizacja, okoliczności, rekwizyty) oraz Wydarzenie, które obejmuje Aktorów (jednostki lub grupy) i Działania/Zachowania. Można te elementy powiązać ze wskazanymi wyżej różnorodnymi typami czynników kontekstowych. Ponieważ obejmują one ogromną ilość informacji, mówiący musi wybrać spośród nich takie, które ukierunkują stworzenie przez niego metafory. Decydujące wydaje się uwzględnienie przez niego określonego znaczenia domeny docelowej, które chce on wyrazić w danej sytuacji komunikacyjnej. Mając na uwadze to znaczenie docelowe, uruchamia on w doświadczeniowej zawartości swego modelu kontekstu właściwe przeniesienia z domeny źródłowej do docelowej.

Jako przykład takiego kontekstowego torowania może posłużyć przeprowadzona przez Semino (2008) analiza metafory zastosowanej w relacji ze spotkania członków grupy G8 w Szkocji w 2005 roku, odbywającego się równoległe z koncertem rockowego zespołu Live 8. Wyrażając negatywną ocenę nikłych skutków spotkania G8, jego komentator stwierdził, że po „ryku” wywołanym przez koncert Live 8, grupa G8 wydała z siebie jedynie „szep” (after „the roar” produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered „a whisper”). Określenie „ryk” może być niemetaforycznym opisem dźwięków wydawanych przez tłum podczas koncertu, ale użycie „szepu” w odniesieniu do spotkania na szczycie to jednoznacznie (negatywny) metaforyczny opis wyniku dyskusji oddany nazwą dźwięku pozbawionego głośności. Zatem kontrast w zakresie głośności pomiędzy dźwiękami określanymi jako „ryk” i „szep” został metaforycznie wykorzystany do przeciwstawienia sobie siły uczuć i zaangażowania wyrażanych przez publiczność koncertową oraz braku determinacji i skuteczności liderów grupy G8. Zdaniem Kövecsesa, metafora szepu wyłania się tu z fizyczno-(społeczny) kontekstu, bo oryginalny konceptualizator, relacjonujący oba zdarzenia, wybiera z całego dostępnego mu bogactwa kontekstowego percepcyjną cechę kontekstu fizycznego (głośność koncertu i porównywalnie ciche spotkanie na szczycie), aby wyrazić zamierzone znaczenie.

2.4. ŚCIEŻKI KONCEPTUALNE

‘Szep’ oraz ‘brak determinacji i skuteczności’ wydają się odległymi od siebie pojęciami. Jednak, zdaniem Zoltana Kövecsesa, metafora szepu została tu wybrana spośród wielu możliwych, ponieważ znaczenie ‘brak determinacji’ (jako domena docelowa) daje się przez nią wyrazić dzięki temu, że można zbudować ścieżkę konceptualną (utworzoną z kilku metafor i metonimii pojęciowych) łączącą obydwie znaczenia: ‘szepu’ i ‘braku determinacji’. Taką niezbędną ścieżkę tworzą w tym przypadku następujące metafory i metonimie pojęciowe: INTENSYWNOŚĆ TO SIŁA SKUTKÓW, REAKCJE EMOCJONALNE ZA EMOCJE, GNIEWNE ZACHOWANIE ZA GNIEW/SPÓR ORAZ EMOCJA ZA DETERMINACJĘ DO DZIAŁANIA. Szczególnie ważna jest tu metafora INTENSYWNOŚĆ TO SIŁA SKUTKÓW, bo stanowi ona łącznik między stopniem głośności zachowań mownych a siłą determinacji do działania. W ten sposób w danej sytuacji nadawca wybiera spośród wielu dostępnych opcji określony rodzaj informacji (czy treści doświadczeniowych) i daną metaforę uzasadnioną kontekstowo (tu „szep” – *whisper*).

3. WIELOPOZIOMOWE SPOJRZENIE NA METAFORY POJĘCIOWE

Metafory pojęciowe pojawiają się na czterech różnych poziomach schematyczności: od najbardziej abstrakcyjnych schematów wyobrażeniowych przez domeny i ramy, które łącznie stanowią część pamięci semantycznej, po przestrzenie mentalne będące indywidualnymi reprezentacjami dyskursu tworzonymi na żywo i obejmującymi konkretne metafory pojęciowe uzależnione od czynników kontekstowych.

W omawianym wyżej przykładzie konceptualizator spotkania grupy G8 konstruuje sytuację w przestrzeni mentalnej WARTOŚCIOWANIA przez metaforę „szepu”, która z kolei opiera się na metaforze wyższego poziomu: INTENSYWNOŚĆ TO SIŁA SKUTKÓW, łączącej się z wieloma innymi metaforami

i metonimiami pojęciowymi. Metafora językowa wyłania się zatem jako rezultat wpływu sytuacji percepcyjnej na jej konceptualizację w trakcie dokonywanej na żywo reprezentacji zdarzeń, czyli na poziomie przestrzeni mentalnych.

Istnieje co najmniej kilka różnych podejść do badań nad metaforą pojęciową, które można powiązać z różnymi poziomami metafory i uznać za wzajemnie się dopełniające:

SCHEMATY WYOBRAŻENIOWE – eksperymenty psycholingwistyczne¹ i neurobiologiczne²

DOMENY – podejście intuicyjne³, badania korpusowe⁴, podejście leksykalne⁵ i badania w rodzaju Framenet⁶

PRZESTRZENIE MENTALNE – analiza dyskursu⁷, modelowanie komputerowe⁸
– psycholingwistyka i neurobiologia

4. WNIOSKI

Konceptualizatorzy tworzą metafory, korzystając z czterech typów doświadczenia: sytuacyjnego, dyskursywnego, pojęciowo-poznawczego i cielesnego. Czynniki kontekstowe przygotowują mówiącego do wyboru danej metafory w dyskursie, ale efekt torowania zachodzi tylko wtedy, gdy konceptualizator (zarówno nadawca, jak i odbiorca) jest w stanie zbudować właściwą ścieżkę konceptualną pomiędzy zamierzonym znaczeniem w domenie docelowej a określoną treścią doświadczeniową. Dlatego badanie metafor pojęciowych nie powinno się ograniczać do tego, co ucieleśnione (korelacji między doświadczeniem sensoryczno-motorycznym a pojęciami abstrakcyjnymi).

Wielopoziomowe spojrzenie na metaforę – od najbardziej abstrakcyjnego poziomu schematów wyobrażeniowych po najniższy poziom przestrzeni mentalnych, uwarunkowanych kontekstowo – uzasadnia, że każdy z poziomów można badać różnymi metodami i nie ma metodologii dobrej dla wszystkich poziomów równocześnie, a najlepsze efekty przynosi analiza prowadzona metodami najważniejszymi dla każdego z tych poziomów.

Streszczenie przygotowała Agnieszka Mikotańczuk

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- ¹ Np. Gibbs (1994, 2006), Gibbs & Colston (2012), Boroditsky (2001), Casasanto (2009).
- ² Np. Gallese & Lakoff (2005), zob. Coulson (2008).
- ³ Np. Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999).
- ⁴ Np. Charteris-Black (2010), Deignan (2005), Stefanowitsch (2006).
- ⁵ Kövecses (2015b).
- ⁶ Np. Sullivan (2013).
- ⁷ Musolff (2006), Cameron (2003), Semino (2008).
- ⁸ Np. Narayanan (1999), Feldman (2006).

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